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TRIBAL TOOLS & LEGAL LEVERS 
FOR HALTING FOSSIL FUEL TRANSPORT & 
EXPORTS THROUGH THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 
 
 
Mary Christina Wood, Anna Elza Brady, & Brendan 
Keenan Jr. 1 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
Every day in the Pacific Northwest, untold volumes of fossil 
fuels pass through tribal geographies en route to foreign and 
domestic markets. Coal and oil trains rumble across Indian 
reservations and through ceded territories. Pipelines pump oil and 
natural gas over ancestral homelands to export terminals in treaty 
fishing waters. Trucks roll down highways carrying volatile 
materials or heavy equipment used for drilling, sometimes travelling 
on narrow roads perilously close to salmon streams that Native 
people have stewarded for millennia.  
The transport of toxic fossil fuels through traditional tribal 
territories poses numerous threats to Native communities as well as 
their non-Native neighbors. Oil spills, explosions, water 
contamination, and particulate drift are among the most obvious and
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immediate burdens of risk.2 Transport of fossil fuels for ultimate 
combustion as sources of energy also exacerbates the long-range 
hazards of climate change. Inundation of coastal Native villages3 
and changing harvest cycles of First Foods4 are two of the many 
forms of damage that tribes already experience on the frontlines of 
the global climate crisis. As sea level continues to rise, extinction 
rates accelerate, and climate systems grow increasingly erratic, 
halting fossil fuel transport becomes ever more crucial to the long-
term viability of life on Earth. 
Tribes are responding with remarkable leadership in the face 
of climate change and the daily direct risks posed by such fossil fuel 
transport and export. As the original sovereigns of this continent, 
tribes possess an array of distinct legal tools, which they are 
successfully deploying to halt fossil fuel infrastructure in its tracks. 
Innovating sophisticated legal strategies, tribes are filling a vacuum 
left by the failure of mainstream political leaders to meaningfully 
address climate change. Through both cultural practices and 
political diplomacy, native nations and grassroots indigenous 
communities now lead the resistance to fossil fuels and the shift to 
carbon-neutral economies.  
Pacific Northwest tribes play a particularly important role in 
such a shift because of the region’s position as the portal—or 
barricade—in the fossil fuel supply chain. The Pacific Northwest is 
renowned for its lush temperate forests, pristine waterways, and 
vibrant fisheries, all of which have sustained indigenous human 
communities for thousands of years. But more recently, the region’s 
geographic location has become a prominent draw in a global 
market distribution scheme for fossil fuels. The Pacific Northwest 
lies poised between major fossil fuel deposits to the east in interior 
North America, and voracious Asian energy markets west across the 
Pacific Ocean.5 In order for natural gas from the Uintah Basin or oil 
from North Dakota to reach power plants in Beijing or drivers in 
Taipei through the most direct route, those fossil fuels must pass 
                                                
2 See infra Section II. 
3 Ashley Ahearn, “Washington Tribe Confronts Climate Change, Sea Level 
Rise,” KUOW, Dec. 2, 2015: http://kuow.org/post/washington-tribe-confronts-
climate-change-sea-level-rise 
4 See “Climate Change,” Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission website: 
http://www.critfc.org/fish-and-watersheds/climate/. 
5 Sightline Institute, “The Thin Green Line”: 
http://www.sightline.org/research/thin-green-line/. 
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through Oregon, Washington, or British Columbia and then across 
the Pacific Ocean. The two leading countries caught in this pan-
Pacific fossil fuel web also happen to be the world’s top emitters of 
carbon dioxide: together the U.S. and China were responsible for 
spewing 44% of total global emissions in 2014.6 Positioned as an 
economic valve between these two single greatest contributors to the 
global climate crisis, giving this damp and sparsely populated region 
known as the Pacific Northwest holds substantial leverage over the 
world’s total amount of carbon emissions.7 Tribal sovereigns of the 
Pacific Northwest are now using this leverage to block the disastrous 
flow of fossil fuels. 
Fossil fuel transport and export schemes rely on a panoply 
of permits, and denial of just one layer of authorization can halt a 
project. Due to the variety of jurisdictions through which transport 
projects must pass, permitting processes often involve a matrix of 
regulations. Between federal, state, and local jurisdictions, a dozen 
or more permits are often necessary in order to ship fuels 
domestically and export them overseas. A single denial at any level 
can prevent a fossil fuel transport or export project from proceeding. 
Permitting authorities exercise discretion at every turn. 
As sovereign nations, tribes wield potent legal prerogatives 
that can directly affect these proposed fossil fuel infrastructure 
projects. This Article examines and catalogs the array of legal levers 
available to tribes to halt fossil fuel infrastructure and assert 
authority as co-trustees of essential natural resources. Section II of 
this Article surveys the context of urgency that motivates tribes to 
act. It discusses both the long-range and immediate threats of fossil 
fuel infrastructure to tribal communities and describes the rising 
movement of indigenous environmental leadership regionally and 
nationally. It then sets forth the legal posture of proposed projects in 
the Northwest. Because the legal tools available to tribes differ on 
and off reservation, the array and efficacy of legal levers will vary 
according to the physical geography and political boundaries 
through which a given transport project proposes to pass. Section III 
                                                
6 International Energy Agency, “CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion 
Highlights,” Dec. 2016: 
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/CO2Emissionsfro
mFuelCombustion_Highlights_2016.pdf. 
7 See Eric de Place, “Northwest Fossil Fuel Exports,” SIGHTLINE INSTITUTE, 
Sept. 2014: http://www.sightline.org/research_item/northwest-fossil-fuel-
exports-2/. 
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delves into on-reservation regulatory and property law mechanisms 
with a specific look at the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ recently revised 
right-of-way easement regulations. Section IV explores potent 
Indian law doctrines that extend off the reservations: the federal 
Indian trust responsibility and tribal treaty rights.8 Significantly, the 
trust responsibility functions as both the federal government’s duty 
of trusteeship over tribal property as well as its duty of care and 
protection towards tribes when federal actions taken off the 
reservations affect tribal interests. Throughout, this Article presents 
case studies of tribes successfully asserting sovereign legal 
prerogatives to stop fossil fuel transport and export at all 
jurisdictional levels—federal, state, and local.  
Through their pursuit of legal remedies to protect their 
people and resources against transport and export proposals, and by 
issuing multiple clear resolutions opposing fossil fuel infrastructure 
projects as a whole throughout the region, tribes are leading a 
necessary shift toward decarbonizing the global economy—a 
measure deemed essential by leading scientists to prevent 
unmitigated climate disaster and runaway heating.9 Their assertion 
of climate leadership at this crucial hour announces the position of 
Native Nations as rightful sovereign co-trustees of planet Earth. This 
Article aims to support tribes in this ground-up effort—an effort 
which, in its broadest sense, endeavors to replace fossil-fueled 
                                                
8 For a general discussion of treaty language in the context of climate change, 
see Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, Everything Old is New Again: Enforcing 
Tribal Treaty Provisions to Protect Climate Change Threatened Resources, 
(Aug. 28, 2015) (unpublished working paper): 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2652954. By contrast, this 
article focuses on tribal efforts to use treaty language to stop specific fossil fuel 
projects. 
9 See James Hansen, et al., “Assessing ‘Dangerous Climate Change’: Required 
Reduction of Carbon Emissions to Protect Young People, Future Generations 
and Nature,” 8 PLOS One 1, Dec. 3, 2013 [hereinafter “Climate Prescription”]: 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0081648. The goal of decarbonization 
involves economic and feasibility analysis well outside the scope and purpose of 
this article. For an in-depth analysis, see Deep Decarbonization Pathways 
Project: http://deepdecarbonization.org. It should also be noted that 
decarbonization (arriving at zero emissions by 2050) is not even alone sufficient 
at this point to prevent global climate catastrophe.  Scientists emphasize the 
need for “negative emissions,” i.e. drawing down the excess carbon dioxide 
from the atmosphere currently heating the planet (and causing present calamities 
such as superstorms, massive floods, droughts, fires, and heat waves).  In other 
words, there must be a cleanup of excess carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.  
See Hansen et al, id.  For natural methods to draw down carbon using soil 
sequestration techniques, see Bronson W. Griscom, et al., Natural Climate 
Solutions, PNAS (2017): http://www.pnas.org/content/114/44/11645.  
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colonialism with a future that is just, healthful, and sustainable for 
all people and all beings.  
 
II.   CULTURES AND CLIMATE: CONTEXTUALIZING THE CRISIS 
 
Virtually every square mile of the Pacific Northwest is the 
aboriginal territory of numerous Native tribes who have inhabited 
these lands since time immemorial. Original tribal rights overlay and 
extend across the entire region. Recognized in exchange for cession 
of vast aboriginal tribal territories, these enduring rights remain 
memorialized in solemn treaty promises and other legal agreements. 
They affirmatively obligate federal and state co-sovereigns to 
uphold tribal interests in ancestral lands and resources. Fossil fuel 
transport and export infrastructure pose grave threats to these 
longstanding rights.  
Such projects include all forms of infrastructure used to 
move hydrocarbon-rich materials across distances—including oil 
and natural gas pipelines, coal and oil trains, and export terminals 
that process and load these fuels (as well as their refined derivatives 
such as xylene). Transportation of such hazardous substances poses 
both imminent and long-range dangers. Climate disruption presents 
an existential threat to Humanity as a whole, but tribes feel 
immediate and worsening impacts within their traditional territories.  
This Section beings with an overview of both the climate 
threats and the localized, acute, and immediate dangers posed by 
fossil fuel projects. It concludes with a brief survey of the legal and 
administrative hurdles that proposed fossil fuel projects must clear 
in order to operate. As the discussion shows, there are many entry 
points for tribes to assert their sovereign prerogatives to arrest the 
flow of fossil fuels across tribal geographies—both reservations and 
ceded lands subject to reserved rights.  
 
A.   The Climate Emergency 
 
In September, 2018, the Secretary General of the United 
Nations issued a warning that the world must begin rapid, deep 
emissions cuts by 2020 to avert runaway climate change.10 A year 
                                                
10  World Must Act By 2020 to Avoid Runaway Climate Change: UN Chief, 
PHYS.ORG, Sep. 11, 2018: https://phys.org/news/2018-09-world-runaway-
climate-chief.html#jCp. 
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earlier, in 2017, the former United Nations climate chief, Christiana 
Figueres, joined sixty scientists, policy leaders, and economists to 
author a comment in the scientific journal Nature calling for deep 
decarbonization and aggressive reduction of fossil fuel usage, 
warning, “If we delay, the conditions for human prosperity will be 
severely curtailed.”11 Yet U.S. President Donald Trump has stated 
his intention to develop $50 trillion worth of domestic fossil fuels, 
including shale, oil, coal, and natural gas.12  
The law has never encountered a threat as pervasive, grave, 
and urgent as the present climate crisis. Scientists warn that carbon 
dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gas emissions place Earth in 
“imminent peril”—on the verge of an irreversible tipping point that 
would impose catastrophic conditions on generations of humanity 
to come.13 As described by Dr. James Hansen, formerly the chief 
climate scientist of the United States at NASA’s Goddard Institute 
of Space Studies, continued carbon pollution will “transform the 
planet.”14 Experts predict that floods, hurricanes, killer heat waves, 
fires, disease, crop losses, food shortages, and droughts will arrive 
with far greater magnitude and regularity.15 Rising sea levels would 
inundate coastal areas worldwide and trigger desperate mass human 
migrations.16 In May 2010, two separate groups of scientists 
published papers warning that the melting of the Western Antarctic 
ice sheet is now unstoppable, set to cause an inevitable sea level rise 
                                                
11 Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Turning the Climate Tide by 
2020, SCIENCE DAILY, June 28, 2017: 
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2017/06/170628144848.htm; Christiana 
Figueres, Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, Gail Whiteman, et al., Three Years to 
Safeguard Our Climate, NATURE, June 28, 2017: 
https://www.nature.com/news/three-years-to-safeguard-our-climate-1.22201. 
12 Michael Bastach, ‘Untapped Energy’: Trump Promises a $50 Trillion 
Economic Stimulus, THE DAILY CALLER, Sept. 23, 2016: 
http://dailycaller.com/2016/09/23/untapped-energy-trump-promises-a-50-
trillion-economic-stimulus/. 
13 See generally FRED PEARCE, WITH SPEED AND VIOLENCE: WHY SCIENTISTS 
FEAR TIPPING POINTS IN CLIMATE CHANGE xxiv-xxvi (2007) (describing 
“unstoppable planetary forces” and the end of climatic stability). 
14 Jim Hansen, The Threat to the Planet, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS, July 13, 2006: 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2006/jul/13/the-threat-to-the-planet/. 
15 See generally “Climate Change Impacts In the United States, U.S. National 
Climate Assessment 4” (2014) [hereinafter “Climate Change Impacts Report”]: 
http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/highlights/overview/overview. 
16 Koko Warner, et al., “In Search of Shelter: Mapping the Effects of Climate 
Change on Human Migration and Displacement” iv, 2 (2009): 
http://ciesin.columbia.edu/documents/clim-migr-report-june09_media.pdf. 
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of at least ten feet in coming centuries.17 They warn that most of the 
world’s coastal cities will have to be abandoned—and Louisiana’s 
state government is already crafting a plan to do just that, 
depopulating its coastal zone.18  
While some climate dynamics will unfold over longer time 
spans, it is no longer possible to assume that severe threats are 
postponed for future generations. Earth has already warmed about 
0.8° Celsius over the past century.21 A report of the U.S. Global 
Climate Change Research Program states unequivocally: “Climate 
change, once considered an issue for a distant future, has moved 
firmly into the present . . . . Precipitation patterns are changing, sea 
level is rising, the oceans are becoming more acidic, and the 
frequency and intensity of some extreme weather events are 
increasing.”22 Though climate disruption affects different parts of 
Earth in different ways—from droughts to floods to superstorms—
no part of Earth is safe from global heating.23 Climate crisis presents 
a clear and present danger, threatening the basic habitability of the 
planet for humans and other species.24 As Dr. Hansen and other 
scientists stated in an amicus brief supporting youth plaintiffs in a 
case challenging government’s fossil fuel policy, “[F]ailure to act 
with all deliberate speed in the face of the clear scientific evidence 
of the danger functionally becomes a decision to eliminate the 
option of preserving a habitable climate system.”25  
As elaborated below, the combustion of fossil fuels largely 
                                                
17 Justin Gillis & Kenneth Chang, “Scientists Warn of Rising Oceans from Polar 
Melt, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2014: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/13/science/earth/collapse-of-parts-of-west-
antarctica-ice-sheet-has-begun-scientists-say.html. 
18 Id. For the Louisiana plan, see Christopher Flavelle, Louisiana, Sinking Fast, 
Prepares to Empty Out Its Coastal Plain, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 22, 2017: 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-22/louisiana-sinking-fast-
prepares-to-empty-out-its-coastal-plain. 
21 “Climate Prescription,” supra note 9, at 4. To provide context, the Earth has 
not been this warm in over 125,000 years. See Doyle Rice, “The Last Time the 
Earth Was This Warm Was 125,000 Years Ago,” U.S.A. TODAY, Jan. 18, 2017: 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/weather/2017/01/18/hottest-year-on-
record/96713338/. 
22 “Climate Change Impacts Report,” supra note 15, at 1. 
23 See id. at 7-10. 
24 Brief for Dr. James Hansen as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-
Appellants at 7-8, Alec L. v. Jackson, No. 4:11-cv-02203-EMC, 2011 WL 
8583134 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2011): 
http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/Hansen%20Amicus%20.pdf. 
25 Id. at 7 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
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drives the global climate crisis.26 “Fossil fuel” is an umbrella term 
used to describe a variety of hydrocarbon-rich geologic deposits 
derived from decayed organic materials such as ancient plants and 
animals, which were buried underground and transformed over eons 
into highly combustible sources of energy. 27 Common fossil fuels 
include coal, natural gas, and petroleum, which takes the form of oil, 
or can be refined into derivatives such as gasoline and diesel fuels. 
Fossil fuels power much of the world’s transportation and electrical 
grids. These valuable, common—yet dangerous—substances are 
extracted from the Earth’s crust through an array of mining methods 
including pumping, strip and pit mining, and hydraulic fracturing, 
also known as “fracking.” New technologies have enabled the 
extraction of fossil fuels from dispersed geologic formations such as 
oil shale and tar sands, the development of which was economically 
prohibitive, until recently. Major North American fossil fuel 
deposits transported and exported through the Pacific Northwest 
include: oil from the Bakken formation in western North Dakota; 
coal and coalbed methane from the Powder River Basin of Montana 
and Wyoming; natural gas from eastern Utah and western Colorado; 
and tar sands from Alberta, Canada.  
The causal relationship between the combustion of fossil 
fuels and climate change has been exhaustively documented and 
empirically proven.28 Burning of fossil fuels accounted for 93.7% of 
all CO2 emitted within the United States in 2014, with CO2 
accounting for 80.9% of total domestic greenhouse gas emissions.29 
The International Energy Agency reports that, in 2015, the United 
States was responsible for 16% of total global CO2 emissions, 
second only to China, which is itself a target market for American 
                                                
26 See “Climate Change,” UNITED NATIONS: 
http://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/climate-change/.  There are other 
significant factors as well, such as methane from concentrated animal 
operations, but these causes are beyond the scope of this article. 
27 “Fossil Fuel,” SCIENCE DAILY: 
https://www.sciencedaily.com/terms/fossil_fuel.htm. 
28 See, e.g., Environmental Protection Agency, “Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2014,” Executive Summary, Apr. 2016: 
https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-
04/documents/us-ghg-inventory-2016-chapter-executive-summary.pdf. 
29 Id. at ES-8-9. According to the EPA, fossil fuel combustion has generated 
76% of all U.S. greenhouse gas emissions since 1990. Id. at ES-9. 
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fossil fuel exports.30 In 2007 the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly 
noted, “[t]he EPA does not dispute the existence of a causal 
connection between manmade greenhouse gas emissions and global 
warming.”31 The Court further found, “The harms associated with 
climate change are serious and well-recognized.”32 While other 
sources of GHG pollution (such as methane from landfills and 
concentrated feed lots and emissions from deforestation) must also 
be addressed, preventing or minimizing fossil fuel extraction and 
combustion remains an urgent step humans must take to address 
global climate change.33 
As the original sovereigns of this continent, tribes are both 
uniquely impacted by, and uniquely positioned to address, global 
climate change.34 Tribal sovereignty and indigenous cultures are 
fundamentally tied to ancestral homelands and natural resources 
endemic to traditional territories.35 Tribal wellbeing remains in 
many ways contingent on the health of biological communities, 
which sustain traditional subsistence gathering and Native spiritual 
practices, as well as modern economic livelihoods. Courts have 
recognized, for example, that salmon—threatened by climate 
change- provide a key component of Pacific Northwest tribal diets, 
cultural identity, and economic livelihoods.36 By upsetting natural 
balances and triggering unforeseeable cascading effects, climate 
change unravels the biological systems upon which tribes rely. In 
                                                
30 International Energy Agency, “CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion 
Highlights,” at 12, Dec. 2016: 
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/CO2Emissionsfro
mFuelCombustion_Highlights_2016.pdf. 
31 Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 523 (2007). 
32 Id. at 521. 
33 See Climate Prescription, supra note 9, at 9-12. Scientists also emphasize that 
decarbonization (reducing CO2 emissions to zero by 2015) is not alone enough 
to stave off climate catastrophe because the atmosphere has excess carbon 
already driving the current climate disasters. Drawing carbon out of the 
atmosphere through natural climate solutions will also be necessary, as a 
cleanup of the atmosphere. Id. 
34 See Rebecca Tsosie, “Indigenous People and Environmental Justice: The 
Impact of Climate Change,” 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1625 (2007); Randall S. Abate 
& Elizabeth Ann Kronk, “Commonality Among Unique Indigenous 
Communities: An Introduction to Climate Change and Its Impacts on Indigenous 
Peoples,” 26 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 179 (2013).  
35 Mary Christina Wood & Zach Welcker, “Tribes as Trustees Again (Part 1): 
The Emerging Tribal Role in the Conservation Trust Movement,” 32 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 373, 375 (2008). 
36 U.S. v. Washington, 827 F.3d 836, 845 (9th Cir. 2016).  
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the Pacific Northwest, many tribal communities and reservations are 
located in low-lying areas adjacent to the sea and are suffering 
impacts of sea level rise.37 The region is also already reeling from 
climate impacts such as extreme wildfires, flooding, loss of 
snowpack, and ocean acidification. 38 
Under the public trust doctrine, first articulated in Roman 
law and long recognized by the United States Supreme Court,39 the 
states and federal government have a firm fiduciary responsibility to 
steward natural assets in trust for present and future generations as 
beneficiaries.40 Tribes have an important role to play in this trust 
framework as well.41 As the first sovereigns of this continent, tribes 
remain the original trustees of the entire natural res (trust 
endowment) now imperiled by escalating climate chaos. Landmark 
treaty fishing rights decisions rendered by Judges Boldt and Belloni 
more than four decades ago recognized Pacific Northwest tribes as 
co-tenants of shared fisheries.42 Native nations are uniquely well-
situated to assert standing as co-tenants and co-trustees of the shared 
atmosphere as well, to prevent further climate violence to their 
peoples and, indeed, all people.43  
 
B.   Direct Threats of Fossil Fuel Transport on Tribes 
 
Beyond systemic damage and threatened societal collapse 
from climate change, fossil fuel infrastructure carries enormous 
                                                
37 See Jessica A. Knoblauch, Climate Change Forces Quinault Tribe to Seek 
Higher Ground, EARTHJUSTICE, Mar. 12, 2018: 
https://earthjustice.org/blog/2018-march/climate-change-forces-the-quinault-
tribe-to-seek-higher-ground. 
38 Union of Concerned Scientists, Confronting Climate Change in Oregon 
(2015): https://www.ucsusa.org/global-warming/regional-information/california-
and-western-states/confronting-climate-change-in-oregon#.W7lHpVJRf-Y 
39 See J. INST., 2.1.1 (T Sandars trans. 4th ed. 1867) (“By the law of nature these 
things are common to mankind-the air, running water, the sea, and consequently 
the shores of the sea.”); Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 
(1892) (“The state can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the 
whole people are interested, like navigable waters and soils under them . . . than 
it can abdicate its police powers in the administration of government and the 
preservation of the peace.”). 
40 See MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR A 
NEW ECOLOGICAL AGE, Cambridge U. Press: New York (2013). 
41 Mary Christina Wood, “Tribal Trustees in Climate Crisis,” 2 AM. IND. L. J. 2 
518 (2014). 
42 Id. at 543. 
43 Id. at 545.  
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harm to nearby tribal communities—through toxic effluent releases, 
damaged air quality, desecration of cultural and spiritual sites, and 
interference with treaty fishing rights.44 These climate harms 
perpetuate the profound assaults of industrial incursion that have 
persisted since first contact.45 
Oil spills are among the most serious and common acute 
dangers of fossil fuel transport. According to the Pipeline and 
Hazardous Material Safety Administration, 633 pipeline leaks and 
explosions occurred in the United States in 2016, averaging 1.7 
pipeline incidents per day.46 These incidents caused 16 deaths, 87 
injuries, and more than $321 million in clean-up costs.47 Pipeline 
ruptures are considered inevitable over time and can present serious 
catastrophes.48  
Shipping oil by train poses hazards as well. The 2016 
derailment and oil spill at Mosier, Oregon presented a vivid and 
sobering example of dangerous “bomb trains.” On June 3, 2016, 
sixteen cars in a 96-car train carrying crude oil derailed beside the 
Columbia River.49 Several train cars ruptured and exploded, 
releasing 47,000 gallons of oil into the air, soil, and nearby 
                                                
44 See “Environmental Effects Of Oil Spill,” ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION 
CENTERS: https://www.environmentalpollutioncenters.org/oil-spill/effects/oil; 
Zak Cheney Rice, An Oil Spill Is Threatening Native American Lands-And No 
One Is Paying Attention, BUSINESS INSIDER, Jun. 8, 2016: 
https://www.businessinsider.com/an-oil-spill-is-threatening-native-american-
lands-in-oregon-2016-6; Maki Somosot, Indian Tribe Suing Companies For Oil 
Spill Damages, HOUMATODAY.COM, Oct. 10, 2015: 
http://www.houmatoday.com/news/20151010/indian-tribe-suing-companies-for-
oil-spill-damages. 
45 See Dobson, Darren, “Manifest Destiny and the Environmental Impacts of 
Westward Expansion,” Flinders Journal of History and Politics, Vol. 29 2013: 
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/81291419.pdf. 
46 “Pipeline Incident 20 Year Trends,” Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety 
Administration: http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/library/data-
stats/pipelineincidenttrends. 
47 Id. 
48 See James Conca, Pick Your Poison For Crude—Pipeline, Rail, Truck or 
Boat, FORBES, Apr. 26, 2014: 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2014/04/26/pick-your-poison-for-
crude-pipeline-rail-truck-or-boat/#789368fb17ac..  
49 “Mosier UPRR Derailment,” Oregon Department of Environmental Quality, 
updated Jan. 26, 2017: 
http://www.deq.state.or.us/Webdocs/Forms/Output/FPController.ashx?SourceId
Type=11&SourceId=6115. 
 260 
wastewater system.50 Nearly 3,000 tons of contaminated soil have 
since been removed from the spill site.51 Upon investigation, the 
Federal Railroad Administration made a preliminary finding that 
“Union Pacific’s failure to maintain its track and track equipment 
resulted in the derailment.”52 Six months after the spill, the cost of 
cleanup at the Mosier site had reached nearly $9 million.53 The 
Umatilla, Yakama, Warm Springs, and Nez Perce Tribes all retain 
and exercise treaty fishing rights within the portion of the Columbia 
where the Union Pacific spill occurred. Images of burning train cars 
sending a plume of black smoke skyward confirmed tribes’ concerns 
about transporting fossil fuels through the Columbia River Gorge.54 
As JoDe Goudy, Chairman of the Yakama National Tribal Council, 
remarked, “The oil train derailment threatens our very way of life. 
The oil seeping into the Columbia is a reminder that these accidents 
will happen . . . .”55 
Water contamination from oil spills or other fossil fuel leaks 
can harm the health of tribal members where domestic water 
supplies have become contaminated. Studies show that exposure to 
oil through contamination causes problems in human reproductive 
health, and the chemicals used in oil cleanup operations are linked 
to certain kinds of cancer.56 Destruction of local cultural resources 
due to oil contamination measurably intensifies rates of depression 
and other mental and emotional health conditions in affected 
                                                
50 Lauren Dake, “Mosier’s Derailment Costs Adding Up,” THE COLUMBIAN, 
Dec. 1, 2016: http://www.columbian.com/news/2016/dec/01/mosier-
derailments-costs-near-9-million/. 
51 “Mosier Oil Train Derailment,” EPA: 
https://response.epa.gov/site/site_profile.aspx?site_id=11637. 
52 “Preliminary Factual Findings Report,” Federal Railroad Administration, 2-4, 
June 23, 2016: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2895018-2016-06-
03-Preliminary-Factual-Findings-Report.html#document/p1. 
53 See Dake, supra note 48.  
54 Id. 
55 “Mosier Train Derailment and Oil Spill,” Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish 
Commission (CRITFC) newsletter, July 2016: http://www.critfc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/2016_07_dipnetter.pdf?x78172. 
56 See Jon Gay, “The Health Effects of Oil Contamination: A Compilation of 
Research,” Worchester Polytechnic Institute, 66-70, Dec. 15, 2010: 
https://web.wpi.edu/Pubs/E-project/Available/E-project-121510-
203112/unrestricted/Health_Effects_of_Oil_Contamination_-_Final_Report.pdf; 
Annie-Rose Strasser, BP Oil Spill Cleanup Workers Are at a Higher Risk Of 
Sickness, Cancer, THINKPROGRESS, Sept. 17, 2013: https://thinkprogress.org/bp-
oil-spill-cleanup-workers-are-at-higher-risk-of-sickness-cancer-aed007083c89/. 
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communities.57 Fish also suffer from oil contamination, leading to 
“reduced growth, enlarged livers, changes in heart and respiration 
rates, fin erosion, and reproduction impairment.”58 This directly 
implicates tribal treaty fishing rights and the commensurate habitat 
protection duties affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, discussed below.59 
Other aquatic life, such as shellfish and plants, suffer harm as well 
from fossil fuel contamination.60 
Interference with tribal fishing due to marine vessel traffic 
forms another class of effects from fossil fuel transport. These 
export schemes necessarily involve large industrial tanker ships that 
transport coal, oil, natural gas, and other petroleum derivatives 
across the Pacific Ocean. Each ship must pass through tribal treaty 
fishing waters at least twice, both inbound and outbound, navigating 
tidal marine lanes that are complex, narrow, and often busy. Every 
tanker ship poses risks of spills, leaks, and explosions, as well as 
incidences of damaged and destroyed tribal fishing gear.61 In 2003, 
a barge spilled approximately 5,000 gallons of heavy fuel oil into 
the Puget Sound near the Suquamish Tribe’s Port Madison 
Reservation.62 The spill damaged an estuary, nearshore habitat, and 
shellfish beds, and an important cultural and spiritual site within the 
                                                
57 Id. 
58 “How Does Oil Impact Marine Life?,” NATIONAL OCEANIC AND 
ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, March 21, 2014: 
http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/oilimpacts.html. 
59 See supra Section IV.B for further discussion of the scope of treaty-
guaranteed tribal fishing rights. 
60 “How Oil Harms Animals and Plants in Marine Environments,” NATIONAL 
OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, Sept. 21, 2018: 
https://response.restoration.noaa.gov/oil-and-chemical-spills/oil-spills/how-oil-
harms-animals-and-plants-marine-environments.html. 
61 See “Weigh Anchor: What Kinder Morgan’s Trans Mountain Pipeline Will 
Mean for B.C.’s Coast,” THE GLOBE AND MAIL: 
https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/kinder-morgan-trans-
mountain-pipeline-bc-
coast/article35043172/?ref=http://www.theglobeandmail.com&; see also 
Memorandum for Record from Michelle Walker, Chief, Regulatory Branch, 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 14, 24, (May 9, 2016) [hereinafter 
Memorandum for Record]: 
https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2016/05/160509mfruademinimisdetermina
tion.pdf (tribal fishing gear loss from tanker traffic). 
62 James May, Oil Spill Damages Marine Estuary at Suquamish, INDIAN 
COUNTRY TODAY, Jan. 14, 2004: 
https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/news/oil-spill-damages-marine-estuary-
at-suquamish/. 
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Tribe’s Reservation and treaty fishing waters. 63 The proposed Trans 
Mountain expansion of the Kinder Morgan pipeline and export 
terminal near Vancouver, British Columbia, for example, would 
increase total tanker traffic in the Salish Sea by a factor of seven64 
and potentially carry a 16-67% probability of an oil spill over a 50-
year period.65 
Fossil fuel transport vessels require safe places to anchor 
before and after loading cargo, and many protected anchorages 
intrude on important tribal fishing sites. When the U.S. Coast Guard 
proposed a rule in 2017 to expand anchorages and create priority for 
“deep-draft vessels” extending over 200 feet in length in greater 
Puget Sound, regional tribes submitted public comments and 
persuaded the Coast Guard to initiate a formal tribal consultation 
process pursuant to its federal Indian trust responsibility.66  
 
                                                
63 The company responsible for the spill, Foss Maritime, ultimately reached a 
settlement with the Suquamish Tribe for “spiritual and cultural damages” to the 
tribe’s marsh and beach. Tiffany Royal, Suquamish Tribe Reaches Oil Spill 
Settlement, NORTHWEST INDIAN FISHERIES COMMISSION, Feb. 26, 2007: 
https://nwifc.org/suquamish-tribe-reaches-oil-spill-settlement/. In addition to 
this settlement, the company also made payments for the initial response, the 
damage assessment, and the federal restoration and mitigation costs. Id. 
64 Jason R.W. Merrick and J. Rene van Dorp, “Vessel Traffic Risk Assessment 
(VTRA) 2015,” George Washington University, Aug. 9-10, 2016: 
http://www2.seas.gwu.edu/~dorpjr/VTRA_2015/PRESENTATIONS/21%20-
%20COMPARISON%20VTRA%202015%20Case%20KM%20348%20to%20
VTRA%202015%20Base%20Case.pdf. 
65 See Hearing Order OH-001-2014, National Energy Board, par. 20336, Feb. 5, 
2016: https://vancouver.ca/files/cov/trans-mountain-pipeline-expansion-
proposal-final-argument-transcript.pdf. The permit for Kinder Morgan was 
recently denied by the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal for failure to properly 
consult with First Nations and for failure to address the environmental impacts 
of the increase in tanker traffic. See Joan Bryden, Federal Court Quashes Trans 
Mountain Expansion; Ottawa Forging Ahead with Purchase, GLOBAL NEWS, 
Aug. 31, 2018: https://globalnews.ca/news/4418485/trans-mountain-pipeline-
quashed-federal-court/. However, typical of fossil fuel infrastructure projects, 
the threat is not over as the Canadian government has purchased the project for 
$4.5 billion and plans to push ahead for completion of the pipeline expansion. 
Id. 
66 See “Anchorages; Captain of the Port Puget Sound Zone, WA,” 82 Fed. Reg. 
10313 (proposed Feb. 10, 2017): 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/02/10/2017-02683/anchorages-
captain-of-the-port-puget-sound-zone-wa; see also id. § 110.230(b)(1-3). See 
“Anchorages; Captain of the Port Puget Sound Zone, WA; Supplemental Notice 
of Tribal Consultation,” 82 Fed. Reg. 27639 (proposed June 16, 2017): 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/06/16/2017-12494/anchorages-
captain-of-the-port-puget-sound-zone-wa-supplemental-notice-of-tribal-
consultation. 
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C.   Tribal Leadership and Vision for a Livable Future 
 
Across the country, tribal leaders and grassroots Native 
American communities are unifying to resist the escalating threats 
of fossil fuel transport. The unprecedented demonstrations at the 
Standing Rock Sioux Reservation in 2016 shaped and shifted the 
dialogue around fossil fuel infrastructure, as the world watched 
tribal opposition to the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) burgeon 
into a national and international social movement. Many thousands 
of individuals traveled to Standing Rock to stand in solidarity 
against the pipeline over the course of the demonstration—including 
2,000 American military veterans and a contingent of Pacific 
Northwest tribal representatives who arrived in traditional canoes.67 
Rallies in support of the Standing Rock Sioux were held in at least 
300 cities around the globe.68 Numerous municipalities 
affirmatively divested from the financial institutions underwriting 
DAPL.69 Online petitions opposing the pipeline have collected 
nearly 1.9 million signatures.70 Standing Rock highlighted the vital 
                                                
67 See, e.g,. Leah Donnella, “The Standing Rock Resistance is Unprecedented 
(It’s Also Centuries Old),” NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, Nov. 22, 2016: 
https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2016/11/22/502068751/the-standing-
rock-resistance-is-unprecedented-it-s-also-centuries-old; Sarah Van Gelder, “In 
Photos: Northwest Canoe Tribes Arrive at Historic Gathering at Standing 
Rock,” YES! MAGAZINE, Sept. 9, 2016: http://www.yesmagazine.org/people-
power/in-photos-northwest-canoe-tribes-arrive-at-historic-gathering-at-standing-
rock-20160909; Michael Edison Hayden, Catherine Thorbecke, & Evan Simon, 
“At Least 2,000 Veterans Arrive at Standing Rock to Protect Dakota Pipeline,” 
ABC NEWS, Dec. 4, 2016: http://abcnews.go.com/US/2000-veterans-arrive-
standing-rock-protest-dakota-pipeline/story?id=43964136. 
68 “People in 300+ Cities are Taking Part In the #NoDAPL Day of Action,” 
COLOR LINES MAGAZINE, Nov. 15, 2016: 
https://www.colorlines.com/articles/people-300-cities-are-taking-part-nodapl-
day-action. 
69 See, e.g., Jimmy Tobias, “These Cities are Pulling Billions from the Banks 
that Support the Dakota Access Pipeline,” THE NATION, March 20, 2017: 
https://www.thenation.com/article/these-cities-are-divesting-from-the-banks-
that-support-the-dakota-access-pipeline/. 
70 “Tell President Obama: Stop the Dakota Access Oil Pipeline, #NoDAPL,” 
CREDO online petition - 419,164 signatures as of Sept. 20, 2018: 
https://act.credoaction.com/sign/NoDAPL/; “Stop the Dakota Access Pipeline 
Once and For All - #NoDAPL,” MoveOn.com online petition - 413,259 
signatures as of Sept. 20, 2018: http://petitions.moveon.org/sign/no-dapl; “Stop 
the Dakota Access Pipeline,” Change.com online petition - 564,464 signatures 
as of Sept. 20, 2018: https://www.change.org/p/stop-the-dakota-access-pipeline; 
“Stand With Standing Rock,” online petition - 478,201 signatures as of Sept. 20, 
2018: http://standwithstandingrock.net/take-action/. 
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role of tribal leadership at this pivotal ecological moment.71 As 
renowned author and climate activist Bill McKibben observed, “The 
events at Standing Rock also allow Americans to realize who some 
of the nation’s most important leaders really are. The fight for 
environmental sanity—against pipelines and coal ports and other 
fossil fuel infrastructure—has increasingly been led by Native 
Americans . . . .”72 
In the Pacific Northwest, a unified coalition of tribal Nations 
has passed a series of resolutions opposing fossil fuel transport. The 
Affiliated Tribes of Northwest Indians (ATNI), representing 58 
tribal governments in six states across the greater Northwest 
region,73 adopted its first resolution against fossil fuel transport in 
2013.74 Since then, this powerful league of sovereign tribal 
governments has adopted at least nine additional resolutions 
expressly declaring Northwest tribes’ opposition to fossil fuel 
infrastructure development at large.75 ATNI’s 2017 reaffirmation 
Resolution unequivocally states, “ATNI calls upon our federal 
trustees to affirm and preserve decisions denying proposals for 
unrefined fossil fuel export facilities to date (including coal), and to 
take every available and appropriate step to deny proposals for 
future transportation or export facilities . . . .”76  
In addition to this broad institutional tribal opposition, 
individual tribal leaders across the region have articulated a clear 
and resounding commitment against fossil fuel transport. Quinault 
Indian Nation President Fawn Sharp (former President of ATNI), 
                                                
71 See Don Gentry & Emma Marris, The Next Standing Rock? A Pipeline Battle 
Looms in Oregon, N.Y. TIMES, March 8, 2018: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/08/opinion/standing-rock-pipeline-
oregon.html?smid=pl-share. The Klamath River, which lies within the Klamath 
Tribes’ ancestral territory in present day Oregon, has been identified as the “the 
next Standing Rock.” Id. 
72 Bill McKibben, “A Pipeline Fight and America’s Dark Past,” THE NEW 
YORKER, Sept. 6, 2016: http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/a-
pipeline-fight-and-americas-dark-past. 
73 The ATNI represents tribes throughout Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Alaska, 
Montana, California.  Affiliated Tribes of Northwest Indians, “Tribal 
Memberships”: http://www.atnitribes.org/tribal-memberships. 
74 Affiliated Tribes of Northwest Indians, Resolution #13-47: Oppose the 
Proposals for Transportation and Export of Fossil Fuels in the Pacific 
Northwest: http://www.atnitribes.org/sites/default/files/res-13-47.pdf. 
75 See Appendix A, Resolution #17-12: 
http://www.atnitribes.org/resolutions/reaffirming-opposition-non-refined-fossil-
fuel-transportation-across-and-export-pacific. 
76 Id. 
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stated: “The technology exists to safely and affordably transition 
away from fossil fuels . . . . Tools such as the public trust doctrine 
and treaty law support such a movement legally and invoke a moral 
responsibility for faster, more decisive action.”77 Brian Cladoosby, 
Chairman of the Swinomish Tribal Indian Community, said in 
regard to his tribe’s easement battle to limit oil-by-rail across its 
Reservation: “We as leaders need to protect our treaty resources, our 
economies, and the human health of citizens and neighbors. We all 
lose if we give up that which is most precious to us all—our 
commitment to do what is right for our children and grandchildren, 
and protect the land and water upon which their lives will depend.”78 
Yakama Chairman JoDe Goudy declared after the oil train 
derailment in Mosier, Oregon, in 2016, “We will stand together to 
speak for those things that cannot speak for themselves. We will 
stand together to protect our lands, our waters and our rights.”79 In 
September 2013, Nez Perce Tribal Council members joined arms as 
part of a human blockade to stop a “mega-load” of massive drilling 
equipment bound for the Alberta tar sands.80 Every year for the past 
four years, members of the Lummi Nation have organized an annual 
Totem Pole Journey, travelling across the continent with a 
traditionally carved pole to “bring attention to proposed fossil fuel 
terminals, oil trains, coal trains, and oil pipelines and the threat they 
pose to tribes and local communities.”81  
Speaking broadly, Native customary law emphasizes 
                                                
77 Fawn Sharp, “Tribes Have Up Close Perspective on Climate Change,” 
SEATTLE TIMES, April 23, 2016: http://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/tribes-
have-up-close-perspective-on-climate-change/. 
78 “Swinomish Tribe Files Suit to Stop Bakken Crude Trains,” Lawsuit Against 
BNSF Railway, Swinomish Indian Tribal Community website, Apr. 7, 2015: 
http://www.swinomish-nsn.gov/news/lawsuit-against-bnsf-railway.aspx. 
79 CRITFC, supra note 47. 
80 Kirk Johnson, “Fight Over Energy Finds a New Front in a Corner of Idaho,” 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2013: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/26/us/fight-over-
energy-finds-a-new-front-in-a-corner-of-idaho.html. The Nez Perce Tribe 
ultimately prevailed in court, securing an injunction against further mega-loads, 
Nez Perce Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 2013 WL 5212317 (D. Idaho 2013). See 
also Idaho Rivers United, “Settlement Protects Historic Uses on Highway 12, 
Restricts Megaloads,” Jan. 27, 2017: 
https://www.idahorivers.org/newsroom/2017/1/26/settlement-protects-historic-
uses-on-highway-12-restricts-megaloads (definition of “mega-load”). 
81 See Linda V. Mapes, A Northwest Traveling Totem-Pole protest Targets 
Fossil-Fuel Development, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 25, 2017: 
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/environment/a-northwest-traveling-
totem-pole-protest-targets-fossil-fuel-development/. 
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humanity’s duty to respect and steward Nature in trust for future 
generations,82 recognizing that the laws of Nature are non-
negotiable and set the parameters for human survival.83 Using a 
range of legal strategies emanating from traditional values, tribes are 
showing success in defeating proposed fossil fuel projects. Tribes 
that have won either in court or in administrative proceedings 
against fossil fuel transport projects include the Lummi Nation, the 
Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, the 
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation, the 
Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs, the Swinomish Tribal Indian 
Community, the Quinault Indian Nation, the Cowlitz Tribe, and the 
Nez Perce Nation, among others. Sections II and III of this Article 
draw upon these successes to explore in detail the legal tools 
available to tribes to stop fossil fuel transport within tribal 
geographies. The section below describes the legal context framing 
such strategies.  
 
D.   Legal Posture of Fossil Fuel Transport and Export Projects 
 
Jurisdictional analyses and best available legal tools will 
vary depending on whether a proposed project lies within or outside 
reservation boundaries. On the reservation, tribes may have direct 
jurisdiction over trains or pipelines crossing into tribal territory. Off-
reservation, tribes may exert considerable sway as interested parties 
and sovereign co-trustees in permit decisions controlled by federal, 
state, or local agencies. Virtually all proposed fossil fuel projects 
pass through tribal geographies (reservations and ceded lands) in 
some capacity.  
                                                
82 Rebecca Tsosie, “Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of Self-
Determination: The Role of Ethics, Economics, and Traditional Ecological 
Knowledge,” 21 VT. L. REV. 225, 228 (119) (“These similarities are useful for a 
comparative discussion of Euro-American and indigenous land ethics, and they 
provide a means to understand the often different values that underlie 
contemporary tribal environment decision-making.”). 
83 “Tribal Trustees in Climate Crisis,” supra note 34, at 526 (citing Oren Lyons, 
Onondaga Nation leader and faithkeeper, The Ice is Melting, Twenty-Fourth 
Annual E.F. Schumacher Lectures (Oct. 2004): “You can’t negotiate with a 
beetle. You are now dealing with natural law. And if you don’t understand 
natural law, you will soon. [If] you don’t abide by that law, you will suffer the 
consequence. Whether you agree with it, understand it, comprehend it, it doesn’t 
make a difference. You’re going to suffer the consequence, and that’s where 
we’re headed right now.”). 
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By their nature as projects designed to cover distance, 
proposed fossil fuel transport and export projects typically require a 
dozen or more permits from a range of jurisdictional authorities. 
Every required permit or authorization represents a legal entry point 
for tribes to assert their sovereign prerogatives. The precise 
configuration of permits and authorizations will necessarily vary by 
project according to transport method, fuel type, and route. A single 
denial can stop a project cold. 
Tribes have a unique opportunity and strong basis to insert 
themselves in these permitting processes. First, “bomb trains” and 
pipelines directly impinge on tribal property rights. Second, tribes 
have special responsibilities as co-trustees of natural resources.84 
Water, air, and fisheries are among the public trust assets over which 
tribes serve as co-trustees.85 Tribes are statutorily positioned to bring 
claims for natural resources damages (NRD) when private or public 
actors injure natural assets held in common by all citizens.86 The 
following description of agencies and permits frequently involved 
in fossil fuel transport provides a useful framework for ascertaining 
opportunities for tribal intervention.  
 
1.   Federal 
 
Given the diversity and reach of the federal government, 
federal agencies commonly exercise jurisdiction over at least one 
phase of most fossil fuel infrastructure proposals. Projects involving 
transportation of coal or oil by rail, for example, will implicate the 
Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA).87 
That statute expressly reserves authority over railroad activities to 
                                                
84 See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 2005 WL 2488447 
*5 (D. Or. 2005) (mandating federal agencies to “collaborate with the sovereign 
entities, including . . . the Tribes”).  
85 See id.; see also Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Asarco, Inc., 280 F.Supp.2d 1094, 
1114-15 (D. Idaho, 2003), modified in part, U.S. v. Asarco, Inc., 4471 
F.Supp.2d 1063, 1068-69 (D. Idaho, 2005) (recognizing the Coeur d’Alene tribe 
as the co-trustee of Lake Coeur d’Alene for purposes of CERCLA); U.S. v. 
Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905) (“The right to resort to the fishing places in 
controversy was a part of larger rights possessed by the Indians, upon the 
exercise of which there was not a shadow of impediment, and which were not 
much less necessary to the existence of the Indians than the atmosphere they 
breathed.”).  
86 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act); 33 U.S.C. § 2706(b)(4) (Oil Pollution Act). 
87 49 U.S.C. § 10101 et seq. 
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the federal Surface Transportation Board (STB).88 The STB is 
responsible for reviewing permit applications for construction and 
acquisition of railway lines.89  
Most new construction requiring federal agency approval 
obliges these action agencies to engage in the NEPA process.90 
Environmental Assessments and especially Environmental Impact 
Statements provide an important opportunity for public 
participation, though agencies retain discretion in weighing 
comments.91 Tribes typically engage in such federal public 
comment processes for proposed fossil fuel infrastructure. The 
National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), crafted to protect 
historic structures and places, also requires a public comment 
process similar to NEPA.92 Both statutes apply only to federal 
actions.  
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers exercises jurisdiction 
over any structures built in, on, or above the navigable waters of the 
United States, as well as over any activity that obstructs 
navigation.93 Fossil fuel export terminals and port facilities involve 
                                                
88 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b) (announcing, “The jurisdiction of the Board . . . is 
exclusive. Except as otherwise provided in this part, the remedies provided 
under this part with respect to regulation of rail transportation are exclusive and 
preempt the remedies provide under Federal or State law.”); 49 U.S.C. § 
10102(1) (defining “Board”). 
89 49 U.S.C. § 10901 et seq. 
90 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. See Ka Makani ‘O Kohala Ohana Inc. v. Water 
Supply, 295 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2002) (articulating the federal nexus test for 
NEPA: “in order to have ‘major federal action,’ . . . ‘the federal agency must 
possess actual power to control the nonfederal activity,’” citing Village of Los 
Ranchos de Albuquerque v. Barnhart, 906 F.2d 1477, 1482 (internal quotations 
and citations omitted)). 
91 Courts generally apply a strict compliance standard to the procedural 
requirement of NEPA, while applying an “arbitrary and capricious” standard to 
the substantive requirement, essentially deferring to the agency. See, e.g., 
Stryker’s Bay Neighborhood Council Inc. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 228 (1980) 
(holding that as long as federal agencies consider the environmental 
consequences of their decisions, “NEPA requires no more.”). Additionally, 
different administrations interpret and apply NEPA differently. See generally 
Walter E. Stern, “‘Black Snakes’ or Essential Infrastructure: Dakota Access 
Pipeline, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, The 
Federal Government’s Tribal Consultation Obligations, and Why This Matters, 
MODRALL SPERLING, Jan. 4, 2018: 
 https://www.modrall.com/2018/01/17/black-snakes-essential-infrastructure-
dakota-access-pipeline-standing-rock-sioux-tribe-v-u-s-army-corps-engineers-
federal-governments-tribal-consultation-obligations-m/. 
92 54 U.S.C. § 300101 et seq. 
93 33 U.S.C. § 403. 
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such structures and activities, typically triggering an affirmative 
obligation for the Army Corps to engage in a full environmental 
review process under NEPA. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act 
gives the Army Corps authority to regulate discharge and fill 
material in navigable waters.94 Section 401 requires certification of 
compliance with state water quality standards.95  
Other federal agencies that are likely to exercise jurisdiction 
over various stages or types of fossil fuel transport and export 
projects include: the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission; the 
U.S. Department of Energy; the U.S. Department of Transportation 
and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration; 
the U.S. Coast Guard; the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service; NOAA 
Fisheries Service; and the U.S. Department of State, among others. 
Each federal agency owes a fiduciary trust responsibility to tribes 
and is responsible for upholding this obligation in all decisions 
implicating tribal interests.96 
 
2.   State 
 
At the state level, Washington and Oregon both have 
extensive administrative frameworks relevant to fossil fuel transport 
permit processes in the Pacific Northwest. In Washington, state 
agencies likely to be involved in reviewing fossil fuel project permit 
applications include Washington’s Departments of Ecology, Natural 
Resources, Fish and Wildlife, and Commerce, as well as the Energy 
Facility Site Evaluation Council (EFSEC), which is specially 
charged with reviewing permit applications for facilities receiving 
oil by rail. The EFSEC makes a recommendation to the Governor, 
who has final say in approving or denying permits.97 On January 29, 
2018, Governor Jay Inslee affirmed EFSEC’s recommendation to 
reject an application for Tesoro-Savage’s proposed oil-by-rail 
terminal in Vancouver, Washington.98  
                                                
94 33 U.S.C. § 1344. 
95 33 U.S.C. § 1341. 
96 See infra Section IV.A.; Parravano v. Babbit, 70 F.3d 539, 546 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(“This trust responsibility extends not just to the Interior Department, but 
attaches to the federal government as a whole.”) (quoting U.S. v. Eberhardt, 789 
F.2d 1354, 1361 (9th Cir. 1986) (Beezer, J., concurring)). 
97 RCW 80.50.100. 
98 Jay Inslee, letter: “Vancouver Energy Distribution Terminal,” Jan. 29, 2018: 
https://www.governor.wa.gov/sites/default/files/documents/InsleelettertoEFSEC
TesoroSavage.pdf?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery. 
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Oregon’s state bureaucratic roster reads somewhat 
differently than its northern neighbor, though the permit hurdles 
which proposed projects must clear are similar. The State Land 
Board (SLB) and the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) 
are important gatekeepers in Oregon, charged with issuing land use 
permits on state-owned land and water quality certifications, 
respectively. The SLB and its administrative arm, the Department 
of State Lands (DSL), maintain jurisdiction over all proposed 
development within wetlands and waterways. In 2014, the DSL 
terminated a proposed coal transport project when it denied a 
removal-fill permit on the middle Columbia, citing a “small but 
important longstanding fishery” for which treaty tribes had 
advocated for.99  
Washington (unlike Oregon) has enacted a State 
Environmental Policy Act (SEPA),100 which requires a NEPA-like 
procedural analysis of state actions and permit decisions. 
Washington’s SEPA was the basis of the Department of Ecology’s 
recent denial of a permit application for a proposed coal-by-rail 
terminal in Longview, Washington.101 Oregon has never passed a 
state environmental policy act, though other state laws, such as those 
governing removal-fill permits, set forth robust environmental 
policies emphasizing protection, conservation, recreation, and 
habitat.102 
Washington and Oregon are also the two longest-standing 
state participants in the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA).103 
In this capacity, both states have developed and implemented coastal 
zone management plans to carry out the national policy of 
preserving, protecting, and sustainably developing coastal zones 
                                                
99 See infra Section III.2.; In re Coyote Island Terminal LLC and Port of 
Morrow, Oregon Office of Admin. Hearings for the Dept. of State Lands, 
Rulings on Motions for Summary Determination (2016): 
http://media.oregonlive.com/environment_impact/other/morrow%20ruling.pdf. 
100 RCW 43.21C et seq. 
101 See Section 401 Water Quality Certification Denial (Order No. 15417), 
Department of Ecology, State of Washington, Sept. 26, 2017: 
http://www.millenniumbulk.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/401-WQ-
Certification-Denial-Letter.pdf. 
102 See, e.g., ORS 196.805(1). 
103 16 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq.; see “Coastal Zone Management Programs,” 
NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION: 
https://coast.noaa.gov/czm/mystate/.  
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“for this and succeeding generations.”104 The statutory scheme 
provides yet another avenue for tribes to work with and through 
states in exerting their sovereign interests in protecting coastal and 
ocean resources against fossil fuel infrastructure.  
Finally, both states also observe and enforce the public trust 
doctrine, which is unequivocally implicated by any fossil fuel 
infrastructure proposal involving submerged lands along navigable 
waterways. Under the public trust doctrine, all submerged lands 
along navigable waterways are owned by the State in trust for 
present and future citizens as beneficiaries, and state decision-
makers must uphold fiduciary obligations under the public trust 
when administering and making decisions on all leases and permits 
involving the seashore, submerged lands, and overlying waters.105 
Not coincidentally, the physical scope of the public trust overlaps 
substantially with tribal treaty fishing waters, indicating the crucial 
nature of the aquatic commons to all citizens. Tribes should consider 
the public trust doctrine among the array of tools available for 
stopping fossil fuel transport projects that threaten tribal people, 
resources, and lands.  
 
3.   Local 
 
Local jurisdictions also exercise authority over aspects of 
proposed fossil fuel projects. Port and county commissions are the 
governmental bodies most likely to hold sway at the local level 
through their authority over construction and expansion permits for 
export facilities. While local governments may not always share the 
same policies or priorities as tribes, formidable alliances may form 
over common fossil fuel infrastructure threats to communities. In 
2016, for example, the Board of Commissioners of Wasco County, 
Oregon, denied a railway expansion permit based on projected 
impacts to tribal treaty fishing rights.106 Cultural resource law has 
                                                
104 16 U.S.C. § 1452(a); see also Washington Coastal Zone Management, WA 
Dept. of Ecology: https://ecology.wa.gov/Water-Shorelines/Shoreline-coastal-
management/Coastal-zone-management; Oregon Coastal Management Program, 
https://www.oregon.gov/LCD/OCMP/pages/cstzone_intro.aspx.  Moreover, in 
Oregon, the public trust encompasses all beaches up to the high-water mark. See 
Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 317 Or. 131, 138-9 (1993) (quoting State ex 
rel. Thorton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 588-596 (1969)). 
105 See Stevens, 317 Or. at 138-9.  
106 For a detailed discussion of this case, see infra Section IV.B.2.c. 
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also delayed local permitting for development of a proposed 
liquefied natural gas facility in Coos Bay, Oregon.107 Local 
jurisdictional authority has the benefit of devolving power over 
dangerous infrastructure to those who, like tribes themselves, face 
direct harm from proposed fossil fuel projects.  
Ultimately, arresting proposed fossil fuel projects involves 
an exercise in braiding the law. Tribal rights, statutory language, and 
common law doctrines such as the public trust must be woven 
together into innovative, sophisticated legal arguments. Tribes stand 
positioned to assert their sovereign legal prerogatives by denying or 
negotiating easements, invoking the federal Indian trust 
responsibility and treaty rights, appealing directly to jurisdictional 
decision-makers, and, when necessary, challenging those decisions 
in court. The precise contours of legal levers available to halt fossil 
fuel transport on-reservation and off-reservation is the focus of the 
next two Sections of this Article. 
 
III.   ON-RESERVATION TRIBAL PREROGATIVES 
 
 Tribes, as unique legal sovereigns, hold on-reservation 
levers against fossil fuel projects unavailable to state or local 
governments. These levers can be viewed through two distinct 
frameworks: those derived from property rights and those stemming 
from the inherent tribal authority to regulate as sovereigns. 
 Through the property rights lever, tribes can exert power 
over fossil fuel export projects by exercising control over the 
easement agreements that allow the projects to cross the reservation. 
The regulatory lever, on the other hand, allows tribes to more 
directly control projects through the application of tribal law. An 
example of direct regulation would be a tribal ordinance stating that 
no trains transporting crude oil shall pass through the tribe's 
reservation boundaries. 
 Tribes likely possess the most effective means of stopping 
these projects on-reservation by operating within the property 
framework and using the rules prescribed by the regulations. Every 
fossil fuel export project that crosses reservation lands will require 
an easement, which is granted by the Secretary of the Interior to third 
                                                
107 Oregon Shores Conservation Coalition v. Coos County, LUBA No. 2016-
095, 43-53, Nov. 27, 2017: 
http://www.oregon.gov/LUBA/docs/Opinions/2017/11-17/16095.pdf. 
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parties through statutory processes. Under the implementing 
regulations for that statute, however, tribes may refuse, revoke, or 
enforce easement agreements. This article will explore those options 
in Section A, and Section B will analyze the potential of direct 
regulation through tribal law and discuss the federal preemption 
barriers that such regulation will likely face. 
  To preface this discussion, several items should be noted. 
First, any individualized analysis must tie to a highly fact-specific 
context. Each right-of-way grant will have unique language. 
Moreover, treaty rights interpretations, as well as the history and 
status of particular tribal land holdings, differ between tribes. 
Second, some of these matters are still laden with uncertainty. A 
multitude of laws remain at play, and on-point precedent is often 
elusive. While not providing hard-and-fast answers, this section 
provides guidance for tribes exercising on-reservation prerogatives 
by highlighting relevant case law, identifying probable obstacles to 
the assertion of tribal authority, and describing potential pathways 
around those obstacles.  
 
A.   Tribal Property Rights Tools 
 
 Right-of-way easements through reservations are governed 
by specific statutes and Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) regulations. 
These laws offer significant leverage to tribes seeking to exercise 
dominion over easements. Caselaw dealing with these issues is 
sparse, but the language in the regulations provides tribes with 
significant control. 
 This section begins by describing the federal scheme that 
governs rights-of-way through tribal lands. It then reviews potential 
property rights levers operating within the regulations. These levers 
function against both new right-of-way applications and existing 
grants. Finally, this section concludes with a discussion of 
Swinomish v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company, a 
recent case that has affirmed tribal power in this context.  
 
1.   Federal Law over Rights-of-Way 
 
 All infrastructure poised to cross over an Indian reservation 
requires a right-of-way from the tribe, whether that infrastructure is 
a telecommunications line, water pipe, or railroad. Federal laws 
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governing rights-of-way through tribal lands historically favored 
non-Indian economic development.108 The Secretary of the Interior 
has long held the ultimate power to grant right-of-way easements in 
Indian Country. Originally, that power derived from a handful of 
piecemeal right-of-way statutes.109 In 1948, however, Congress 
passed sweeping legislation enabling rights-of-way for any use or 
purpose, including pipelines and railroad tracks. Commonly called 
the Indian Right-of-Way Act (or IRWA),110 the statute conferred 
broad authority to the Secretary of the Interior to grant easements, 
subject to a requirement for consent from the affected tribe.111 The 
newest iteration of the implementing regulations, published in 2016, 
suggests that the longtime trend of placing tribal interests 
subordinate to non-Indian development interests may be receding. 
 Purpose of the New Right-of-Way Regulations: BIA's 
purpose in updating the IRWA regulations was to “streamline the 
procedures and conditions” for application and approval of a right-
of-way grant.112 The regulations apply to all right-of-way grants 
issued on or after April 21, 2016.113 For grants issued prior to that 
date, the procedural provisions apply retroactively, unless those 
provisions are incompatible with the express terms of the grant.114 
 The new rules are meant to bolster tribal self-determination 
by “acknowledging and incorporating tribal law and policies” and 
by deferring to tribal decisions wherever possible.115 Such language 
makes clear a policy to respect the sovereign authority of tribes in 
                                                
108 See, e.g., Ward Churchill & Winona LaDuke, Native America: The Political 
Economy of Radioactive Colonialism, 13 The Journal of Ethnic Studies (Fall 
1985). 
109 25 U.S.C.A. § 311-22. Strangely, IRWA made clear that the prior right-of-
way statutes would not be repealed. In hindsight, this preservation of the older 
statutes has only added confusion to the already unclear scheme of federal 
dominion over tribal easements. 
110 25 U.S.C.A. § 324. 
111 25 U.S.C.A. § 324 (consent required for tribes organized under Indian 
Reorganization Act); see also Coast Indian Community v. U.S., 550 F.2d 639 
(Ct. Cl. 1977) (holding that the Bureau of Indian Affairs violated the law sold 
right-of-way over Indian lands without obtaining consent of majority of adult 
members of Indian community).  
112 25 C.F.R. § 169.1.  
113 25 C.F.R. § 169.7(a). 
114 25 C.F.R. § 169.7(b). For a list of procedural regulation provisions, 
https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/as-ia/raca/pdf/idc1-033661.pdf.  
115 25 C.F.R. § 169.7(b). 
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choosing whether to allow these projects to carve through tribal 
lands.116  
 Obtaining a Right-of-Way: To obtain a right-of-way 
easement, the applicant, or grantee, must submit an application to 
the regional BIA office.117 The BIA must determine if the right-of-
way is in the best interest of the tribe.118 As a predicate to the 
decision, BIA must analyze any potential environmental or other 
adverse impacts and confirm that the proposed easement complies 
with applicable federal laws.119 Significantly, BIA must defer “to 
the maximum extent possible” to the tribe on whether the right-of-
way is in its best interest.120 
 Consent Requirements for Right-of-Ways: Most 
importantly, the regulations underscore a clear tribal consent 
requirement and clarify the tribe's authority over how that consent 
is negotiated.121 Consent is required for any new easement that 
crosses “tribal land.”122 Consent must come as an authorization from 
the tribe or, if the tribe requires, as a written agreement with the 
tribe.123 Apart from new right-of-way applications, the consent 
requirement may also be triggered by a number of actions on 
existing easements: new uses, amendments, assignments, and 
renewals elaborated below.  
 New Uses under Existing Easements Agreements: 
Easement holders can utilize their existing rights-of-way for a new 
use under certain circumstances, without obtaining tribal consent.124 
                                                
116 The agency's position is also apparent from its filings in a suit challenging the 
new regulations, discussed infra in FN 141.  
117 25 C.F.R. § 169.101(a). 
118 25 C.F.R. § 169.124. 
119 25 C.F.R. § 169.123. 
120 25 C.F.R. § 169.124. 
121 Although IRWA only required consent from tribes organized under IRA, the 
regulations made clear that the consent requirement applies to all tribes. 25 
C.F.R. § 169.107. See also Kevin K. Washburn & Jody Cummings, “Explaining 
the Modernized Leasing and Right-of-Way Regulations for Indian Lands,” 
University of New Mexico School of Law Research Paper No. 2017-10: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3055854.  
122 25 C.F.R. § 169.107(a). Tribal land is defined as any tract where a tribe owns 
at least an undivided interest in the surface estate in trust or restricted status. 25 
C.F.R. § 169.2. Under that definition, the regulations seemingly expand the 
requirement from applying only to trust lands to also applying to fee land in 
which a tribe has an undivided ownership interest. 
123 25 C.F.R. § 169.107(a). 
124 25 C.F.R. § 169.127(a). “An example of uses within the same scope would be 
an underground telephone line being used for an underground fiber optic line. A 
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Grantees may use existing easements for a use not stipulated in the 
original grant as long as the original grant has not yet expired, the 
new use is “within the same scope” as the original use, and no 
ground disturbance is necessary.125 On the other hand, if the new 
uses are not within the same scope of the original easement and 
involve ground disturbance, such change would require a brand-new 
application, triggering the consent requirement.126 
 Amendments to Existing Easement Agreements:127 
Grantees can also make certain changes to their easements through 
amendments, at any point in the lifetime of the grant.128 However, if 
a proposed amendment makes any material changes, the BIA may 
instead require an application for a new grant.129 Further, even if the 
proposed amendment lacks material changes, tribal consent must be 
obtained unless the amendments are merely administrative changes, 
such as correcting a legal description within the grant document.130 
The BIA can only disapprove an amendment request if: consent (if 
required) has not been obtained; the grantee has violated the original 
grant; the BIA finds a “compelling reason” for withholding approval 
to protect the tribe's best interest (the agency must defer to the 
maximum extent possible to the tribe); or any other requirements of 
the regulations have not been met.131  
 Renewals of Easement Agreements: Easements are 
granted for a definite period of time, as specified in the grant 
document, and the BIA will defer to the tribe's determination on 
                                                
pipeline easement being used for a railroad, on the other hand, is not within the 
same scope.” Id. at (c). 
125 25 C.F.R. § 169.127(a). This action is attractive to grantees because it does 
not require the resources necessary for a brand-new application. 
126 25 C.F.R. § 169.127(a)(2). 
127 The regulations also prescribe rules for assignments of existing grants. 
Assignments are used when a grantee wants to transfer their right-of-way 
interest to another actor. As with amendments, the regulations require tribal 
consent for assignments, unless the express terms of the grant provide otherwise. 
Even with such terms, however, the BIA may still need to approve the 
assignment. The disapproval factors for assignments are nearly identical to the 
amendment factors. 25 C.F.R. § 169.207. Note that assignments with new 
proposed uses may also require a new grant application. 25 C.F.R. § 169.127(b). 
128 For example, new uses outside the scope of the original grant that will not 
require ground disturbance may only require an amendment. 25 C.F.R. § 
169.127(a)(1). 
129 25 C.F.R. § 169.204(a). 
130 25 C.F.R. § 169.204(b). 
131 25 C.F.R. § 169.206. BIA notes in this provision that the agency will not 
“unreasonably withhold approval of an amendment.” 
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whether the original right-of-way term is reasonable.132 Once the 
right-of-way term expires, the grantee may renew the existing 
grant.133  
 However, a renewal will only be granted if several 
conditions are met: the initial and renewal term do not cumulatively 
exceed the maximum term under the regulations; the existing grant 
explicitly allows for renewal and specifies compensation terms; the 
grantee provides an affidavit stating that there is no change in right-
of-way size, type, or location; there are no uncured violations under 
the regulations or the existing grant's terms; the grantee confirms 
that consent has been obtained (or, if the original right-of-way 
explicitly allows for renewal without consent, the grantee has 
provided notice to the tribe); and the initial right-of-way term has 
not already expired. 134 If any of these conditions are not met, the 
grantee must reapply for a new right-of-way, and the BIA must 
handle the application as a new right-of-way application that 
requires tribal consent.135  
Negotiating for Conditions, Restrictions, Remedies, and 
Compensation: Tribes have significant negotiating power with 
respect to right-of-ways that trigger the consent requirement. The 
consent agreement may impose conditions or restrictions on the 
right-of-way grant.136 The consent document may also include 
negotiated remedies for violations, such as termination of the 
grant.137 If the remedies provide the tribe or the grantee with the 
power to terminate the grant, then BIA approval of termination is 
not required; if an express negotiated remedy for termination is not 
included, then BIA approval is necessary.138 The tribe also has the 
power to negotiate the monetary compensation that will be paid by 
the grantee for the right-of-way.139  
                                                
132 25 C.F.R. § 169.201. 
133 25 C.F.R. § 169.202. 
134 25 C.F.R. § 169.202(a). 
135 25 C.F.R. § 169.202(c). 
136 Id.  
137 25 C.F.R. § 169.403(a). 
138 Id. 
139 25 C.F.R. § 169.110(a). The compensation can be “any payment amount 
negotiated by the tribe.” The BIA will defer to the tribe's valuation if the tribe 
submits an authorization expressly stating that it has agreed to satisfactory 
compensation, waives the BIA valuation process, and has determined that 
accepting the agreed upon compensation and waiving BIA valuation is in its best 
interest. 
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2.   Property Rights Levers Using IRWA and the Regulations 
 
The new regulations, while far from perfect, do offer 
potential leverage for tribes through the consent requirement.140 The 
need for consent may be triggered at various times through the 
lifetime of an easement and can essentially act as a tribal veto power. 
 Whether or not tribal consent is needed, the BIA remains 
obligated to act in accordance with the trust obligation, as reflected 
in the regulatory language requiring decisions that protect the “best 
interests” of the tribe. The trust obligation permeates all federal 
agency discretionary actions, including right-of way decisions.141 
Even in those instances where the tribal consent requirement is not 
triggered, there is a manifest policy throughout the regulations to 
promote consultation with tribes, and defer to their decisions.142 The 
next subsections will review in more detail the tribal role in projects 
crossing reservations. Subsection (a) considers new applications, 
while subsection (b) discusses existing grants.   
 
 
 
                                                
140 Importantly, tribal claims that are based off noncompliance with the 
regulations, such as failure to obtain consent, should not be defeated by a 
preemption-style challenge. Although existing federal regulation of fossil fuel 
transport is overarching and may have limited tribal authority to directly 
regulate using tribal law, the right-of-way regulations operate under IRWA. 
Federal statutes do not preempt one another, and there is no indication that 
IRWA has been implicitly repealed. Instead, Congress's failure to repeal IRWA 
demonstrates its intent to allow tribes to pursue IRWA-based remedies despite 
the overarching federal regulation. See Swinomish Indian Tribal Community v. 
BNSF Railway Company, 228 F.Supp.3d 1171, 1180-3 (W.D. Wash. 2017). 
141 “It is well established that the BIA holds a fiduciary relationship to Indian 
tribes, and its management of tribal rights-of-way is subject to the same 
fiduciary duties.” McDonald v. Means, 309 F.3d 530, 538 (9th Cir. 2002). 
142 See 25 C.F.R. § 169.1(a) (stating that these regulations are intended to also 
intended to support tribal self-determination and self-governance by 
acknowledging and incorporating tribal law and policies in processing a request 
for a right-of-way across tribal lands and defer to the maximum extent possible 
to Indian landowner decisions regarding their Indian land.”); see also: 25 C.F.R. 
§ 169.209(b) (stating that BIA will defer to the tribe, even where tribal consent 
is not necessary, in determining whether to approve a right-of-way assignment); 
25 C.F.R. § 169.206(b) (stating that BIA will defer to the tribe, even where 
tribal consent is not necessary, in determining whether to approve a right-of-way 
amendment); 25 C.F.R. § 169.202(a)(1) (stating that, in determining whether to 
grant a right-of-way renewal, BIA will defer to the tribe on whether the length 
of renewal is reasonable, regardless of whether consent is required). 
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a.   New Right-of-Way Grant Applications 
 
Tribes hold the greatest leverage against proposed projects 
that will require a new right-of-way grant to pass through the 
reservation, due to the consent requirement. Without consent, there 
can be no new pipeline or rail line built across tribal land.143 The 
BIA cannot consent on behalf of a tribe, and the Secretary cannot 
grant a right-of-way without consent.144 Thus, the tribe holds an 
absolute power over projects that do not already have grants.  
 If a tribe does not wish to refuse consent outright, the 
regulations provide an opportunity for it to nevertheless retain 
significant control over an easement. Written consent agreements 
can contractually impose conditions and restrictions, including the 
type or amount of fuel transported through the easement area.145 
Moreover, the tribe increases control over these projects by 
including negotiated remedies for violating the terms of the written 
agreement. In particular, unilateral termination without BIA 
approval allows a tribe to cancel the right-of-way agreement at any 
time, though enforcement may pose a challenge.146 BIA's trust 
                                                
143 25 C.F.R. §169.107(a). 
144 25 C.F.R. § 169.108(a); 25 C.F.R. § 169.107(a). 
145 Typically, breach of contract claims based on easement agreement conditions 
that de facto regulate may be preempted because of their potential effect on 
interstate commerce (U. S. v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 333 U.S. 169, 176 (U.S. 
1948), holding that noncarrier regulation of cargo type through contract with a 
rail carrier is preempted Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act 
(ICCTA), even when the noncarrier owns the track itself, not merely the land 
crossed by easement). See also, Pejepscot Indus. Park, Inc. v. Maine Cent. R. 
Co., 297 F.Supp.2d 326, 333 (D. Me. 2003), holding that a breach of contract 
claim for “exemplary” damages was preempted by the ICCTA). However, this 
rule should not apply in this context. Through IRWA, Congress has expressly 
granted the Secretary of Interior authority to promulgate regulations specific to 
right-of-way agreements through tribal lands. Through that authority, the 
Secretary has created a process for tribes to impose conditions and restrictions 
on easement consent agreements. See Swinomish Indian Tribal Community v. 
Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company, 2017 WL 2483071, 1 (W.D. 
Wash. 2017).  
146 The written agreements may also contain negotiations for compensation 
between the tribe and the grantee. The monetary negotiations form an additional 
possible lever. The regulations explicitly provide that this can be “any payment 
amount negotiated by the tribe” and that the BIA will give deference to the 
tribe's valuation. 25 C.F.R. § 169.110(a). In theory, the tribe could negotiate for 
an amount so obscenely high that no company, no matter how well funded, 
would be willing to pay for rights to cross over a relatively small piece of land. 
It is a bit unclear what would happen in this scenario, as the regulations state 
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obligation to act in a tribe's best interests should compel the agency 
to support and enforce tribally-proposed conditions, restrictions, and 
negotiated remedies that mirror the trust obligation owed by the 
agency to the tribe. Given the clarity of the IRWA regulations, 
prospective grantees would have difficulty challenging a tribe that 
withheld consent. 
 
b.   Existing Right-of-Way Easements 
 
Existing right-of-way easements demand a different 
analysis, because many provisions in the IRWA regulations are 
prospective only, applying to projects initiated after the regulations 
took effect.147 Moreover, the express terms of the applicable grant 
will always govern the particular situation.148 Although the 
prospective-only regulations and the binding nature of existing grant 
terms do present obstacles, tribes still hold potential levers against 
existing grants. Those spring from regulatory provisions controlling 
renewal, assignment, and changes (including both minor 
amendments and material changes in use) of existing easement 
agreements.149 
                                                
that if agreement is not reached then BIA will require the grantee to pay the fair 
market value. 25 C.F.R. § 169.110(c).  
147 This was necessary, perhaps, for the BIA to avoid a flurry of challenges 
arguing that existing property interests had been altered by the regulations. One 
such challenge has already been attempted, albeit unsuccessfully. Western 
Energy Alliance (WEA), an organization of individuals “involved in all aspects 
of exploration, production, and transportation of oil and natural gas on federal 
and Indian lands”, brought a claim in federal court to invalidate the regulations. 
Order, Western Energy Alliance v. United States Department of Interior, Case 
no. 1:16-cv-050, 2 (D.N.D. 2016) [hereinafter WEA Order]. WEA's primary 
argument was that the regulations are contrary to federal Indian law principles 
and improperly altered property rights on existing easements. Id. at 3. The Dept. 
of Interior countered that the regulations were consistent with federal court 
decisions regarding tribal jurisdiction and did not affect existing property 
interests. Defendants' Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Western 
Energy Alliance v. United States Department of Interior, Case no. 1:16-cv-050, 
21 (D.N.D. 2016). WEA's motion for a preliminary injunction was denied, and 
the organization voluntarily dismissed their suit. See WEA Order, at 15.  These 
documents available through PACER. 
148 These terms could undermine tribal power, such as terms providing 
automatic renewal without consent or an absolute waiver of tribal jurisdiction 
over the right-of-way. 
149 See 25 C.F.R. § 169.202, 25 C.F.R. § 169.127, and 25 C.F.R. § 169.204. 
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Perhaps most notably, tribes retain the power to refuse to 
renew an easement grant upon expiration.150 The provisions 
governing renewals are procedural, thereby applying retroactively 
to existing grants.151 Barring any express terms for automatic 
renewal without consent, the BIA must disapprove of a renewal 
unless the grantee obtains consent from the tribe.152 Further, if the 
original grant was silent to renewals altogether, then a brand-new 
right-of-way application will be necessary, triggering the consent 
requirement discussed above and affording the tribe the opportunity 
to negotiate a written agreement with conditions and restrictions.153 
The BIA must also disapprove renewal requests where there is a 
change in the easement's size, type, or location, where the original 
grant has already expired, or where there are any outstanding grant 
violations.154 Lastly, the BIA may not approve a renewal if the 
aggregate lease or right of way term is considered unreasonable 
under the regulations.155 The regulations state that BIA must defer 
to the tribe on the question of reasonableness.156 If any of these 
procedural obstacles materialize, existing infrastructure would be 
subject to removal, as any possession or use without a right-of-way 
grant warrants treatment as trespass by the BIA.157  
A proactive approach is key in the context of existing rights-
of-way. For tribes seeking to extinguish existing grants, tribal 
attorneys must determine when each grant expires and what the 
terms prescribe for renewal. Grantees, and perhaps even the BIA, 
are unlikely to alert a tribe of a grant's approaching expiration, 
particularly in this era in which many tribes are demonstrating 
opposition to these fossil fuel projects.  
In an interesting application of the IRWA regulations, the 
Bad River Band of the Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians in 
2017 refused to renew an easement for the Enbridge Line 5 through 
                                                
150 25 C.F.R. § 169.202. 
151 Id.; see also “What are PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS of the Rights-of-Way 
on Indian Land Final Rule?” at 4: 
https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/as-ia/raca/pdf/idc1-033661.pdf. 
152 25 C.F.R. § 169.202(a)(6). 
153 25 C.F.R. § 169.202(c). 
154 25 C.F.R. § 169.202(a)(3); 25 C.F.R. § 169.202(a)(4); 25 C.F.R. § 
169.202(a)(5). 
155 25 C.F.R. § 169.202(a)(1). 
156 25 C.F.R. § 169.201(b). 
157 25 C.F.R. § 169.413. 
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certain parcels of its reservation.158 The particular easement 
agreement covered only a small portion of the pipeline that crosses 
the reservation, and the remaining easements were not due to expire 
for quite some time.159 Though it is too early to determine whether 
the refusal will block transport of oil through the entire pipeline, the 
tribe broadcast a powerful message through its spokesman who 
stated: “No form of compensation or negotiations will change our 
decision…It’s not about the money. It’s about the environment and 
what we leave behind for our next generations.”160  
A grantee’s attempt to assign an easement presents another 
lever over existing rights-of-way. Tribal consent must be obtained 
for assignments, unless the express terms of the grant provide 
otherwise.161 Even where the grant expressly provides for 
assignment without tribal consent, the BIA still must approve the 
assignment, and that approval process necessarily invokes the trust 
obligation.162 This broad federal obligation is captured by language 
directing BIA to reject an assignment to “protect the best interests” 
of the tribe, and to defer as much as possible to the tribe's position.163 
The language bears the indicia of a classic trust relationship. Thus, 
if relatively benign right-of-way grantee, such as an operator of a 
water line, seeks to assign its grant to  an oil pipeline company, the 
tribe likely can prevent such an assignment, either by refusing its 
consent or by imploring the BIA to honor the trust obligation, defer 
to the tribe's refusal, and disapprove the assignment.164 
 Changes in the grant carry similar potential for the exercise 
of tribal sovereignty. Changes can range from minor clerical 
                                                
158 See Karen Graham, Spills on Enbridge’s Old Line 5 Pipeline Tops One 
Million Gallons, DIGITAL JOURNAL, Apr. 26, 2017: 
http://www.digitaljournal.com/news/environment/spills-on-enbridge-s-old-line-
5-pipeline-tops-one-million-gallons/article/491245. 
159 See Danielle Kaeding, Bad River Band Won’t Renew Land Easements With 
Enbridge, BUSINESSNORTH, Jan. 9, 2017: 
http://www.businessnorth.com/kuws_wisconsin_public_radio/bad-river-band-
won-t-renew-land-easements-with-enbridge/article_e3e9fb0e-d6e1-11e6-b75c-
93b69f176c42.html. 
160 Id. 
161 25 C.F.R. § 169.207(a)(1). 
162 25 C.F.R. § 169.207(b). 
163 25 C.F.R. § 169.209. 
164 An interesting quandary arises when the opposite scenario occurs, with BIA 
denying a right of way after the tribe approves it, on the grounds that the right of 
way would harm the tribe’s ecological or other interests. This circumstance is 
not the focus of this article, but does underscore the complexity of the federal 
trust obligation. 
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amendments in the grant to a material change in use. The former 
category would not require tribal consent, but the latter would 
require at least BIA approval, if not complete tribal consent.165 The 
approval considerations for amendments mirror the trust language 
used for assignment approval, exposing the grantee to possible 
denial. 
As to changes in use, it is worthy of note that an unauthorized 
use amounts to a violation of the right-of-way grant and constitutes 
trespass, meaning that the BIA may—and under the trust obligation 
must—take action to recover possession of the easement and pursue 
any other available remedies.166 Drawing from established 
principles outside of the federal Indian law context, significant 
changes in use implicate traditional property law concepts regarding 
easements. Under these concepts, a user violates its easement when 
using the land for a use not specified in the original agreement or 
grant.167 The unstipulated use is said to be an “adverse” one, 
meaning a “wrongful use, made without the express or implied 
permission of the owner of the land.”168 Adverse uses “exceed the 
scope” of the original easement and create an undue burden on the 
easement, which may compel a forfeiture by the user.169 In this 
event, forfeiture should revert the land back to the tribe.170 
 Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that a change in 
use may mean a change in the frequency of use, rather than the type 
of use. There is already at least one notable example of such 
unauthorized use, where a railroad allegedly ramped up the 
frequency of trains carrying oil through a reservation without 
notifying the tribe, despite a requirement for notice in the terms of 
the easement.171 The next subsection analyzes the litigation that 
ensued. 
 
3.   Case Study on Enforcement of Existing Easement 
Agreements: Swinomish v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe 
                                                
165 25 C.F.R. § 169.127(a). 
166 25 C.F.R. § 169.413. 
167 Carye Cole Chapman, “Railroads Across Tribal Lands,” 20 AM. INDIAN L. 
REV. 489, 499 (1996). 
168 O'Dell v. Stegall, 703 S.E.2d 561, 583 (W. Va. 2010).  
169 See Chapman, supra note 165, at 499. 
170 Id. at 500. 
171 See Swinomish Indian Tribal Community v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe 
Railway Co., 228 F.Supp.3d. 1171 (2017) [hereinafter Swinomish I]. 
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In 2015, the Swinomish Indian Tribal Community (the tribe) 
brought suit against Burlington North Santa Fe (BNSF) railroad 
company, claiming that BNSF had violated an easement agreement 
with the tribe.172 The tribe asserted that BNSF unilaterally chose to 
start moving 100-car oil trains through the right-of-way, allegedly 
violating its obligation under the easement grant to both inform and 
receive approval by the tribe before increasing train traffic.173 
BNSF conceded that a breach of the easement occurred.174 
Its argument, however, was that an immediate injunctive remedy 
was unavailable from a federal court, because the Surface 
Transportation Board (STB) was the proper entity to initially hear 
disputes that could potentially stop rail traffic.175 Therefore, BNSF 
argued, any remedies from federal court are preempted by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA), 
which created the STB. Further, it concluded that the ICCTA 
usurped any authority to proceed under the previously enacted 
IRWA for easement violations.176 
Ultimately, the court found that there was no preemption 
issue between ICCTA and IRWA, as federal statutes do not preempt 
one another.177 Although the two statutes do intersect and at times 
conflict, any potential conflict is not “irreconcilable” to point of 
                                                
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 1176.  
174 Id.  
175 BNSF Motion to Dismiss or Stay, at 15. The Interstate Commerce 
Commission Termination Act (ICCTA), discussed in depth infra, gives the STB 
exclusive jurisdiction over “transportation by rail carriers, and the remedies 
provided in this part with respect to rates, classifications, rules . . . , practices, 
routes, services, and facilities of such carriers,” as well as the “abandonment, or 
discontinuance of” tracks. 
176 Swinomish I, at 1179-80. The court initially misunderstood the tribe’s 
contract and trespass arguments to be state law claims. The ICCTA, the court 
held, preempted any injunctive relief under these claims. The court drew from 
cases where agreements, arising under state contact law, constituted de facto 
regulation of rail carriers and therefore were preempted by federal railroad law. 
Such agreements “burden interstate commerce” because they “effectively 
require a common carrier to discriminate against a particular type of cargo 
and/or a particular region.” Thus, the ICCTA precluded federal courts from 
enforcing state contract claims through an injunction if that injunction would 
burden commerce by interrupting rail traffic. Id. at 1179. The tribe successfully 
motioned for reconsideration based on this error, and the court issued a second, 
corrected order. 
177 Id. at 1180.  
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repealing IRWA.178 In fact, there is no clear or even implicit 
indication that federal railroad law has repealed IRWA. The ICCTA 
did not mention IRWA, despite IRWA predating it significantly.179 
Furthermore, the STB has repeatedly recognized the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs' primary role in handling disputes over rights-of-way 
between tribes and grantees.180 Finally, the Secretary of the Interior 
made clear that the IRWA regulations applied to railway rights-of-
way.181 Therefore, any contract or trespass remedies available to 
tribes under IRWA are not foreclosed merely because the right-of-
way at issue belongs to a railroad regulated by the STB.182 
Enforcing the easement, the tribe asserted treaty rights in the 
land underlying the railroad tracks,183 thereby prompting a question 
of whether the ICCTA abrogated the tribe’s treaty right of exclusive 
use.184. The court recognized that such treaty rights remain on equal 
footing with statutes.185 Given the ICCTA’s lack of express 
abrogation language and the presumption against implicit 
divestment of treaty rights, the court concluded that the ICCTA did 
not affect the tribe's treaty right.187 When the ICCTA was enacted, 
many railroads crossed reservation lands—yet Congress failed to 
mention any conflict with treaty rights in the ICCTA, a factor  
weighing against abrogation. The IRWA, on the other hand, 
expressly recognized the intersection of railroads and treaties, 
making clear that unauthorized uses constitute trespass.188 In sum, 
                                                
178 Id. at 1181. 
179 Id.  
180 Id. at 1182. 
181 Id.  
182 In the past, the STB's predecessor has conditioned its ultimate approval of a 
railroad construction project through a reservation on consent from the 
governing tribe, through the BIA. In one notable case, a U.S. District Court gave 
deference to the BIA decision to uphold the tribe’s consent refusal and to deny 
the railroad an appeal hearing. See Star Lake R. Co. v. Lujan, 737 F.Supp. 103 
(D.D.C. 1990). 
183 See Swinomish Indian Tribal Community v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe 
Railway Co., 2018 WL 1336256 (2018) [hereinafter Swinomish III]. 
184 See Swinomish Indian Tribal Community v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe 
Railway 2017 WL 2483071, 2 (2017) [hereinafter Swinomish II]. “Where…a 
treaty is pitted against a federal statute, there is no issue of preemption.” Id. 
185 Id. 
187 Id. Congressional abrogation of treaty rights must be clear and express; 
generally, implicit abrogation of such rights is disfavored. 
188 Id. (stating that tribes “may pursue any available remedies under applicable 
law,” including treaty-based trespass actions in federal court.). 
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the Swinomish court held that the tribe could proceed with its claims 
without facing any preemption by federal railroad regulation. 
It is important to note at this juncture that an IRWA statutory 
claim of unauthorized use is distinct from a treaty claim asserting an 
inherent and unabrogated right to exclude non-tribal members from 
the reservation. Tribal attorneys should exercise caution in basing 
claims solely on a treaty right to exclude, because, as discussed 
below, the Supreme Court has suggested that this right may have 
been abrogated, at least in part, in the context of right-of-way 
easements.189 But despite the murkiness surrounding the treaty right 
to exclude—and Swinomish’s failure to sort out the confusion—the 
case makes clear that, under IRWA, unauthorized easement use 
amounts to a trespass, and tribes may seek redress in federal court 
to prevent that trespass. That statutory proposition (grounded in the 
IRWA), unlike the treaty-based right to exclude, which may have 
been limited by the Supreme Court.190 By leaving IRWA intact, 
Congress demonstrated that tribal right-of-way claims are unique. 
IRWA granted the Secretary of the Interior (through BIA) authority 
to prescribe right-of-way regulations, and those regulations provide 
mechanisms for tribes to pursue when easement agreements are 
violated. Because rights-of-ways invoke BIA’s trust obligation, any 
grant of exclusive authority to other agencies, such as the STB, 
would be improper.  
 The Swinomish case is still in its early stages, and the rulings 
thus far may be overturned or limited on appeal, so it remains 
difficult to predict what effect the decision will have on tribal rights-
of-way.191 Nevertheless, the case represents a positive legal 
development for tribes, in that a court has affirmed a tribe’s ability 
to exercise dominion over a right-of-way easement through its own 
                                                
189 “[S]o long as that [easement] is maintained as part of the State's highway, 
they cannot assert a landowner's right to occupy and exclude.” Strate v. A-1 
Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 440 (U.S. 1997). Nevertheless, this statement 
specifically references the landowner right to exclude, rather than a treaty right 
to exclude. Strate did not expressly contemplate treaty rights. Moreover, other 
treaty rights, such as the right to hunting and fishing, may be implicated by a 
significant increase in fossil fuel transport through a reservation, especially 
when such an increase did not receive tribal approval. 
190 See supra FN 166. 
191 Most recently, BNSF motioned for clarification and reconsideration on 
whether the right-of-way was actually located on tribal land. If not, no treaty 
rights could be asserted, and the claims were preempted. The court granted the 
motion for clarification, answered in the affirmative, and denied the motion for 
reconsideration of the issue. See Swinomish III. 
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lands. Such an affirmation empowers tribes, by asserting their 
property rights, to address the threat from irresponsible fossil fuel 
transport. The potential implications for tribes, energy extractors 
and transporters, and federal agencies are far-reaching.  
 
B.   Tribal Regulatory Tools 
 
The prior section discussed property-based tools available to 
a tribe to limit or prevent fossil fuel transportation through its 
reservation. The other framework that exists within the reservation 
boundaries is direct tribal regulation action, stemming from inherent 
governmental authority to pass laws that regulate conduct within 
sovereign boundaries.192 Tribes, as the original sovereign nations of 
this continent, have historically used regulatory systems to ensure 
that natural resources are sustained and protected. In the context of 
modern fossil fuel projects on reservations, direct regulation would 
likely be applied through tribal laws prescribing rules and 
limitations on fossil fuel transport within the tribe's jurisdiction. 
Such rules might include, for example, a moratorium against rail 
transport of oil or a requirement to use the best available technology 
for pipeline leak prevention. This approach is quite distinct from 
(but complimentary to) one asserting property rights. 
 Direct tribal regulation would seem to be much more 
straightforward and absolute than working within the property 
easement framework.193 However, this area faces preemption 
obstacles in federal court. While there is no bright-line rule against 
tribal regulation, tribal authority over easements and, more 
specifically, fossil fuel transport, has been somewhat diminished by 
judicial characterizations of easements over reservation and trust 
                                                
192 The “Treatment as States” provisions of several federal environmental laws, 
such as the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C.A. § 1377), also equip tribes with 
powerful regulatory tools in this context. Treatment as states provisions allow 
federal agencies to treat tribes as states for purposes of applicable federal laws, 
placing tribes on equal footing as states in terms of enforcement mechanisms. 
These federal laws are outside the scope of this article, which focuses on the 
viability of tribal regulation through tribal law. 
193 Notably, the property and regulatory approaches, while theoretically distinct, 
are easily confused because federal Indian law jurisprudence has greatly 
constrained tribal regulation over non-tribally owned lands within the 
reservation—thus making regulatory outcomes contingent on property 
ownerships. Tribal governments and attorneys must assess the riskiness of 
asserting such regulatory authority, as an unfavorable court decision could strip 
tribes of regulatory authority in this context entirely.  
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lands as being equivalent to easements over non-Indian fee land. 
Tribal regulatory authority over fossil fuel projects encounters the 
preemptive nature of overarching federal legislative control in this 
area, which may in some circumstances exclude tribal authority. 
 This section explores such limitations on tribal regulatory 
power. It begins by analyzing whether tribes retain the inherent 
authority to regulate fossil fuel infrastructure over easements 
passing through reservations. It then examines the relevant federal 
legislation that expressly limits tribal authority. Finally, it briefly 
considers whether the Dormant Commerce Clause operates to 
thwart tribal regulation.  
 
1.   Authority to Regulate 
 
For a tribe seeking to use direct regulation to protect its 
natural resources and the health of its members from the harm posed 
by fossil fuel infrastructure, the first inquiry is a foundational one: 
does the tribe possess basic authority to regulate? 
 This question is deceptively simple and depends largely on 
property ownership. Tribes generally have inherent authority to 
assert jurisdiction over their reservation and trust lands in civil and, 
to some extent, criminal matters.194 Civil authority largely extends 
over nonmembers. As the Supreme Court declared in Montana v. 
United States, “Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to 
exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their 
reservations.”195 However, tribal authority does not indefinitely 
extend to nonmembers on “non-Indian fee land” that has been 
transferred out of trust and into non-tribal member fee ownership 
through an act of Congress.196 A complicated patchwork of authority 
exists on many reservations, often making jurisdictional analyses 
rather difficult. 
 Tribal regulation of fossil fuel infrastructure will likely 
entail regulation over right-of-way land, given that these projects 
almost always require an easement as discussed in the previous 
                                                
194 “Handbook of Federal Indian Law,” Felix S. Cohen (2012). 
195 Montana v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544, 565 (U.S. 1981) [hereinafter Montana]. 
Nevada v. Hicks did prohibit tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers on trust lands, 
but that was under an extremely particular set of facts involving state law 
enforcement capability. 533 U.S. 353 (U.S. 2001). 
196 Montana, at 566. 
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section.197 The first question for a jurisdictional analysis, then, is 
what type of property are rights-of-way through tribal lands: do they 
remain standard trust land, or do they constitute fee land? The 
answer seems to be somewhere in between. 
 Under traditional property law principles, rights-of-way are 
conventionally viewed as non-possessory interests—”easements 
that do not convey fee title and may be limited to a specific use or 
purpose.”198 Thus, under a traditional interpretation, a tribe would 
have regulatory jurisdiction over a right-of-way as it would over any 
other reservation or trust land. But in the world of federal Indian 
law, traditional interpretations have morphed into complex and 
confusing arrangements. In a handful of opinions, federal courts 
have concluded that right-of-way easements are “equivalent” to 
non-Indian fee land for purposes of tribal jurisdiction. These 
opinions continue a multi-decade trend of the judiciary to erode 
tribal jurisdiction, but ultimately should not categorically foreclose 
regulation here, for reasons explained below. 
The leading case in this line is Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 
which dealt with a state highway right-of-way and a tribe's authority 
to adjudicate a tort claim over an accident that occurred on that 
highway.199 The Court concluded that although the right-of-way 
passed over tribal trust land, the land within the right-of-way was 
“equivalent, for nonmember governance purposes, to such alienated, 
non-Indian land.”200 To reach this conclusion, the Court considered 
several factors: “the legislation creating the right-of-way; whether 
the right-of-way was acquired with the consent of the tribe; whether 
                                                
197 Given that significant portions of land in many reservations has been 
transferred to nonmembers in fee through various allotment-style actions, it is 
possible that a pipeline or railroad could pass through a reservation but remain 
entirely within fee land without a right-of-way. In this scenario, the Montana 
analysis discussed infra would still apply. It is also worth noting that regulation 
would also likely occur over existing easements, because new projects could 
conceivably be denied through the regulations' consent requirement without the 
need for regulatory action. Yet, there is much clearer tribal authority for 
regulatory jurisdiction over new easements than existing easements; § 169.10 
preserves tribal jurisdiction, but BIA has characterized that provision as 
prospective only.  
198 United States v. Jackson, 697 F.3d 670, 676 (8th Cir. 2012). 
199 Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) [hereinafter Strate].  
200 Id. at 454. However, the regulations discussed supra aim to contain this 
holding by clearly noting that a right-of-way grant does not diminish tribal 
jurisdiction. Kevin Washburn refers to this provision as a “Strate ‘Fix.’” 
Washburn & Cummings, supra note 119, at 4. 
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the tribe had reserved the right to exercise dominion and control over 
the right-of-way; whether the land was open to the public; and 
whether the right-of-way was under state control.”201 Although this 
case dealt with adjudicative, rather than regulatory, jurisdiction, the 
Court stated that “a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed 
its legislative jurisdiction.”202 
 Despite this overarching precedent, the Department of the 
Interior, under the Obama administration, took the position that no 
categorical rule exists on the question of whether a right-of-way 
easement is equivalent to non-Indian fee land; rather, a fact specific 
inquiry is necessary using the Strate factors.203 As made apparent by 
several cases discussed below, this is also the position that the Ninth 
Circuit has implicitly taken. That court has never concluded 
absolutely that a right-of-way is non-Indian fee land without first 
considering the facts, even if the court ultimately determined that 
tribal jurisdiction is lacking. Because the context can vary 
dramatically with respect to the Strate factors, a fact specific inquiry 
is the correct analysis. 
If pipeline or railroad rights-of-way are determined to be 
conventional trust land for jurisdictional purposes, as distinguished 
from the highway right of way in Strate, then tribes have the 
underlying authority to regulate activity over that right-of-way, and 
the basic jurisdictional inquiry ends there. If, on the other hand, 
fossil fuel easements are equivalent to non-Indian fee land for 
jurisdictional purposes (applying the Strate test), the “Montana 
Test” will apply.204 Under Montana, inherent sovereign jurisdiction 
over nonmembers on nonmember fee land is prohibited unless one 
of two exceptions are met.205 First, tribes may exercise jurisdiction 
                                                
201 Big Horn County Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Adams, 219 F.3d 944, 950 (9th Cir. 
2000) (referencing Strate). 
202 Strate, at 453.  
203 Brief for Dept. of the Interior, Western Energy Alliance v. United States 
Department of the Interior, 2016, at 30. 
204 Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Red Wolf, 196 F.3d 1059, 1064 (9th 
Cir.1999). 
205 Montana, at 565. Although the two are usually what is being referred to when 
one mentions the “Montana Test,” the Court made clear that a treaty could also 
empower tribes to exercise jurisdiction over non-Indian fee land. This article 
does not delve too deeply into the matter of whether the Montana treaty basis 
would apply here. The question would be whether the statute that transferred 
property interests away from the tribe, IRWA, abrogated the tribe's treaty-based 
right to exclude non-members. Although Strate implies that it did, the tribe in 
that case did not raise treaty arguments. Strate instead dealt with a landowner's 
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over the activities of nonmembers who “enter consensual 
relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial 
dealing, contracts, leases or other arrangements.”206 Second, tribes 
may assert jurisdiction over “the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands 
within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct 
effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health 
or welfare of the tribe.”207 A line of cases in the Ninth Circuit applies 
the Montana Test to determine tribal jurisdiction over rights-of-way 
in Indian Country.208 These cases do not involve fossil fuel 
easements, but examination of the judicial analyses does provide 
some important insight to how a court might characterize 
jurisdiction over such a right-of-way. 
In State of Montana Department of Transportation v. King, 
the court prohibited the assertion of a tribal employment preference 
ordinance against a state conducting maintenance on a state highway 
right-of-way through a tribe's reservation.209 The court applied the 
Strate factors and concluded that the highway was equivalent to 
non-Indian fee land, thus triggering the Montana test.210 Applying 
the test, the court rejected the consensual relationship exception, 
stating that “transfers of property interests between governmental 
entities create property rights; they generally do not create 
                                                
right to exclude. Moreover, South Dakota v. Bourland, a case very similar to 
Montana, says that the effect on the land at issue is dispositive. 508 U.S. 679, 
692 (1993). In Bourland, the Court concluded that because the land was opened 
to the public, the tribe lost its right to “absolute and undisturbed use and 
occupation.” Id. at 697. Arguably, IRWA did not have this effect. Instead, it 
only grants a usufructuary interest to a nonmember. In addition, tribal consent 
was always required. Therefore, a tribe under the Treaty of Point Elliot may still 
retain its right to exclusive use, despite some property interests being transferred 
away from the tribe. This treaty-based approach opens up an entirely new and 
distinct analysis. We save that full discussion of a treaty-based right to regulate 
for another article, although several subsequent footnotes in this article will 
address the question. Moreover, there is a very strong argument that the tribal 
regulation via inherent regulatory authority, under the second Montana Test 
exception, applies per se (see infra discussion). 
206 Montana, at 565. 
207 Montana, at 565. 
208 See also Big Horn County Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Adams, 219 F.3d 944, 950 
(9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a tribal lacked jurisdiction to tax the property of a 
telecommunications company when that property sat atop a right-of-way granted 
to the company). 
209 Montana Dept. of Transp. v. King, 191 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 1999) 
[hereinafter King]. 
210 Id. at 1113. 
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continuing consensual relationships.”211 The court went on to 
conclude that the health and welfare exception was not satisfied 
either.212 Although the tribe's interest in mitigating the harm caused 
by unemployment on the reservation might have been legitimate, 
this was not the type of harm to health and welfare contemplated by 
Montana.213 
Drawing on this precedent, the Ninth Circuit in Burlington 
North Railroad Company v. Red Wolf rejected tribal adjudicative 
jurisdiction over a tort claim by tribal members against a railroad for 
an accident occurring on the railroad's right-of-way through trust 
lands.214 Using the Strate factors, the court concluded (as it did in 
King) that the right-of-way was equivalent to non-Indian fee land 
and that application of the Montana Test was appropriate.215 The 
tribal members argued that because tribal consent is required before 
a right-of-way through a reservation may be granted, a consensual 
relationship is created between the grantee and the tribe.216 The 
court rejected this argument, citing King for the principle that “A 
right-of-way created by Congressional grant is a transfer of a 
property interest that does not create a continuing consensual 
relationship between a tribe and the grantee.”217 The court also 
rejected application of the second exception, noting that the threat 
to health and welfare must be “demonstrably serious” and that 
railcar accidents, even those with the “possibility of injuring 
multiple tribal members” do not meet that standard.218 
 Unlike the cases discussed above, where jurisdiction was 
asserted over relatively benign activity, the potential for accidents 
during fossil fuel transport does indeed pose a grave threat to tribal 
health and natural resources. Thus, if a court were to apply the 
                                                
211 Id.  
212 Id. at 1114.  
213 Id. 
214 196 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir.1999) [hereinafter Red Wolf]. 
215 Id. at 1063. Referring to a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction over a tort claim, 
“[t]here is no principled distinction to be made between the jurisdictional 
analysis applicable to a congressionally-granted highway right-of-way and a 
congressionally-granted railroad right-of-way.” Id. The reason, in both 
scenarios, was that Congress acted consistent with its plenary power “to bestow 
rights to a parcel of land upon one party, thereby limiting the rights of another to 
the same land.” Id. 
216 Id. at 1064. 
217 King, at 1113-14. 
218 Red Wolf, at 1065, quoting Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 815 (9th 
Cir. 1997). 
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Montana Test to a tribe's assertion of regulatory jurisdiction over 
fossil fuel right-of-way easements, then the “health and welfare” 
exception appears satisfied, as even a cursory examination of fossil 
fuel transport accidents shows that the potential harm posed by some 
of these projects is “demonstrably serious,” meeting the standard 
announced in Red Wolf.  
 As an example of the grave harm posed by oil “bomb trains” 
carrying Bakken crude oil, a derailment in Lac-Mégantic, Quebec 
killed fifty people and destroyed or contaminated nearly every 
building in the downtown area.219 Fire response personnel testified 
in later hearings before the U.S. Congress that people were 
“vaporized” upon exiting their homes.220 The derailed train dumped 
26,000 gallons of crude oil into the Chaudière River.221 In the Pacific 
Northwest, the 2106 derailment at Mosier, Oregon along the 
Columbia River Gorge necessitated a clean-up with short-term costs 
of nearly $9 million. 222 In periods of low precipitation, explosions 
carry the added potential of sparking a wildfire capable of 
eradicating entire communities of the sort that incinerated Paradise, 
California, in a matter of hours in November 2018.223 Oil train 
                                                
219 “Canada Train Derailment: Death Toll at 50; Lac-Mégantic Residents Jeer 
Rail CEO,” ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 11, 2013: 
http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2013/07/canadian_train_derailment_de
ath_roll_at_50_residents_of_lac-megantic_jeer_rail_c.html. 
220 Nick Sambides, Jr., “Rangeley Fire Chief Tells Senate Subcommittee People 
‘Vaporized’ in Quebec Rail Disaster,” BANGOR DAILY NEWS, April 9, 2014: 
https://bangordailynews.com/2014/04/09/news/state/rangeley-fire-chief-tells-
senate-subcommittee-people-vaporized-in-quebec-rail-disaster/. 
221 “Leaking Oil from Lac-Mégantic Disaster Affects Nearby Towns,” CBN 
NEWS, July 7, 2013: 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/story/2013/07/07/quebec-lac-
megantic-questions-raised-environmental-safety-concerns.html; 
https://www.securitepublique.gouv.qc.ca/fileadmin/Documents/securite_civile/a
ccident_ferroviaire_lac-megantic/reintegration_citoyens_lac-megantic_en.pdf. 
222 Dake, supra note 40. Further, the railroad companies have been known to be 
unwilling or unable to pay clean-up costs, leaving the financial burden to 
government entities. For example, in the Quebec disaster, the rail and fuel 
companies at fault delegated blame to one another, leaving the city to pay the 
bill until litigation between the companies was finished. See Allan Woods, Lac-
Mégantic Mayor Says Town Stuck With $4 Million in Unpaid Bills for Cleanup, 
THE STAR, July 23, 2103: 
https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2013/07/23/lacmegantic_residents_allowe
d_brief_visit_home.html. 
223 Alastair Gee and Dani Anguiano, “Last Day in Paradise: The Untold Story of 
How a Fire Swallowed A Town,” THE GUARDIAN, December 20, 2018: 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/dec/20/last-day-in-paradise-
california-deadliest-fire-untold-story-survivors. 
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explosions and the resulting contamination pose threats to tribal 
members’ health and welfare that fall into in a different league than 
the car accidents considered by the courts in Strate and Red Wolf. 
 Safety records point to grave threats from pipelines as well. 
In 2016, 633 pipeline leaks and explosions occurred in the United 
States; on average, a pipeline incident occurred almost twice a day 
during that year.224 These accidents caused sixteen deaths, eighty-
seven injuries, and well over $321 million in clean-up costs.225 Such 
data suggests that pipeline ruptures and explosions are common, and 
sometimes catastrophic. Fossil fuel contamination, whether from oil 
train derailments or pipeline ruptures, can ruin reservation water 
supplies, expose tribal members to acute short-term and long-term 
health effects, and damage tribal fisheries and wildlife. 226 A 
multitude of experiences, studies, and data build a case towards 
making a categorical determination that fossil fuel transport meets 
the health and welfare exception of Montana, thereby justifying 
tribal jurisdiction over these activities across reservations. Indeed, 
the federal government and court decisions have already recognized 
that the health and welfare exception of Montana may be met when 
a tribe's water resources are threatened.227  
The second, consensual relations, exception of Montana 
triggers a different analysis, one turning on variable circumstances 
involving the precise right-of-way, so it is not susceptible to a 
presumptive (or categorical) application. The most recent Ninth 
Circuit precedent stems from the Red Wolf decision, which held that 
no consensual relationship was formed by a right-of-way grant. But 
                                                
224 “Pipeline Incident 20 Year Trends, “Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety 
Administration”, accessed Feb. 9, 2017: 
http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/library/data-stats/pipelineincidenttrends. 
225 Id.  
226 For various impacts, see “How does oil impact marine life?” NATIONAL 
OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, March 21, 2014, 
http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/oilimpacts.html; Bittel, Jason, “Oil Spills Are 
Even Worse for Birds than We Thought,” NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE 
CENTER, July 7, 2017, https://www.nrdc.org/onearth/oils-spills-are-even-worse-
birds-we-thought; Gay, Jon, “The Health Effects of Oil Contamination: A 
Compilation of Research,” Worchester Polytechnic Institute, Dec. 15, 2010. 
https://web.wpi.edu/Pubs/E-project/Available/E-project-121510; 
203112/unrestricted/Health_Effects_of_Oil_Contamination_-_Final_Report.pdf. 
227 33 U.S.C.A. § 1377(e); see also Montana v. U.S. E.P.A., 137 F.3d 1135 (9th 
Cir. 1998); Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d. 42, 52 (E.D. 
Wash. 1978) (holding that threats to water quantity rights can satisfy the 
Montana Test).   
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in so finding, Red Wolf seemingly misplaced its reliance on King. 
King involved a tribal-state dispute over right-of-way jurisdiction, 
and that court clearly stated that “transfers of property interests 
between a tribal governmental entities create property rights; they 
generally do not create continuing consensual relationships” 
(emphasis added).228 While the King context involved a tribal-state 
transfer, the fossil fuel context involves a property relationship 
between a government and a private entity, such as a railroad or 
pipeline developer. This indeed may create a consensual 
relationship that is absent in the government-to-government 
transfer. While the Red Wolf court collapsed the two contexts into 
one test, it seemingly did so without analysis, and a future court 
would be justified in revisiting the question and distinguishing the 
private fossil fuel context from the King facts.   
 But even more notable, these cases (King and Red Wolf) 
were both decided prior to the enactment of the new right-of-way 
regulations. As discussed in the previous section, the new 
regulations clearly form a continuing relationship between the 
grantee and the tribe, because they require tribal consent at multiple 
points in the lifetime of the grant rather than only at the initial 
application stage. They also provide tribes with significant 
negotiating power to set conditions and restrictions when that 
consent requirement is triggered. Within this new regulatory regime, 
it seems paradoxical to condition continued activity on affirmative 
tribal consent yet deny that a continuing consensual relationship 
exists.229 But, in any event, the argument for satisfying the “health 
and welfare” exception of Montana is strong enough (as explained 
above) that tribes should not have to premise their regulatory 
authority on the consensual relationship exception. 
 To summarize, tribes should retain inherent regulatory 
jurisdiction over fossil fuel rights-of-way, despite the multi-layer 
jurisdictional analysis required to arrive at that conclusion. If the 
right-of-way is found to be trust land, the tribe retains its sovereign 
authority unfettered by narrowing court opinions. If the right-of-way 
                                                
228 King, at 1113. 
229 In addition, the Department of Interior recently took the position that 
consensual relationships between right-of-way grantees and tribes are, at the 
very least, not categorically foreclosed moving forward Brief for Dept. of the 
Interior, Western Energy Alliance v. United States Department of the Interior, 
2016, at 30. 
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is found to be the equivalent of non-Indian fee land, thus triggering 
the Montana test, the tribe seemingly retains its sovereign authority 
to regulate because one, if not both, of the exceptions can be 
satisfied.230  
 
2.   Federal Preemption Issues 
 
If tribes retain authority to regulate, the second issue is 
whether that authority is preempted by federal law.231 Federal 
statutory regulation of these fossil fuel projects is sweeping and 
expressly preempts most state and local laws. Several of the relevant 
federal laws, however, fail to make any reference to tribal regulation 
or tribes generally, and there may be a sound argument that they do 
not even apply to tribes in some circumstances.232 But even if they 
do apply, no express conflict exists under the plain language in two 
of the three relevant statutes. 
 This article does not analyze in depth whether each 
applicable federal law preempts tribal regulation; such analysis 
draws a complex inquiry and warrants a dedicated commentary of 
                                                
230 Moreover, IRWA regulations seem to concede initial tribal jurisdiction, 
though they limit such jurisdiction by preemption concepts, discussed in the next 
section. Under the regulations for rights-of-way, easements are subject to tribal 
law except to the extent that tribal law is inconsistent with federal law. In other 
words, tribes can regulate except to the extent that federal law preempts the 
exercise of tribal law. 25 C.F.R. § 169.6. Kevin Washburn impliedly 
characterized this provision as a “Strate fix,” preserving tribal jurisdiction over 
easements moving forward. Washburn & Cummings, supra note 119, at 17-9. 
231 Again, the terms of each particular grant will likely control. For example, a 
grant might expressly and absolutely waive tribal jurisdiction over the easement. 
The analysis here presumes that a grant is silent as to jurisdiction and regulatory 
authority.  
232 With some exceptions, courts have generally adhered to the principle that 
Congressional intent to divest a tribe of sovereign authority should be clear and 
express. Furthermore, the Indian Canons of Construction, which say that “any 
doubtful expressions of legislative intent must be resolved in favor of the 
Indians” should operate in this context. A statute of general applicability will 
apply to tribes unless one of the following exceptions are met: 1) application 
would impede purely intramural tribal government processes, 2) the application 
would infringe on treaty rights, or 3) Congressional intent to exclude tribes is 
demonstrated. See Donovan v. Coeur D'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113 (9th 
Cir. 1985). Arguably, applying these statutes, particularly to the extent that 
concurrent tribal regulation is precluded, would infringe on the treaty right to 
exclude, as tribes would not be able to exclude export projects from their 
reservations. 
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its own.233 The following discussion instead maps the terrain 
generally and examines the statutory language for express reference 
to tribes and their laws. Because the statutes governing pipelines and 
those governing railroads are distinct, this section handles them 
separately. Subsection (a) examines preemption under the Pipeline 
Safety Act (PSA), which controls pipeline safety standards. 
Subsection (b) considers the preemption provisions of the ICCTA, 
which governs coal-by-rail and oil-by-rail, and the Hazardous 
Materials Transportation Act (HMTA), which governs oil-by-rail 
only.  
 
a.   Federal Pipeline Regulation 
 
 Pipeline construction and safety is regulated by a myriad of 
federal and state statutes and regulations.234 State law cannot 
preempt tribal law, so the preemption analysis only involves federal 
law.235 Further, because the right-of-way regulations require consent 
for new easements (as previously explained), any new pipeline 
construction could conceivably be denied on consent grounds 
without the need for tribal regulation.236 Any regulation from a tribe 
would instead likely be over existing infrastructure through safety 
requirements, such as design, emergency plans and procedures, 
operation, and maintenance of pipeline facilities. 
 The closest federal parallel to such regulation appears to be 
the PSA.237 The PSA’s stated purpose is to “provide adequate 
protection against risks to life and property posed by pipeline 
                                                
233 Aside from the complexity of the statutory analysis involved, the policy 
justifications for preemption differ enormously between contexts. It matters 
greatly whether federal preemption operates as a tool to drive destruction of 
local ecological and human communities, or whether it provides a bar against 
the same. Conceivably, cases could arise out of federal environmental protection 
rules imposed on tribal-led projects, approved by a tribal council, that threaten 
irrevocable damage to reservation lands and resources that are held in trust to 
perpetually sustain future generations of tribal members. That is not the case 
addressed in this article, where tribal councils oppose numerous fossil fuel 
projects that have high potential for damage but are nevertheless streamlined by 
federal law. It is sufficient here to note that the federal Indian trust responsibility 
imposes a duty of protection that frames any preemption issue.  
234 “Pipeline Transportation of Natural Gas and Crude Oil: Federal and State 
Regulatory Authority”: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44432.pdf. 
235 See Cohen, supra note 177. 
236 25 C.F.R. § 169.107(a). 
237 49 U.S.C.A. § 60101 - 60141. 
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transportation and pipeline facilities.”238 To that end, the statute 
grants the Secretary of Transportation the power to promulgate and 
enforce minimum pipeline and facility safety standards.239  
 While expressing preempting state standards, the PSA is 
altogether silent as to tribal regulation.240 The omission suggests that 
tribal governments have retained regulatory authority over pipeline 
safety within their borders. The PSA stands in marked contrast to 
the HMTA, discussed infra, where both tribal and state regulation is 
expressly limited by the same preemption provision. Since Congress 
enacted the PSA four years after amending the HMTA to preempt 
tribes, it would seem that Congress intentionally omitted tribes from 
the PSA preemption provision.241 There appears to be no mention of 
tribes within the legislative history, much less a discussion of the 
implications on tribal regulation. In sum, there are no clear signs of 
preemption or express conflict in the PSA. The lack of preemption 
or conflict suggests that, through tribal regulatory law, tribes may 
create and enforce pipeline safety standards more stringent than 
federal standards.242  
 
b.   Federal Rail Regulation 
 
i.   Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA) 
 
                                                
238 49 U.S.C.A. § 60102. 
239 49 U.S.C.A. § 60101-60141. 
240 49 U.S.C.A. § 60104(c). 
241 See FN 251 infra. The PSA was enacted in 1994 to combine and recodify the 
Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act of 1979 (formerly 49 U.S.C.A. 2001-
2014) (HLPSA) and the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 (formerly 49 
U.S.C.A. 1671). See Sutton, Randy J., Validity, Construction, and Application of 
Pipeline Safety Act, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 60101 et seq., and Other Acts Subsumed 
Therein, 186 A.L.R. FED. 361 (2003). 
242 Importantly, a safety standard that temporarily shuts down flow may, in the 
context of natural gas, implicate the Natural Gas Act (NGA, 15 U.S.C. § 717f) 
and involve the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Like the PSA, 
the NGA is also silent on tribal regulation. However, courts have held that “once 
natural gas is “dedicated” to interstate commerce under a certificate of public 
convenience and necessity, that gas may not be withdrawn from the interstate 
market without prior [FERC] approval,” even when a tribe is electing to 
withdraw the gas on tribal lands. However, the case involved a taxation dispute, 
not an attempt by a tribe to regulate for environmental protection purposes. See 
Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 578 F.2d 289, 
291 (10th Cir. 1978). 
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The ICCTA provides the Surface Transportation Board 
(STB) with general federal oversight of railway operations.243 The 
aim of the ICCTA is to improve the consistency and efficiency of 
interstate rail traffic by centralizing authority within this agency.244 
The ICCTA controls general rail transportation, meaning that both 
coal trains and oil trains fall within the STB’s regulatory scheme. 
The ICCTA grants the STB exclusive authority over two general 
matters: 1) Transportation by rail carriers, and remedies with respect 
to rates, routes, and services; and 2) Construction of tracks and 
facilities.245 
Preemption language in the statute’s section 10501(b) makes 
clear that the “remedies provided” under the ICCTA are “exclusive 
and preempt the remedies provided under Federal or State law.”246 
Ordinances from states and local governments that seek to regulate 
rail traffic are commonly invalidated under this “exclusive” 
authority provision.247 Courts have held that state and local law may 
not impose “operating limitations,” such as limits on train length, 
speed, or scheduling, on rail carriers.248 Further, state and local laws 
compelling rail carriers to undergo “substantial capital 
improvements” are preempted.249 
 Although the explicit ICCTA preemption language has been 
construed to bar state and local regulation, courts have not evaluated 
                                                
243 “Regulation - Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act 
Preemption,” 65 Am. Jur. 2d Railroads § 184 (2018). 
244 Id. 
245 49 U.S.C.A. § 10501(b). 
246 Id. Interpreting this provision, one court stated, “It is difficult to imagine a 
broader statement of Congress's intent to preempt state regulatory authority over 
railroad operations.” See City of Auburn v. U.S. Government, 154 F.3d 1025, 
1030 (9th. Cir. 1998) (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 
944 F. Supp. 1573, 1581 (N.D. Ga. 1996)).  
247 City of Auburn, at 1033; see also, Association of American Railroads v. 
South Coast Air Quality Management District, 622 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 
2010); Green Mountain Railroad Corporation v. Vermont, 404 F.3d 638, 640 
(2nd Cir. 2005). However, courts have noted that state laws which have a 
“remote or incidental” effect on rail transportation are permissible. The question 
is to what degree the state law burdens rail transportation. Furthermore, the STB 
has ruled that the preemption provision does not extinguish the right of state and 
local actors to “impose appropriate public health and safety regulation on 
interstate railroads,” as long as regulation does not interfere with or 
unreasonably burden rail transportation. Tovah R.Trimming, “Derailing Powder 
River Basin Coal Exports: Legal Mechanisms to Regulate Fugitive Coal Dust 
from Rail Transportation,” 6 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 321 (2013). 
248 See supra Section IV.B.2-3.   
249 Id. 
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tribal regulation through the provision. The statutory language of 
section (b) expressly preempts only “Federal and State” laws.250 
Tribes are referenced in subsection (c) which notes that state, local, 
and tribal authority over certain public transportation and solid 
waste shipment by rail is unaffected by the statute.251 One might 
argue that tribal authority over these matters would not need to be 
preserved if the statute did not otherwise apply to preempt tribal 
regulation. However, the explicit mention of tribal authority in 
section (c) also shows that Congress was aware of the potential for 
tribal regulation, and suggests that the omission of tribes from (b) 
must be purposeful, particularly given the placement of (b) and (c) 
quite literally next to each other in the statute. 
  Similar to the PSA analysis above, the ICCTA can and 
should be viewed in comparison to the HMTA. The ICCTA was 
enacted after tribes were added to the HMTA.252 Despite the 
HMTA's five-year-old express preemption against tribal regulation 
of certain rail traffic, Congress did not expressly preempt tribal 
regulation of rail traffic more broadly in the ICCTA. Accordingly, 
tribal regulation of coal and oil trains should not be hindered by the 
ICCTA's preemption provision directed to states.253 However, as 
noted previously, federal oversight of oil trains falls under the 
HMTA as well, which has a preemption provision that bars tribal 
laws. The next subsection discusses that provision along with a 
potential work-around through a preemption waiver.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
250 49 U.S.C.A. § 10501(b). 
251 49 U.S.C.A. § 10501(c). 
252 See FN 251, infra. Moreover, the ICCTA was enacted around fifty years after 
IRWA, meaning that railroad rights-of-way through Indian Country were 
commonplace at the time of enactment. 
253 The Federal Rail Safety Act (FRSA) (49 U.S.C.A. § 20106), which governs 
rail safety requirements, also potentially preempts state rail safety rules. 
However, as with the PSA and the ICCTA, FRSA's preemption provision does 
not mention tribes. Furthermore, the regulations implementing the HMTA 
regulations covering preemption also reference FRSA as another potential 
source of preemption. However, those regulations clearly refer only to the 
preemptive nature of the HMTA in regard to tribal regulation, while referring to 
both the HMTA and FRSA as potentially preempting state regulation. 49 C.F.R. 
§ 174.2, 49 C.F.R. § 179.8. 
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ii.   Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA) 
 
The HMTA regulates shipment of hazardous materials, 
including oil-by-rail, declaring its purpose to “protect against the 
risks to life, property, and the environment that are inherent in the 
transportation of hazardous material in intrastate, interstate, and 
foreign commerce.”254 The HMTA gives the Secretary of 
Transportation authority over the “safe transportation, including 
security, of hazardous materials” in commerce.255 
 In contrast to the PSA and the ICCTA, the HMTA does 
abrogate tribal regulatory power over oil trains, expressly 
contemplating tribal regulation.256 The statute contains an express 
preemption provision, declaring that “unless authorized by another 
law,” a tribal “requirement” is preempted if one of two conditions is 
met:257 1) if compliance with the tribe's requirement and “a 
requirement of this chapter, a regulation prescribed under this 
chapter, or a hazardous materials transportation security regulation 
or directive issued by the Secretary of Homeland Security” would 
not be possible;258 of 2), if the tribal requirement “is an obstacle to 
accomplishing and carrying out” the HMTA, a regulation of the 
HMTA, or any other hazardous materials transportation requirement 
from the Secretary of Homeland Security.259  
 The provision has generated some caselaw. In Northern 
States Power Company v. Prairie Island Mdewakanton Sioux Indian 
Community, a tribal law that regulated the transport of nuclear 
                                                
254 The HMTA does not apply to pipelines, 49 U.S.C.A. 5126(b)(1) and does not 
appear to cover coal-by-rail. 49 U.S.C.A. § 5126(b)(1). Although the statute and 
regulations do not explicitly say so, coal train regulations are generally under 
ICCTA, rather than HMTA, preemption. See Holmquist v. U.S., 2017 WL 
3013259 (E. D. Wash. 2017); see also Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. Goldthwaite, 
176 So.3d 1209 (Ala. 2015). Thus, any preemptive effect of the HMTA for 
tribal oil train regulation should not apply for tribal coal train regulation. Comes 
down to whether it meets one of the 9 hazard classes activated charcoal.  
255 49 U.S.C. § 5103(b). 
256 49 U.S.C.A. § 5125(a), 49 C.F.R. § 171.1, 49 C.F.R. § 174.2, 49 C.F.R. § 
179.8. Tribes were not listed in the HMTA’s preemption provision until 1990. 
See PL 93–633 (HR 15223) (1975). HMTA that did not include tribes in 
preemption provision 49 USC 1811; but see PL 101–615 (1990) (HMTA that 
included tribes in preemption provision 49 USC 1811); PL 101 (HR 3229), from 
Sept. 7, 1989, was the first proposed version of amended HMTA with “tribes” to 
appear in history. 
257 49 U.S.C.A. § 5125(a). 
258 49 U.S.C.A. § 5125(a)(1). 
259 49 U.S.C.A. § 5125(a)(2).  
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material through a reservation was held to be preempted by the 
HMTA.260 The Eighth Circuit concluded that the tribal ordinance's 
extensive information requirements would demand too much of 
transporters and frustrate shipping that was allowed under the 
HMTA.261 The court concluded that the tribal law created an 
obstacle to the goals of the HMTA and was therefore preempted by 
that statute.262 
 A court following on Prairie Island would likely hold that a 
tribal ordinance regulating oil trains (rather than nuclear waste 
trains) is likewise prohibited. Yet one possible, largely untested, 
workaround exists in the statute’s waiver application. A provision 
of the HMTA allows for a tribe to apply to the Secretary of 
Transportation to waive federal preemption of a tribal ordinance.263 
As a requirement of the waiver application, the tribe must concede 
that its law is preempted by the HMTA.264 The Secretary may then 
grant the waiver if two conditions are met: 1) that the tribal 
ordinance “provides the public at least as much protection” as the 
HMTA and its regulations; and 2) that the ordinance is not an 
unreasonable burden on commerce. 
 The first prong is easily satisfied by a tribal regulatory 
ordinance restricting rail transport of oil via “bomb trains” currently 
allowed by federal law. The second prong, on the other hand, makes 
for a more difficult argument against preemption, as “unreasonable 
burden” on commerce is not defined. The only guidance comes from 
the relevant regulations, which prescribe several factors to govern 
the inquiry:  
                                                
260 In 1991, the Prairie Island Mdewakanton Sioux Community passed an 
ordinance that required shipping companies to obtain a tribal permit one 
hundred and eighty days prior to transporting nuclear material through their 
reservation. The ordinance gave the tribe power to deny permits and impose a 
substantial fine for willful violations. Northern States Power Company sought 
declaratory judgment that ordinance was preempted by the HMTA. The court 
concluded that the tribal ordinance's 180-day license and notice requirements 
create a much stricter standard than that which HMTA requires, creating an 
obstacle to the HMTA's goals. The tribal ordinance was ruled to be preempted. 
The holding suggests that a similar regulatory ordinance that acts upon fossil 
fuels rather than nuclear material would also be preempted. See Northern States 
Power Co. v. Prairie Island Mdewakanton Sioux Indian Community, 991 F.2d 
458 (8th Cir.1993) [hereinafter Prairie Island]. 
261 Id. at 462. 
262 Id.  
263 49 U.S.C.A. § 5125(e). 
264 Id. 
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1. The “extent to which increased costs and impairment of 
efficiency” result from the  tribe's requirement;  
2. Whether the tribe's requirement has a rational basis;  
3. Whether the tribe's requirement achieves its stated 
purpose; and  
4. Whether there is a “need for uniformity with regard to the 
subject concerned,” and if so  whether the tribe's requirement 
“competes or conflicts” with those of other States,  municipalities, 
or tribes. 265    
 
 A well-crafted ordinance, complemented by accident impact 
data that demonstrates necessity, should easily secure the second 
and third factors as weighing in favor of the tribe. The efficiency 
factor and the uniformity factors, on the other hand, will likely 
weigh against a restrictive tribal ordinance. The PHMSA, the 
agency charged with authority over hazardous materials, has 
indicated that the need for efficiency and uniformity prevent tribal 
“opt out” from transport routing decisions,266 and the agency may 
cite this “need” to deny a waiver application. However, the 
discretion involved in a waiver determination also conjures federal 
trust and treaty obligations, which must permeate the agency’s 
consideration of these factors. Acting in the tribe’s best interest may 
well mean waiving preemption for a tribal regulation designed to 
protect tribal resources, particularly if those regulations promote the 
statute’s stated protectionary purpose.  
 Judicial guidance on the likelihood of waiver application 
success is almost nonexistent, as there is only one published case in 
which a state or local government applied for a waiver of 
preemption, and tribes apparently never have.267 Regardless, if the 
Secretary refused the tribal waiver, then the tribe may be positioned 
to bring suit for a breach of the trust obligation (described in Section 
IV.A). While the waiver cannot be viewed as a guaranteed avenue 
around preemption, the process itself may provide a platform for 
judicial interpretation of the trust responsibility.  
 
iii.   The Dormant Commerce Clause 
                                                
265 49 C.F.R.§ 107.221. 
266 Final Rule on Oil Trains, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration, at 293. 
267 New York v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., 700 F.Supp. 1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) 
(where state of New York applied for a waiver of preemption). 
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Apart from statutory preemption, the Dormant Commerce 
Clause raises an inquiry. It comes into play when state laws impede 
interstate commerce, so the question is whether it operates in a 
similar way for tribes. The answer should be no, as the Dormant 
Commerce Clause was not designed to limit tribes. The doctrine 
derives from the Interstate Commerce Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution and addresses the federalism relationship between 
states and the federal government. Courts crafted this doctrine to 
prevent states from passing overly-protectionist economic laws that 
frustrate interstate commerce, thus interfering with the overall 
federal commerce schemes.268 The Interstate Commerce Clause, 
which provides the source of the doctrine, expressly references 
states and not tribes.269 An entirely separate clause, the Indian 
Commerce Clause, forms the source of Congressional power over 
tribes.270 As separate sovereigns (albeit “domestic dependent 
nations”), tribes should arguably be free to promote or restrain 
economic ventures regardless of how those actions affect the states. 
Notably, the Supreme Court has refused to equate states and tribes 
for purposes of the Interstate Commerce Clause in challenges to 
tribal tax regiments,271though the Court has not addressed the tribal 
regulatory measures.hbjhbjhbjhbjhbjhbjhbjhbjhbjhbjhbjhbjhbjhbjh.   
In the event a court applied the Dormant Commerce Clause 
to tribes, the analysis still allows substantial opportunity for tribes 
to regulate. The courts have deemed permissible under the Dormant 
Commerce Clause state regulations that are not inherently 
protectionist and that merely cause an “incidental burden” on 
                                                
268 Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 622 (U.S. 1978). 
269 Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 191 (U.S. 1989). 
270 See Cohen, supra note 177. 
271 See Cotton Petroleum Corp., at 192 (“It is also well established that the 
Interstate Commerce and Indian Commerce Clauses have very different 
applications. In particular, while the Interstate Commerce Clause is concerned 
with maintaining free trade among the States even in the absence of 
implementing federal legislation…the central function of the Indian Commerce 
Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of 
Indian affairs…”); see also, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache, 455 U.S. 130, 154 
(U.S. 1982). Examining a tribal tax regiment under Commerce Clause scrutiny, 
the Court prefaced that examination by noting “even if we assume that tribal 
action” is subject to the Commerce Clause. Id. Thus, although not an explicit 
answer, such a qualification by the Court implies would that it did not believe 
that such scrutiny was necessary, on the grounds that the Commerce Clause does 
not limit tribal action. 
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commerce.272 The Supreme Court articulated the general test as 
follows: 
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a 
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate 
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the  burden 
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the 
putative local  benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then 
the question becomes one of degree.  And the extent of the burden 
that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of  the 
local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well 
with a lesser  impact on interstate activities.273 
 Increasingly, as local non-tribal governments seek to 
regulate “bomb trains” through their jurisdictions as well as other 
fossil fuel infrastructure, the Dormant Commerce Clause will gain 
attention. In depth analysis of this area is beyond the scope of this 
article, but a few observations are in order. First, well-crafted tribal 
regulations would not be geared toward “economic protectionism” 
but rather would be aimed at safeguarding health and resources, 
deemed a “legitimate local public interest,” and any burden on 
commerce would amount to an “incidental”– not primarily intended, 
though clearly significant—effect of such protection. Second, 
although regulations would likely burden interstate commerce, that 
burden would arguably not be “clearly excessive” against the threat 
posed to tribal life, property, and natural resources. Finally, 
considering that the passage of these trains and pipelines through 
tribal lands creates an inherent and fairly unavoidable risk of 
disaster, there is seemingly no viable alternative to protect these 
interests that would lessen the impact on commerce. 
 In sum, while the Dormant Commerce Clause clearly 
applies to states, the reasoning behind the doctrine and language 
from Supreme Court caselaw weigh against its application to tribes. 
But even if a court were to conclude that the doctrine applied to 
tribes, regulations designed to limit fossil fuel transport through 
reservations may be justified under the prevailing Supreme Court 
test. Admittedly the Dormant Commerce Clause is relevant, but it 
remains difficult to predict the outcome of any application in the 
fossil fuel context 
                                                
272 National Ass’n of Optometrists & Opticians v. Harris, 682 F3d 1144, 1148 
(9th Cir. 2012). 
273 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (US 1970) (emphasis added). 
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C.   Conclusion: On-Reservation Prerogatives  
 
In sum, tribes retain a great deal of power over fossil fuel 
projects that pierce directly through tribal lands, despite a judicial 
trend over the past century to constrain the power of tribes over their 
reservations. In the property law framework, tribes retain significant 
power over easements as specified in the IRWA: they can refuse to 
consent to new grants, refuse to consent to renewal of existing 
grants, and enforce the terms of existing grants against grantees that 
attempt to quietly violate those terms. In the regulatory framework, 
tribes retain at least some direct authority over these projects. 
Regulation of pipeline safety and coal trains seems unhampered by 
preemption concerns. Regulation of oil trains may face difficult 
preemption-style barriers, though leverage may be found within the 
largely untested waiver of preemption found in the HMTA.  
 The tools discussed in this section are available against on-
reservation projects only. Unfortunately, on-reservation action will 
not always be sufficient. Many of these fossil fuel projects skirt 
around reservations so that their physical footprints never actually 
cross tribal land, yet their disastrous impacts threaten to cross 
jurisdictional boundaries or damage treaty resources outside those 
boundaries. Off-reservation projects require a different approach 
described in the next section, one that makes demands and asserts 
unique tribal rights within the matrix of federal, state, and local 
processes.  
 
IV.   OFF-RESERVATION TRIBAL PREROGATIVES 
 
Much as tribes’ ecological interests and environmental 
ethics transcend modern political borders, so do tribal legal 
prerogatives reach beyond reservation boundaries.274 To halt fossil 
fuel infrastructure off-reservation, tribes must apply their legal 
levers within the permit systems of federal, state, and local 
jurisdictions. Two types of tribal rights are particularly relevant to 
these efforts in the Pacific Northwest. First, the federal Indian trust 
responsibility affirmatively imparts a fiduciary duty on all branches 
                                                
274 See Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, “Looking to the Third Sovereign: Tribal 
Environmental Ethics as an Alternative Paradigm,” 33 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 
397 (2016). 
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and agencies of the federal government, as trustees, to protect the 
interests of federally recognized tribes, as beneficiaries.275 The trust 
responsibility is triggered any time a federal action or decision 
implicates tribal interests.  
Second, treaty-guaranteed “usual and accustomed” fishing 
rights ensure tribes’ sovereign entitlements to fishing access, 
harvest, and habitat protection in and around traditional tribal 
fishing waters.276 Pacific Northwest tribal treaty fishing rights have 
been robustly interpreted by the federal judiciary, in effect reserving 
a considerable management role in shared resources to the region’s 
original sovereigns.277  
 This Section begins by examining the role of the federal trust 
responsibility in the context of fossil fuel transport and export 
projects, then turns to tribal treaty fishing rights as they operate to 
constrain hazardous off-reservation fossil fuel infrastructure. 
Throughout, this Section examines case studies of tribes 
successfully asserting core sovereign legal prerogatives to halt the 
transport of fossil fuels across their ancestral lands and waters. 
 
A.   The Federal Indian Trust Responsibility in the Century of 
Climate Change 
 
For nearly 200 years, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
consistently articulated a trusteeship between the federal 
                                                
275 See U.S. v. White Mt. Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 474 n. 3 (2003) 
(recognizing the general trust relationship between tribes and the United States 
as one of “a ward to his guardian” (quoting Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 
1, 17 (1831)). 
276 See Washington v. Wash. St. Com. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n., 443 
U.S. 658, 674-79 (1979) (“At the treaty council the United States negotiators 
promised, and the Indians understood, that the Yakimas would forever be able to 
continue the same off-reservation food gathering and fishing practices as to 
time, place, method, species and extent as they had or were exercising. The 
Yakimas relied on these promises and they formed a material and basic part of 
the treaty and of the Indians’ understanding of the meaning of the treaty.” 
(quoting U.S. v. Washington, 384 F.Supp 312, 381 (W.D. Wash. 1974)) 
(emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted)) (harvest); U.S. v. Winans, 198 
U.S. 371, 381 (1905) (access); U.S. v. Washington, 827 F.3d 836, 852-53 (9th 
Cir. 2016) (habitat). 
277 For background and commentary on recent cases, see Michael C. Blumm, 
Indian Treaty Fishing Rights and the Environment: Affirming the Right to 
Habitat Protection and Restoration, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2017). 
 308 
government and all federally recognized tribes.278 As the Court 
proclaimed in Dept. of Int. & Bureau of Indian Affairs v. Klamath 
Water Users Protective Assn.: 
The fiduciary relationship has been described as ‘one of the 
primary cornerstones of Indian law,’ and has been compared 
to one existing under a common law trust, with the United 
States as trustee, the Indian tribes or individuals as 
beneficiaries, and the property and natural resources 
managed by the United States as the trust corpus.279  
 
Though the history of federal Indian relations is marked 
more by a breach of the trust obligation than its fulfillment, 280 
nevertheless the principle remains an important and enduring legal 
obligation towards tribes. As first articulated by Justice John 
Marshall in the 1830s, a core fiduciary duty of the federal trustee is 
to protect sovereign tribal nations and Native American persons as 
beneficiaries.281 In 1886, the Court stated that this “duty of 
protection . . . . has always been recognized by the executive, and by 
congress, and by this court, whenever the question has arisen.”282 In 
1924, the Court found that, in regard to tribal interests, the United 
States is “bound by every moral and equitable consideration to 
                                                
278 See Dept. of Int. & Bureau of Indian Affairs v. Klamath Water Users 
Protective Assn., 532 U.S. 1, 11 (2001) (noting “The fiduciary relationship has 
been described as ‘one of the primary cornerstones of Indian law’”) (quoting 
FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 221 (Rennard Strickland 
et al. eds., Michie Bobbs-Merrill 1982) (citation omitted)); see also Worcester v. 
Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
279 532 U.S. 1, 11 (2001). 
280 See generally CHARLES F. WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF 
MODERN INDIAN NATIONS (W.W. Norton 2006); see also “Report of the 
Commission on Indian Trust Administration and Reform,” Department of the 
Interior, Dec. 10, 2013: 
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/migrated/cobell/commission/upload/Rep
ort-of-the-Commission-on-Indian-Trust-Administration-and-
Reform_FINAL_Approved-12-10-2013.pdf. 
281 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 
515 (1832). In characterizing the nature of the trust responsibility, Justice 
Marshall made clear that the affirmative trust obligation of the federal 
government toward tribes in no way diminishes tribes’ inherent sovereignty. 
“This relation [is] that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one 
more powerful.” Worcester, at 555; “Protection does not imply the destruction 
of the protected.” Id. at 518. 
282 U.S. v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886).  
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discharge its trust with good faith and fairness.”283 The Indian trust 
responsibility obligates the federal government to protect tribal 
lands and off-reservation resources on ceded lands284 whether that 
cession was accomplished by treaty, statute, or executive order.285  
The federal government’s “overriding duty” to tribal nations 
and people is ongoing,286 as the modern Supreme Court 
acknowledges “the undisputed existence of a general trust 
relationship between the United States and the Indian people.”287 An 
earlier landmark case, Seminole Nation v. U.S, provides the 
enduring benchmark of the federal trust responsibility and is still 
cited today by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) as defining its 
fiduciary obligations:288 
 
Under a humane and self-imposed policy which found 
expression in many acts of Congress and numerous decisions 
of this Court, [the federal government] has charged itself 
with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust. 
Its conduct, as disclosed in the acts of those who represent it 
in dealings with the Indians, should therefore be judged by 
the most exacting fiduciary standards.289 
 
The trust responsibility is germane to virtually every 
proposed fossil fuel transport project, whether on- or off-
reservation, because federal decision-making is likely to be involved 
at one or more stages of permitting, construction, and development. 
The federal fiduciary duty of protection towards tribes is incumbent 
                                                
283 U.S. v. Payne, 264 U.S. 446, 448 (1924) (citing Choctaw Nation v. U.S., 119 
U.S. 1, 298 (1886)).  
284 See, e.g., Parravano v. Babbitt, 70 F.3d 539, 547 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he 
tribes’ federally reserved fishing rights are accompanied by a corresponding 
duty on the part of the government to preserve those rights.”); Muckleshoot v. 
Hall, 698 F.Supp. 1504, 1510-11 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (finding tribal fisheries are 
property rights protected by federal trust responsibilities). 
285 Parravano, 70 F.3d at 545 (“We have long held that when it comes to 
protecting tribal rights against non-federal interests, it makes no difference 
whether those rights derive from treaty, statute or executive order, unless 
Congress has provided otherwise.”). 
286 Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 236 (1974).  
287 U.S. v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983).  
288 “Frequently Asked Questions—What is the Federal Indian Trust 
Responsibility?” Bureau of Indian Affairs, U.S. Dept. of Interior: 
https://www.bia.gov/frequently-asked-questions. 
289 Seminole Nation v. U.S., 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942) (emphasis added). 
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on federal agents every time a proposed fossil fuel project directly 
or indirectly implicates tribal property, including shared waters and 
fisheries to which tribes retain harvest rights.290 291 While the BIA is 
specially charged with administering Indian trust lands and services 
for Native American tribes and individuals, the trust responsibility 
extends to all branches, agencies, and agents of the federal 
government. The Ninth Circuit has emphasized, “This trust 
responsibility extends not just to the Interior Department, but 
attaches to the federal government as a whole,”292 and “any Federal 
government action is subject to the United States’ fiduciary 
responsibilities toward the Indian tribes.”293 As such, the trust 
remains a key potential legal lever for tribes opposing permit 
decisions (before a multitude of varied federal agencies) for fossil 
fuel projects that threaten tribal fishing or hunting rights or water 
rights off their reservations.  
 
1.   The Modern Trust: A Muddled Context 
 
In its most fundamental form, the trust responsibility toward 
tribes creates a duty of protection—imposing the “most exacting 
fiduciary standards”—towards tribal lands, waters, treaty rights, and 
other tribal resources.294 As straightforward as that seems, 
enforcement of the trust responsibility is quite complex due to a line 
of cases decided over the past three decades reflecting basic 
                                                
290 See Muckleshoot v. Hall, 698 F. Supp. 1504, 1510-11 (W.D. Wash. 1988) 
(finding tribal fisheries are property rights protected by federal trust 
responsibilities); Robert T. Anderson, “Indian Water Rights and the Federal 
Trust Responsibility.” Natural Resources Journal, vol. 46, no. 2, 2006, pp. 399–
437.  
291 See Parravano v. Babbitt, 70 F.3d at 546 (“This trust responsibility extends 
not just to the Interior Department, but attaches to the federal government as a 
whole.”); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. U.S. Dept. of Navy, 898 F.2d 
1410, 1420 (9th Cir. 1990) (hereinafter Pyramid Lake); Nance v. EPA,  645 F.2d 
701, 711 (9th Cir. 981); N.W. Sea Farms, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engrs., 931 
F.Supp. 1515, 1519 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (“This [trust] obligation has been 
interpreted to impose a fiduciary duty owed in conducting ‘any Federal 
government action’ which relates to Indian tribes.” (quoting Nance, 645 at F.2d 
at 711)).  
292 Parravano, 70 F.3d at 546.  
293 Nance, 645 F.2d at 711. 
294 Seminole Nation, 316 U.S. at 297. 
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confusion between the two contexts in which the trust responsibility 
is enforced against agencies.295  
One such context involves tribes seeking injunctive relief 
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in federal district 
court.296 This context for federal trust responsibility is important 
because injunctive relief aims to stop damage before it happens. 
Tribes will likely seek injunctive relief when challenging federal 
agency decisions regarding fossil fuel transport and export projects. 
Trust claims for injunctive relief are most often brought under the 
(APA), which allows courts to set aside an action that is “arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with the law.”297 Early cases arising in this context rendered 
decidedly favorable decisions towards tribes. One of the clearest 
declarations of the administrative trust responsibility in this context 
was made in Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, a case involving 
the Secretary of the Interior’s water allocations from a river, to the 
detriment of tribal fisheries.298 The Court stated:  
 
The Secretary was obligated to formulate a closely 
developed regulation that would preserve water for the 
Tribe. He was further obliged to assert his regulatory and 
contractual authority to the fullest extent possible to 
accomplish this result . . . The Secretary’s action . . . fails to 
demonstrate an adequate recognition of his fiduciary duty to 
the Tribe. This is also an abuse of discretion and not in 
accordance with the law.299 
 
                                                
295 See Warner, supra note 8, at 20-28. See also Mary Christina Wood, The 
Indian Trust Responsibility: Protecting Tribal Lands and Resources through 
Claims of Injunctive Relief Against Federal Agencies, 39 TULSA L. REV. 355 
(2003).  Parts of this discussion are adapted from that article.  For a textbook 
treatment of this area of Indian law, see LAITOS, ZELLMER, AND WOOD, 
NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 2D 394-397 (West 2012). 
296 See supra note 32-42 and accompanying text (discussing cases).   
297 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A). For cases that have incorporated trust analysis within 
statutory claims brought under the APA, see Northwest Sea Farms v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Engrs.,931 F.Supp. 1515 (W.D. Wash. 1996); Quechan Tribe of the 
Fort Yuma Reservation v. Dept. of Interior, 755 F.Supp.2d 1104 (2010); Gros 
Ventre Tribe v. U.S., 469 F.3d. 801 (9th Cir. 2006); Pit River Tribe v. U.S. 
Forest Serv., 469 F.3d 768 (9th Cir. 2006). 
298 354 F.Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972). 
299 Id. at 256-57 (emphasis added). 
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Several other cases decided after Pyramid Lake also invoked the 
trust obligation to protect Indian lands and resources against harm 
by federal agencies acting either through the federal government’s 
permitting role or its public land management role.300  
The second, and notably distinct, context of trust 
enforcement involves tribes seeking monetary damages against the 
BIA for mismanaging their lands, a line of challenge not so pertinent 
to the off-reservation context. Those suits are brought in the Court 
of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act301 or the Indian Tucker 
Act.302 The language of those statutes is far more restrictive than the 
APA because both of the Tucker Acts require express law 
supporting claims for damages against the United States.303 The 
Indian Tucker Act requires claims be based on express law found in 
the Constitution, statutes, executive orders, or treaties.304 The 
Tucker Act requires that claims be based on the Constitution, a 
statute, regulation, or contract.305 The Supreme Court has stressed 
                                                
300 See, e.g., Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 12 Indian L. Rep. 3065 (D. 
Mont. 1985) (mem.) (finding violation of trust responsibility by Dept. of Interior 
in issuing coal leases on public lands adjacent to Cheyenne Reservation); 
Klamath Tribes v. U.S. Forest Service, 1996 WL 924509 (D. Or. 1996) 
(enjoining timber sales that could adversely affect treaty hunted deer herds, 
finding that the Forest Service has a “Substantive duty to protect ‘to the fullest 
extent possible’ the tribes’ treaty rights, and the resources on which those rights 
depend.”); Northwest Sea Farms, 931 F.Supp. at 1520 (“In carrying out its 
fiduciary duty, it is [the federal agencies’] responsibility to ensure that the 
Indian treaty rights are given full effect.”). 
301 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). 
302 28 U.S.C. § 1505. 
303 See Warner, supra note 8, at 20-28. The Tucker Act allows individuals to 
pursue monetary claims against the federal government. This act extends to 
claims by allottees on Indian reservations. The Indian Tucker Act allows tribes 
to sue the federal government for damages. See United States v. Mitchell, 463 
U.S. 206, 211-12 (1983) (hereinafter Mitchell II). 
304 The Indian Tucker Act provides: 
The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction of any claim against the 
United States accruing after August 13, 1946, in favor of any tribe, 
band, or other identifiable group of American Indians residing within 
the territorial limits of the United States or Alaska whenever such claim 
is one arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United 
States, or Executive orders of the President, or is one which would 
otherwise be cognizable in the Court of Claims if the claimant were not 
an Indian tribe, band or group. 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (emphasis added) 
28 U.S.C. § 1505 (emphasis added). 
305 The Tucker Act provides in pertinent part: 
 The United States Claims Court shall have jurisdiction to render 
judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon 
the Constitution, or an Act of Congress or any regulation of an 
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that the express source of law supporting either Tucker Act claim 
must “fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the 
Federal Government for the damages sustained.”306 Several major 
Supreme Court cases dealing with the federal trust obligation arise 
out of this damages context, where tribes have challenged BIA’s 
mismanagement of their lands or resources such as timber or 
minerals. 307 
Trust enforcement under the APA is much broader than 
under the Tucker Acts because under the APA there is no 
requirement of premising a claim on a statute or some other source 
of express law.308 Due to the two statutory contexts, courts should 
treat trust issues arising under the Tucker Acts and the APA 
separately to develop two distinct prongs of the overall trust 
doctrine. But recent decisions have ignored the different contexts in 
which trust claims are brought, applying Tucker Act restrictions to 
claims brought under the APA.309 These holdings require a tribe to 
premise its APA trust claims on a statute or other source of express 
law.310 This approach is erroneous because the APA does not have 
the restrictive language found in the Tucker Acts.  
The judicial error confusing the two prongs of trust 
enforcement traces back through the case law to a 1980 case decided 
by the D.C. Circuit, North Slope Borough v. Andrus.311 In that case 
the Inupiat people of Alaska sued the Secretary of the Interior, 
                                                
executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the 
United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not 
sounding in tort. 
 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1983) (emphasis added). 
306 Mitchell II, supra note 299, at 216-17 (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 
U.S. 392, 400 (1976)); United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 123 S. 
Ct. 1126, 1132 (2003) (hereinafter White Mountain Apache Tribe). The Supreme 
Court has also indicated that the federal government's “elaborate control” over 
tribal property may support a claim under both Tucker Acts. See Mitchell II, at 
209, 225; White Mountain Apache, at 1133. This control theory, however, is 
generally not applicable where the government is taking action off the 
reservation, thereby incidentally affecting, rather than directly controlling, tribal 
property. 
307 United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980) (hereinafter Mitchell I);; 
Mitchell II; White Mountain Apache Tribe; United States v. Navajo Nation, 123 
S.Ct. 1079 (2003). 
308 See Warner, supra note 8, at 28-29; see also APA, 5 U.S.C. 706 (granting 
general authority to courts to set aside agency action “not in accordance with 
law.”). 
309 See Warner, supra note 8, at 30-31. 
310 Id. 
311 North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980).  
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asserting that the Secretary’s program of federal oil leasing in the 
Beaufort Sea would threaten the bowhead whale population the 
Inupiat people hunted, and therefore would violate the Secretary's 
trust responsibility toward them to protect their harvest rights. This 
was a suit seeking injunctive relief under the APA.312 In language 
that launched the present confusion, the court applied United States 
v. Mitchell (a Tucker Act case known as Mitchell I because it was 
the first of two Supreme Court decisions in the same case) and held:  
 
[A] trust responsibility can only arise from a statute, treaty, 
or executive order; in this respect we are governed by the 
recent Supreme Court decision in United States v. Mitchell 
holding that the United States bore no fiduciary 
responsibility to Native Americans under a statute which 
contained no specific provision in the terms of the statute. . . 
. We have no specific provision for a federal trust 
responsibility in any of the statutes argued to us. . . . by 
confining the extension of trust responsibility, however 
defined and whatever the source, to the area of overlap with 
the environmental statutes, the district court was arguably 
consistent with the Supreme Court's rationale in United 
States v. Mitchell.  Without an unambiguous provision by 
Congress that clearly outlines a federal trust responsibility, 
courts must appreciate that whatever fiduciary obligation 
otherwise exists, it is a limited one only.313  
 
This judicial misstep remains rather astonishing, because it amounts 
to applying the strict requirements of one statute (the Tucker Act) to 
a case premised on an entirely different statute (the APA) lacking 
such restrictive language.314 The Mitchell I holding (upon which the 
North Slope court relied) was unambiguously tied to the express 
language in the Tucker Act.315 Unfortunately, once a mistake takes 
                                                
312 Id. at 592. 
313 Id. at 611-12 (citing district court opinion).   
314 For further discussion, see Warner, supra note 8, at 30-31; Wood, Trust II, 
supra note 1, at 117-21. 
315 See Mitchell I, at 546, emphasizing: 
The individual claimants in this action premised jurisdiction in the 
Court of Claims upon the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1491, which gives that 
court jurisdiction of 'any claim against the United States founded either 
upon the Constitution or any Act of Congress.' . . . . The General 
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hold in one case, it becomes stare decisis that judges rely upon in 
deciding future cases and can thereby metastasize through an entire 
body of caselaw. The misapplication of the trust doctrine originating 
in North Slope v. Andrus found its way into Ninth Circuit law, 
blurring the critical distinction between the two prongs of trust 
enforcement. In a 1998 case, the Morongo Band of Mission Indians 
brought a claim under the APA against the Federal Aviation 
Administration for situating a flight path into Los Angeles 
International Airport directly over canyons on the reservation where 
tribal members conducted traditional ceremonies.316 The court 
applied United States v. Mitchell (a case arising under the Tucker 
Act) and concluded: “[U]nless there is a specific duty that has been 
placed on the government with respect to Indians, [the trust] 
responsibility is discharged by the agency's compliance with general 
regulations and statutes not specifically aimed at protecting 
tribes.”317 This flawed line of precedent led some courts, including 
the Ninth Circuit, to collapse the Indian trust responsibility with 
federal laws and regulations of general application.318 
                                                
Allotment Act . . . cannot be read as establishing that the United States 
has a fiduciary responsibility for management of allotted forest lands.  
Any right of the respondents to recover money damages for 
Government mismanagement of timber resources must be found in 
some source other than that Act. 
See also Mitchell II, at 217-18: 
[I]n United States v. Mitchell [I]. . . this Court concluded that the 
General Allotment Act does not confer a right to recover money 
damages against the United States. . . . [W]e held that the Act creates 
only a limited trust relationship. The trust language of the Act does not 
impose any fiduciary management duties or render the United States 
answerable for breach thereof. . . . Thus, for claims against the United 
States 'founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or 
any regulation of an executive department,” 28 U.S.C. 1491, a court 
must inquire whether the source of substantive law can fairly be 
interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for 
the damages sustained. . . . The question in this case is . . . whether the 
statutes or regulations at issue can be interpreted as requiring 
compensation. 
316 Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Federal Aviation Administration, 161 
F2d. 569 (9th Cir. 1998) (hereinafter Morongo Band).     
317 Id. at 574; see also Skokomish Indian Tribe v. F.E.R.C., 121 F3d 1303 (9th 
Cir. 1997) (rejecting argument that FERC “must afford an (sic) tribes greater 
rights than they would otherwise have under the [Federal Power Act] and its 
implementing regulations.”).   
318 See Okanogan Highlands Alliance v. Williams, 236 F.3d 468, 479 (9th Cir. 
2000) (“Federal agencies owe a fiduciary responsibility to Native American 
tribes. In the absence of a specific duty, this responsibility is discharged by ‘the 
agency's compliance with general regulations and statutes not specifically aimed 
 316 
The requirement of filing suit under a specific statutory duty 
operates as a barrier for tribes seeking to protect their lands and 
natural resources because there are few environmental or natural 
resources statutes that impose specific duties toward tribes. Such an 
interpretation of the trust obligation is inaccurate and may severely 
limit its benefit to tribes. Fortunately, tribes’ equitable challenges to 
off-reservation fossil fuel infrastructure now create fresh 
opportunities for the courts to reflect on the meaning and scope of 
the federal Indian trust responsibility.  One such case involved the 
Nez Perce Tribe successfully challenging large fossil fuel extraction 
equipment passing through its ceded territory, as described in 
Section 2 below. 
 
2.   Enforcing the Trust Through the APA: 
Nez Perce Tribe v. U.S. Forest Service 
 
In 2013, the District of Idaho held that Indian trust 
responsibility required the United States Forest Service to exercise 
its statutory authority to protect tribal property rights that were being 
directly threatened by fossil fuel infrastructure.319 This “mega-
loads” case involved shipments of massive evaporators, used in tar 
sands oil extraction, across the Rocky Mountains and into Canada, 
through traditional Nez Perce territory and National Forest lands on 
                                                
at protecting Indian tribes.’”) (citing Morongo Band, supra note 312)(other 
citations omitted); Skokomish Indian Tribe v. FERC, 121 F.3d 1303 (9th Cir. 
2000); Gros Ventre Tribe v. U.S. Bureau of Land Management, CV 00-69-M-
DWM (Order) at 6-7 ((D. Mon. Jan. 29, 2001)  (“The United States' trust 
obligations are content-less unless a statute, regulation, or treaty supplies the 
imperatives.”). But see Island Mountain Protectors, et. al., 144 IBLA 168, at 
184-85 (May 29, 1998) noting: 
In addition to a mandate found in a specific provision of a treaty, 
agreement, executive order, or statute, any action by the Government is 
subject to a general trust responsibility (citing Mitchell II) . . . . BLM 
had a trust responsibility to consider and protect Tribal resources. 'A 
federal agency's trust obligation to a tribe extends to actions it takes off 
a reservation which uniquely impact tribal members or property on a 
reservation.'  While the trust responsibility created by environmental 
laws may be 'congruent' with other duties they impose, the enactment 
of those laws does not diminish the Department's original trust 
responsibility or cause it to disappear.  BLM was required to consult 
with the Tribes and to identify, protect, and conserve trust resources, 
trust assets, and Tribal health and safety in making its [decision 
approving expansion of mine].” (Other citations omitted).   
319 Nez Perce Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 2013 WL 5212317 (D. Idaho 2013) 
[hereinafter Nez Perce]. 
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U.S. Highway 12.320 The Forest Plan governing the National Forest 
at issue directed the Forest Service to “[e]nsure that Forest actions 
are not detrimental to the protection and preservation of Indian 
Tribes’ religious and cultural sites and practices and treaty 
rights.”321 According to the court,  
 
The Forest Service has a statutory duty, under the National 
Forest Management Act (NFMA),322 to act consistently with 
this Forest Plan direction. Overarching [the Forest Service’s] 
statutory duty, is the Government’s duty as trustee over the 
Tribe. The Supreme Court has held that the ‘constitutionally 
recognized status of Indians justifies special treatment on 
their behalf when rationally related to the Government’s 
unique obligation toward the Indians.’323 
 
The Nez Perce Tribe prevailed in leveraging the trust 
responsibility to obtain a preliminary injunction ordering the Forest 
Service to close Highway 12 to the mega-loads.324 The Court held 
that “the mega-loads at least had the potential to be ‘detrimental’” 
to the tribal rights and interests protected by the Forest Plan, which 
“triggered a duty on the part of the Forest Service to consult with 
the Tribe.”325 Moreover, the Court expressly and correctly 
characterized its exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to the trust 
responsibility as purely equitable: “The plaintiffs are not seeking 
damages; they are seeking to preserve their Treaty rights along with 
cultural and intrinsic values that have no price tag.”326  
While the District of Idaho’s opinion failed to elaborate 
extensively on the Indian trust responsibility, its ruling underscores 
the equitable powers of the court in this context and puts all federal 
agencies on notice that they must fulfill their trust obligations to 
tribes when taking action carrying the “potential to be ‘detrimental’” 
                                                
320 Id. at 1-2.  
321 Id. at 5, quoting Forest Plan for the Clearwater National Forest: 
https://www.fs.usda.gov/detail/nezperceclearwater/landmanagement/planning/?c
id=stelprdb5404075. The Nez Perce Tribe reserved treaty rights to hunt and fish 
within the present-day National Forest. Id. 
322 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a)(i). 
323 Id. at 5-6 (citing Washington v. Wash. Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel 
Assoc., 443 U.S. 658, 673 n. 20 (1979)) (emphasis added). 
324 Id. at 8.  
325 Nez Perce, at 6 (emphasis added). 
326 Id. at *7. 
 318 
to tribal interests. The opinion marks an important return to earlier 
caselaw enforcing the trust obligation through equitable relief in the 
APA context. As a practical matter, tribal challenges to modern 
fossil fuel projects will likely invoke both statutory and trust 
grounds. The Nez Perce court recognized the agency’s statutory 
authority to halt the mega-loads and imposed the trust obligation on 
the agency to use such authority to protect tribal interests.327 This 
approach very much parallels that taken in the Pyramid Lake case 
discussed above where the court required the Secretary of Interior 
to “assert his regulatory and contractual authority to the fullest extent 
possible” to preserve water for the tribe.328  
In sum, fossil fuel transport and export projects that propose 
to cross off-reservation ceded territories may seriously impinge on 
tribal interests, including property rights. Tribes continue to press 
federal agents to fulfill their duties under the federal Indian trust 
responsibility and deny permits for mega-loads, bomb trains, and 
other hazardous fossil fuel infrastructure. When that trust obligation 
is not upheld, courts may exercise their equitable jurisdiction to 
enjoin federal agency action.329 Though this trust responsibility has 
received erratic and inconsistent interpretation and enforcement 
against environmental threats (over the past few decades in 
particular), it remains a reservoir of legal obligation that can be 
invoked by Pacific Northwest tribes to stop fossil fuel export 
permits,330 as with the notable success of the Nez Perce Tribe. In 
                                                
327 The case implicitly left an open question what the result would have been if 
the Forest Plan had lacked protective language towards tribes. Because the trust 
obligation originated long before any statutory scheme and stands apart from 
statutes, federal managers are obligated by that trust to protect tribal interests 
even if their prior planning processes fail to articulate the duty. 
328 See Pyramid Lake, 354 F.Supp. at 256-57 (emphasis added) (demonstrating 
that where a federal agent has authority over matters implicating tribal interests, 
the agencies have a duty to uphold the trust responsibility by prioritizing tribal 
rights to the maximum extent possible within the bounds of their discretion); see 
Mary Christina Wood, “Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: 
The Trust Doctrine Revisited,” 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471, 1529 n.275.   
329 See Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 12 INDIAN L. RPTR. 3065, 3071, 3074 
(D. Mont. 1985); Pyramid Lake, at 256.  
330The trust responsibility was also used as a basis by the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers to deny a permit for a coal export facility at Cherry Point, 
Washington. See discussion infra Section IV.B.1.a. For an amicus brief setting 
forth the federal Indian trust responsibility in a case supporting a motion for 
summary judgement by the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe seeking to enjoin 
construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline, see https://www.indian-
affairs.org/uploads/8/7/3/8/87380358/amici_brief_supporting_srst_smj.pdf. 
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addition to this trust responsibility, some tribes also have enduring 
treaty rights that provide a powerful source of protection against 
federal and state agency permitting actions as described in the next 
section. 
 
B.   Tribal Treaty Fishing Rights Asserted Against 
Fossil Fuel Projects 
 
Treaty-reserved fishing rights are tribes’ most potent tool for 
stopping off-reservation fossil fuel infrastructure in the Pacific 
Northwest. Through nineteenth-century treaties with the United 
States, tribes reserved “usual and accustomed” (U&A) fishing rights 
to most rivers, streams, and marine waters across the region.331 As 
the U.S. Supreme Court has observed, “the Indians were vitally 
interested in protecting their right to take fish at all usual and 
accustomed places, whether on or off the reservations. . . .”332 
Today, tribes continue to exercise considerable influence over 
activities that impact off-reservation treaty waterways and fisheries. 
The transport of oil, gas, coal, and other fossil fuel derivatives within 
or along treaty fishing waters may directly imperil tribal fishing 
either by interfering with access or by damaging fish habitat through 
spills and pollution.333 In response, tribes are drawing upon their 
treaty-reserved fishing rights to successfully block fossil fuel 
infrastructure projects in ancestral territories beyond modern 
reservation boundaries.  
Treaty rights represent the first, original, and antecedent 
property rights in the Pacific Northwest. Since time immemorial, 
tribes have possessed what modern legal systems recognize as 
property rights, over vast ancestral territories. Through extensive 
jurisprudence, courts have enumerated the dimensions of aboriginal 
rights legally retained by tribes.334 
                                                
331 U&A tribal treaty fishing rights operate distinctively on the Columbia River, 
which tribes have managed as a shared fishery since time immemorial and 
regard as “The Great Table.” Today, the entirety of Columbia River Zone 6 
constitutes a U&A fishing site. This 147-mile stretch of the Columbia River 
between Bonneville and McNary dams is an exclusive tribal treaty commercial 
fishing area. See “Columbia River Zone 6,” Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish 
Commission: http://www.critfc.org/about-us/columbia-river-zone-6/. 
332 Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 667.  
333 See supra Section II.B. 
334 See generally Michael Blumm, Retracing the Discovery Doctrine: Aboriginal 
Title, Tribal Sovereignty, and their Significance to Treaty-Making and Modern 
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Notably, treaties did not create or give rights to tribes, but 
rather memorialized the inherent property rights that tribes reserved 
from their land cessions to the United States.335 In this way, treaty 
rights represent unbroken threads of continuity between tribes and 
the landscapes, waterways, and biotic communities that tribes have 
stewarded for millennia. The U.S. Constitution honors the 
antecedent nature of tribes’ sovereign property rights, declaring 
treaties to be “the supreme law of the land.”336 The treaties 
negotiated between tribal nations and the United States supersede 
all local and state laws, as well as most federal laws.337  
The treaty fishing rights reserved across the Pacific 
Northwest have turned out to be among the strongest and most 
expansive in the nation. Between 1854 and 1856, many tribes 
throughout the Puget Sound, Pacific Coast, and Columbia River 
Basin regions entered into treaties negotiated by Isaac Stevens, the 
first governor of what was then the Washington Territory. All of 
these so-called “Stevens treaties” include the following clause, 
expressly reserving tribal fishing rights: “The right of taking fish at 
all usual and accustomed grounds and stations is further secured to 
said Indians in common with all other citizens of the Territory . . . 
.”338 These treaty fishing rights are commonly referred to as “usual 
and accustomed,” or “U&A” fishing rights.  
Courts have held that U&A tribal fishing rights accord 
Pacific Northwest tribes important corollary rights. First, tribal 
                                                
Natural Resources Policy in Indian Country, Aboriginal Policy Research 
Consortium International (2004): 
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1241&context=aprci. 
335 Winans, 198 U.S. at 381 (explaining, “the treaty was not a grant of rights to 
the Indians, but a grant of rights from them—a reservation of those not 
granted”). 
336 Art. VI, cl. 2, U.S. Constitution. 
337 Under the plenary power doctrine, Congress has the authority to enact laws 
which limit or take away, i.e. abrogate, treaty-reserved tribal rights. See Lone 
Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903). However, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has repeatedly held that tribal property rights and sovereignty are preserved 
unless Congress evinces a clear and unambiguous intent to abrogate. See 
Menominee Tribe of Indians v. U.S., 391 U.S. 404 (1968) (noting the intention 
to abrogate treaty rights is “not to be lightly imputed to Congress,” quoting 
Pigeon River, etc., Co. v. Charles W. Cox, Ltd., 291 U.S. 138, 160 (1934)); U.S. 
v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986) (emphasizing, “Indian treaty rights are too 
fundamental to be easily cast aside”).  
338 See, e.g., Treaty with the Duwamish, Suquamish, etc., 1855, 12 Stat. 927, 
ratified Mar. 8, 1859, proclaimed Apr. 11, 1859: 
http://www.washington.edu/diversity/files/2013/03/treaty-point-elliott.pdf. 
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treaty fishing rights include the right of access to all usual and 
accustomed fishing sites, including through and within private 
property.339 Second, tribal treaty fishing rights include the right to 
take up to half of the harvestable portion of a particular fishery,340 
and in 2016, Pacific Northwest tribes won a landmark victory 
securing a third right when the Ninth Circuit upheld a ruling that 
tribes’ “right of taking fish” included a corollary right: the right of 
habitat protection.341 The case described below is known as the 
“Culverts case.” 
 
Culverts Treaty Rights Victory 
 
The Culverts case began in 2001, when a coalition of twenty-
one tribes across Washington State filed a claim against the State 
regarding “barrier culverts.”342 Barrier culverts are large pipes 
beneath roadways allowing streams to flow but obstructing the 
migration of anadromous fish.343 Anadromous fish include salmon 
and trout species that spawn (lay eggs) in freshwater streams, 
migrate out to the sea as juveniles, then return upstream as adults to 
spawn.344 Barrier culverts restrict access to spawning habitat, 
ultimately reducing the number of adult fish available for catch.345 
The tribes alleged that the State had unlawfully abrogated treaty 
fishing rights by cutting off spawning habitat through installing and 
maintaining these non-fish passable culverts.346 The tribes sought 
declaratory and injunctive relief mandating that the State remove 
and replace over 1,000 barrier culverts.347 Taken together, the 
identified culverts blocked fish migration on approximately 1,000 
                                                
339 Winans, 198 U.S. at 381 (holding that U&A tribal treaty rights “imposed a 
servitude upon every piece of land” that tribal peoples had traditionally used to 
access fishing waters; also characterized as “easements,” id. at 384.). 
340 U.S. v. Washington, 384 F.Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974, aff’d, 443 U.S. 658 
(1979)); see also Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 US at 686 (the court imposed a 
“moderate living standard” as a ceiling to the harvest amount tribes were entitled 
to). 
341 U.S. v. Washington, 827 F.3d 836 (9th Cir. 2016) [hereinafter “Culverts”] 
(amended in part by U.S. v. Washington, 853 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2017) (affirmed 
by an equally divided court, Washington v. U.S., 138 S.Ct. 1832 (2018). 
342 Id. at 841. 
343 Id. at 845. 
344 Id. 
345 Id. 
346 Id. at 857. 
347 Id. 
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linear miles of streams and 5 million square meters of habitat: 
enough to produce an additional 200,000 adult salmon each year.348 
The district court for the Western District of Washington, 
and subsequently the Ninth Circuit, ruled in favor of the tribes.349 
The District Court found the tribes had relied on the treaties to 
secure a continuing supply of fish when they ceded vast lands to the 
federal government containing U&A fishing sites.350 The barrier 
culverts violated the expectations memorialized by those treaties. 
An en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
ruling and held that, by building and maintaining barrier culverts, 
Washington State “has violated, and continues to violate, its 
obligation to the Tribes under the fishing clause of the Treaties.”351 
The court found the State had breached its treaty duty to the tribes 
despite the Court’s finding that “this consequence was not the 
State’s ‘primary purpose or objective.’”352 Because diminishing the 
supply of fish available to tribal fishers was an incidental impact, 
rather than the primary purpose, of the State’s barrier culverts, “[t]he 
‘measure of the State’s obligation therefore depends ‘on all the facts 
presented’ in the ‘particular dispute.’”353 The case was appealed to 
the United States Supreme Court, resulting in a 4-4 split vote of the 
Justices, thus affirming (without an opinion) the Ninth Circuit 
decision.354 
The same fact-based standard applied to the culverts context 
seemingly applies to proposed fossil fuel transport projects because 
oil and gas pipelines, coal and oil trains, and export terminals 
similarly impact tribal treaty fishing rights in an incidental rather 
                                                
348 Id. 
349 U.S. v. Washington, 20 F.Supp.3d 828 (W.D. Wash. 2007); U.S. v. 
Washington, 2013 WL 1334391 (W.D. Wash. 2013); Culverts, 827 F.3d 836. 
350 U.S. v. Washington, 20 F.Supp.3d at 897-99. 
351 Culverts, 827 F.3d at 865.  
352 Id. at 853, citing U.S. v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(“U.S. v. WA 1985”) (articulating the test for determining the proper scope of 
judicial authority over government actions that impact tribal treaty fishing 
rights: “If the State acts for the primary purpose or object of affecting or 
regulating the fish supply or catch in noncompliance with the treaty as 
interpreted by past decisions, it will be subject to immediate correction and 
remedial action by the courts. In other instances, the measure of the State's 
obligation will depend for its precise legal formulation on all of the facts 
presented by a particular dispute.”). 
353 Culverts, 837 F.3d at 853 (citing the test established in U.S. v. WA 1985, at 
1357). 
354 Justice Kennedy recused himself from the case because he had participated in 
the case as a Judge on the Ninth Circuit many years earlier. 
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than directly intentional manner.355 Professor Michael Blumm offers 
a useful analysis of the legal standard set forth in the Culverts case, 
noting “Applying treaty rights to particular activities will be a 
factual decision” involving a two-step test: 356 (1) there must be “an 
affirmative action adversely affecting fish subject to the treaties,” 
and (2) such action “must proximately cause significant damage.”357 
Accordingly, courts will most likely assess and adjudicate threats to 
tribal treaty fishing rights and fisheries on a case-by-case basis.358  
The Culverts decision clarifies the affirmative duty of both 
state and federal agencies to carefully consider potential impacts on 
fish habitat as well as other U&A tribal treaty fishing rights.359 As 
Blumm explains, “The Ninth Circuit’s decision . . . make[s] clear 
that regulatory agencies cannot approve developments that block 
access to treaty fishing sites or diminish the availability of 
harvestable fish.”360 In effect, the Ninth Circuit has embraced a test 
that places the onus on lawmakers and resource managers at every 
level of government to uphold tribal treaty rights of access, harvest, 
and habitat, bound by duties flowing from tribes’ treaty-guaranteed 
fishing rights.361 As Professor Blumm describes, “all non-tribal 
entities should now feel prodded to improve salmon habitat-harming 
processes of their activities.”362 The following Subsections explore 
tribal strategies to leverage treaty fishing rights in order to defeat 
proposed fossil fuel transport projects at every jurisdictional level.  
 
                                                
355 Curtailing tribal fishing is probably never the “primary purpose” of fossil fuel 
infrastructure projects.   
356 Michael C. Blumm, Indian Treaty Fishing Rights and the Environment: 
Affirming the Right to Habitat Protection and Restoration, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1, 
31 (2017).   
357 Id. at 31-32; see also Robert T. Anderson, “Federal Treaty and Trust 
Obligation, and Ocean Acidification,” 6 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 474 
(2016). 
358 Blumm, supra note 352, at 32.  
359 Pursuant to the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Culverts, the duty of habitat 
protection logically extends to regional and local governmental bodies as well. 
See Culverts. 
360 Blumm, supra note 352, at 37.  
361 Agencies are legally obligated to take into account tribal treaty fishing rights 
regardless of whether or not tribes affirmatively assert their sovereign 
prerogatives. Tribes should not be expected to monitor every prospective fossil 
fuel project or associated administrative action that threatens to affect treaty 
fishing. Many tribes are choosing to do so, however, in order to defend their 
treaty rights and help mitigate the climate crisis. See Wood, supra note 294. 
362 Id. at 33.  
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1.   Federal: The De Minimis Impacts Test 
 
As explained at the outset of this article, federal agencies are 
frequently involved in facilitating, reviewing, and permitting 
proposed fossil fuel transport and export projects.363 On reservation, 
the BIA plays an important role approving or disapproving third 
party applications seeking rights-of-way across tribal reservation 
land.364 Off reservation, the array of federal actors multiplies (due 
to the several environmental permitting requirements triggered 
when a project threatens to damage air and water resources), and any 
number of agencies may exercise permitting authority (or similar 
approval) over areas within a tribe’s U&A territory. Federal 
agencies that may exercise jurisdiction over proposed fossil fuel 
infrastructure impacting treaty fishing rights include: the Army 
Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, the Department of 
Energy and the Bonneville Power Administration (within DOE), the 
Department of Transportation and the Pipeline and Hazardous 
Materials Safety Administration (within DOT), the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, the National Marine Fisheries Service 
(Department of Commerce), the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
(Department of Interior), the Environmental Protection Agency, the 
Coast Guard, and the State Department.365 Insofar as tribes hold 
U&A treaty fishing rights in portions of rivers and streams that pass 
through federal public lands, federal land management agencies 
such as the United States Forest Service, the Park Service or Bureau 
of Land Management may also be involved.366 All federal agencies 
are legally bound to protect and uphold tribal treaty rights as the 
“supreme law of the land.”367 
The Army Corps of Engineers is one of the federal agencies 
tribes are most likely to confront at the interface of tribal treaty 
fishing rights and proposed fossil fuel infrastructure projects.368 The 
Army Corps has jurisdictional authority over all construction, fill, 
or excavation in “navigable waters” of the United States.369 By 
definition and precedent, navigable waters includes all non-enclosed 
                                                
363 See supra Section II.D. 
364 See supra Section III. 
365 See supra Section II.D. 
366 See, e.g., Nez Perce. 
367 U.S. Constitution, Art. VI, cl. 2. 
368 The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is another. 
369 33 U.S.C. § 403. 
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marine waters and fresh water bodies capable of being navigated for 
purposes of interstate commerce as well as wetlands associated with 
navigable waters.370 The geographic scope of Army Corps authority 
is thus largely coextensive with major tribal U&A treaty fishing 
territories, including the Puget Sound and the greater Salish Sea, as 
well as the Columbia River and its tributaries.371 The Army Corps 
is an important gatekeeper in permitting any port facility, and 
typically serves as the lead agency in the NEPA process for any 
project slated to be constructed in, on, or overlying, navigable 
waters. For example, The Army Corps was the primary federal 
agency exercising regulatory authority over the proposed Gateway 
Pacific Terminal at Cherry Point, which the Corps denied in 2016 
based on the Lummi Nation’s successful assertion of U&A treaty 
fishing rights, discussed below.372  
 
Lummi Nation Protects Cherry Point 
 
The Lummi Nation’s Cherry Point victory is probably the 
most significant and widely known example to date of a tribally led, 
treaty rights-based defeat of a proposed fossil fuel export project in 
the Pacific Northwest. Located on Rosario Strait outside the city of 
Bellingham, Washington, Cherry Point lies within the Lummi 
Nation’s adjudicated U&A fishing grounds, reserved by the tribe in 
the 1855 Treaty of Point Elliott.373 The proposed Gateway Pacific 
Terminal (GPT) slated to be constructed at Cherry Point would have 
been the largest coal export facility in North America,374 designed 
to process up to 48 million metric tons of coal annually for export to 
Asian markets.375 The Lummi Nation formally filed opposition to 
                                                
370 See 33 C.F.R. § 329.4. 
371 Army Corps of Engineers jurisdiction also coextends with the aquatic public 
trust. 
372 See Memorandum for Record from Michelle Walker, Chief, Regulatory 
Branch, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (May 9, 2016) (hereinafter 
Memorandum for Record): 
https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2016/05/160509mfruademinimisdetermina
tion.pdf.  
373 Id. at 26. In the Native language of the Lummi Tribe, the Cherry Point area is 
known as Xwe’chi’eXen and is part of the Tribe’s larger traditional cultural 
property. 
374 See de Place, supra note 5, at 3: 
http://www.sightline.org/research_item/northwest-fossil-fuel-exports-2/. 
375 Ralph Schwartz, “How Indigenous Tribes Are Fighting the Fossil Fuel 
Industry—and Winning,” YES! MAGAZINE, Aug. 9, 2016: 
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construction of the GPT in January 2015 by submitting a request to 
the Army Corps’ Seattle District to deny the GPT’s Section 404 
permit application.376 Through declaratory evidence and technical 
fish catch data, the tribe was able to satisfactorily demonstrate to the 
Army Corps that the Cherry Point area is an important tribal fishing 
site that is “productive and regularly fished.”377 As a result, the 
Army Corps found that the GPT “would have a greater than de 
minimis impact on the Lummi Nation’s access to its usual and 
accustomed fishing grounds,” and it denied the permit.378 
The de minimis impacts standard is an important precept for 
tribes and tribal attorneys to grasp and argue when attempting to 
stop a proposed or existing fossil fuel transport or export project. 
The de minimis standard is fundamentally rooted in the important 
Indian law tenet and canon of construction that tribal treaty rights 
may not be abrogated without express authorization by Congress.379 
Courts and federal agencies use the de minimis standard to assess 
whether an infringement on tribal treaty fishing rights rises to the 
level of being “legally significant,” i.e. de facto abrogation, and 
therefore meritorious of judicial intervention.380 As the Army Corps 
explained in its decision denying the GPT, “If the impact on either 
[the right of access or the right to take fish] is greater than de 
minimis, in other words the impact is legally significant, the Corps 
would be required to deny the permit because only Congress can 
abrogate a treaty right.”381 
The Lummi Nation carried its burden by building a strong 
evidentiary foundation for the Corps’ “greater than de minimis” 
determination. To begin with, the Nation provided fourteen tribal 
declarations demonstrating exercise of treaty fishing rights by tribal 
                                                
http://www.alternet.org/environment/how-indigenous-tribes-are-fighting-fossil-
fuel-industry-and-winning. At full operational capacity, GPT would have 
handled 487 total annual vessel calls, an average of 1.3 cargo ships traveling 
through of Lummi U&A treaty fishing territory every day. See Memorandum of 
Record at 10. 
376 Memorandum of Record, at 1. 
377 Id. at 26. 
378 Id. at 31. 
379 See FN 312 (Lonewolf v. Hitchcock), supra; see also Passenger Fishing 
Vessel, 443 U.S. at 690 (1979) (“Absent explicit statutory language, we have 
been extremely reluctant to find congressional abrogation of treaty rights”). 
380 Memorandum for Record, at 1; see also Northwest Sea Farms, Inc. v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers, 931 F.Supp. 1515, 1520-22 (W.D. Wash. 1996) 
(applying the de minimis test to the Lummi’s right to access for fishing).   
381 Memorandum of Record, at 20. 
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members in the Cherry Point area.382 These declarations included 
maps showing where tribal members fished, specifically, “all the 
maps show fishing or crabbing within or near the footprint of the 
GPT.”383 The Lummi Fisheries Harvest Manager also provided a 
declaration supported by nearly 40 years of data demonstrating that 
tribal fishing at Cherry Point and within the GPT footprint had 
“resulted in millions of fish and shellfish catches by Lummi 
fishermen.”384 In addition, the Tribe submitted an independently 
prepared Vessel Traffic and Risk Assessment Study,385 which 
demonstrated that Lummi fishers “spend at least 1/3 of their time in 
the Cherry Point subarea.”386 The Study concluded that, at full 
operation, the GPT footprint and associated marine vessel traffic 
would disrupt the Lummi fishing in the Cherry Point subarea by 76 
percent.387 Altogether, the Corps found the body of evidence 
assembled and presented by the Lummi Nation “substantial”388 and 
“sufficient to support a finding that the construction of GPT would 
have greater than a de minimis impact on Lummi U&A treaty fishing 
rights.”389 As a result, the Corps was obligated to deny the Section 
404 permit for GPT.390 
Tribes seeking to stop fossil fuel export or transport projects 
within U&A treaty fishing territories are well-advised to look to the 
Lummi Nation’s successful strategy.391 In particular, tribes may 
wish to collect declarations from tribal members or gather 
commission studies regarding the tribal exercise of treaty fishing 
rights and anticipated project impacts and submit this record to 
federal regulatory authorities responsible for granting or denying 
permits for projects in treaty fishing waters.392 However, 
                                                
382 Id. at 21. 
383 Id. at 21-22. 
384 Id. at 22. 
385 Id. at 1; study prepared by Glosten Associates, a naval architecture and 
marine engineering firm based in Seattle: www.glosten.com. 
386 Memorandum for Record, at 22. 
387 Id. at 11. 
388 Id. at 24. 
389 Id. at 25. 
390 Id. at 31. 
391 Export and transport projects entail different physical footprints on the 
landscape and carry different risks. For risks associated with transport projects, 
see supra Section II.B. 
392 Once shared with a federal agency, information regarding traditional 
knowledge would be subject to public disclosure under the Freedom of 
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552.  
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circumstances vary tremendously, and some tribes may encounter 
more difficulty demonstrating clear conflict between a given fossil 
fuel project and tribal U&A treaty fishing rights. As Professor 
Robert T. Anderson has observed, “The Cherry Point decision rested 
on evidence of direct interference with Lummi fishing by increased 
shipping traffic (at the terminal). The less direct the connection 
between such interference and environmental harm, the more 
difficult the case will be.”393  
Still, the Lummi Nation’s landmark victory at Cherry Point 
provides a valuable template of how one tribe successfully defeated 
a fossil fuel infrastructure project by proving to a federal decision 
maker the greater than de minimis impact on U&A treaty fishing 
rights that would result.394 As the Federal District Court of 
Washington made clear in a case decided over 20 years earlier 
concerning the same treaty fishing area, “In carrying out its 
fiduciary duty, it is the government’s, and subsequently the Corps’, 
responsibility to ensure that Indian treaty rights are given full 
effect.”395 The court’s statement makes clear that the federal trust 
obligation (explained in Section IV.A.) reinforces treaty rights as 
well. Reflecting this duality, the Army Corps expressly noted in its 
Memorandum of Record regarding the GPT and Lummi treaty 
fishing rights, “the Corps [has a] fiduciary duty to take treaty rights 
into consideration when making its permit decisions.”396 The next 
section explains the application of treaty rights to states and local 
entities in more detail. 
 
2.   States: Protecting Tribal Resources Through General Public 
Benefits Standards 
                                                
393 See Schwartz, supra note 15. 
394 At a 2017 presentation on the Cherry Point victory, Lummi tribal attorney 
Mary M. Neil emphasized the important role of the Tribe’s coordinated public 
relations campaign strategy alongside legal efforts; she noted that such an 
initiative is “more impactful when it comes from the people themselves.” Mary 
M. Neil, Panel: The Intersection of Tribal Religion and Environmental Claims, 
Federal Bar Association 42nd Annual Indian Law Conference, Talking Stick 
Resort - Scottsdale, AZ, April 6, 2017. 
395 Northwest Sea Farms, 931 F.Supp. at 1520 (salmon farming permit properly 
denied by Army Corps as infringing on the Lummi Nation’s treaty right of 
access); see also Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Hall, 698 F. Supp. 1504 (W.D. 
Wash. 1988) (court enjoins Army Corps from permitting construction of marina 
that would interfere with treaty fishing rights). 
396 Memorandum for Record, at 20.  
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While states have historically demonstrated tense 
relationships with tribes397 and outright hostility to tribal treaty 
fishing rights,398 Pacific Northwest states in particular have begun 
to signal legal regard for tribal authority and treaty fishing rights 
when tribal interests conflict with proposed fossil fuel infrastructure. 
Both expressly and implicitly, state agencies in Oregon and 
Washington have denied permits for fossil fuel transport projects 
based in part on prospective impacts to tribal treaty fishing rights. 
State agencies appear to be recognizing that tribes’ treaty-
guaranteed rights to fisheries in fact promote public benefits of 
ecosystem protection and align naturally with states’ broader 
environmental policy mandates.399 By denying permits for fossil 
fuel infrastructure projects that endanger tribal treaty fishing rights, 
states are taking steps to fulfill what the Ninth Circuit has referred 
to as “the State’s precise obligations and duties under the 
treat[ies].”400 The discussion below elaborates upon key examples 
to provide guidance to tribes in navigating state permitting processes 
triggered by fossil fuel project proposals. 
 
 
                                                
397 For example, the passage of Public Law 280 in 1953, statutorily extended 
state criminal and civil jurisdiction into tribal reservations within a number of 
states, in effect abrogating tribes’ inherent sovereign jurisdiction within unceded 
reservations. 18 U.S.C. § 1162; 28 U.S.C. § 1360. See Carole Goldberg, Public 
Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA 
L. REV. 535 (1975); Carole Goldberg, Public Law 280 and the Problems of 
Lawlessness in Indian Country, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1405 (1997). 
398 See Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F.Supp. 899 (D. Or. 1969); Passenger Fishing 
Vessel, 443 U.S. 658 (1979); Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa 
Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999); see also Charles Wilkinson, Messages from 
Frank’s Landing: A Story of Salmon, Treaties, and the Indian Way, Uni. of 
Wash. Press: Seattle, WA (2000). 
399 See WAC 173-802-110, State Environmental Policy Act: Policies and 
procedures for conditioning or denying permits or other approvals (1984) 
(including an iteration of the public trust doctrine at § (1)(b)(i): “Fulfill the 
responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding 
generations”). See ORS § 196.825 Removal and Fill: Permit criteria (1991) 
(including § (1) “The Director of the Department of State Lands shall issue a 
permit applied for . . . if the director determines that the project described in the 
application: (a) Is consistent with the protection, conservation and best use of 
the water resources of this state . . . ; and (b) Would not unreasonably interfere 
with the paramount policy of this state to preserve the use of its waters for 
navigation, fishing and public recreation” (emphasis added)).  
400 U.S. v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353, 1357 (1985). 
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a.   Coyote Island Terminal Defeat 
 
When a fossil fuel export facility involves construction along 
navigable waters, the permitting process typically requires approval 
from one or more state agencies (in addition to federal approvals). 
This type of requirement became center stage in a controversy over 
the proposed Coyote Island Terminal in Oregon in 2014. The 
company financing Coyote Island Terminal had sought a removal-
fill permit from the Department of State Lands for construction of 
an industrial loading dock on the Columbia River, at the Port of 
Morrow in Boardman, OR, approximately 270 miles upstream from 
the mouth of the Columbia.401 Coyote Island was designed to serve 
as a transfer station for 8.8 million tons of coal per year, which 
would be transported by rail to the Port of Morrow, loaded onto 
barges at Coyote Island, then shipped downriver, where the coal 
would be transferred onto oceangoing cargo ships bound for Asia.402  
On August 18, 2014, the Oregon Department of State Lands 
denied a permit for the proposed coal transport facility on the 
Columbia River.403 The matter was then appealed to the Office of 
Administrative Hearing. On August 11, 2016, after an extensive 
review, the administrative law judge issued a ruling upholding the 
Department of State Land’s earlier order rejecting the permit.404 
Four Columbia River tribes with U&A treaty fishing rights 
in and along the Columbia——the Confederated Tribes of the 
Umatilla Reservation, the Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs 
Reservation, the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama 
Nation, and the Nez Perce Tribe405—as well as their inter-tribal 
                                                
401 Id. at 1.  
402 Id.  
403 The order, hereinafter referred to as DSL Order, is available at 
https://crag.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Findings-and-Order-49123-RF.pdf. 
Parts of the order are also excerpted in an order subsequently issued by a 
hearings examiner on motions for summary determination, see In re Coyote 
Island Terminal LLC and Port of Morrow, Oregon Office of Admin. Hearings 
for the Dept. of State Lands, Rulings on Motions for Summary Determination at 
5 (2016) (hereinafter Administrative Hearings Order), 
http://media.oregonlive.com/environment_impact/other/morrow%20ruling.pdf. 
404 Administrative Hearings Order, supra note 399, at 426. 
405 Treaty with the Nez Perces art #, Jun. 9, 1863, 14. Stat. 647; art #, Aug. 13, 
1868, 15. Stat. 693. Treaty with the Walla Walla art #, Cayuse, etc. Jun. 9, 1855, 
12 Stat. 945. (Umatilla). Treaty with the Tribes of Middle Oregon art #, Jun. 25, 
1855, 12 Stat. 963. Treaty with the Yakima, Jun art #. 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 951.  
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fishery agency, the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission 
(CRITFC)—played a key advocacy role in challenging the permit. 
During the initial comment period for the permit application, and in 
response to a subsequent investigation by the Department of State 
Lands, the four tribes and CRITFC submitted information and 
affidavits showing that “negative impacts would occur to tribal 
fishing and fisheries from: fill size and location physically 
interfering with fishing; operation of the dock facility causing noise, 
light, vibration, and increased barge interference.”406 The 
Department described the tribal information as “extensive, robust, 
and persuasive input,” and cited numerous affidavits, reports, 
photos, and declarations.407 The submitted evidence included 
“historical information, descriptions, mapping, photographs, and a 
video,” the totality of which, in the Department’s words, “support 
that there is commercial, subsistence and cultural fishing uses by 
tribal fishers of Waters of the State in the project area.”408 At the 
later procedural stage in the administrative process, the four tribes 
were granted authority to participate as “limited parties” and 
submitted an extensive response to the proponent’s Motion for 
Summary Determination.409  
The written opinions of both the Department of State Lands 
and the Administrative Law Judge reflect the significance of tribal 
fishing interests in the permit denial. The regulatory decision-
making context was set by ORS 196.825, a state law which governs 
permit issuance. A permit may only issue if the Department 
determines that the project 1) “is consistent with the protection, 
conservation and best use of the water resources of this state,” and 
2) would not unreasonably interfere with the paramount policy of 
this state to preserve the use of its waters for navigation, fishing and 
public recreation.”410 The Department is required to examine several 
listed factors in making these determinations.  
                                                
406 DSL Order, supra note 399, at 3. 
407 Id. at 16. 
408 Id. 
409 Id. at 2 (noting Consolidated Response by tribes opposing Motions for 
Summary Determination that had been filed by CIT, the Port of Morrow, and the 
states of Montana and Wyoming). The states of Montana and Wyoming were 
similarly granted authority to participate in the proceeding as limited parties. A 
coalition of environmental organizations including Columbia Riverkeeper, 
Sierra Club, and Friends of the Columbia also filed motions of opposition to the 
proposed project. Id. 
410 ORS § 196.825(1). 
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In evaluating the list of factors, the Department’s order 
referenced evidence of tribal fishing use on multiple occasions. 
Tribal fishing interests made a prominent appearance in the 
Department’s evaluation of the first factor, (3)(a), which focuses on 
the “public need for the proposed fill” and the public benefits likely 
to result from the fill. The opinion listed evidence submitted by both 
the project proponents (arguing public need for the facility) and the 
opponents, which included the tribes describing their distinct fishing 
interests. The Department concluded that low public need did not 
justify the fill, and that evidence regarding social and economic 
benefits (presumably of the natural area without the fill) was 
“inconclusive, with the notable exception of the fisheries.” Since the 
only evidence on fisheries that appeared in the written decision 
pertained to tribal fisheries, it may be assumed that the subsequent 
finding pertained to those tribal fisheries: “Regarding fisheries. . . 
the preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that there is a small 
but important long-standing fishery at the project site, which is itself 
a social, economic and other benefit to the public. The fishery is 
more significant than the public benefits that may be derived from 
the proposed fill.”411 The conclusion is dramatic in many ways, as it 
represents the outcome of a balancing test between conflicting 
public economic and environmental needs. By weaving the tribal 
fishery interests into “public need,” the Department opened an 
avenue for tribal interests through the express language of the statute 
(language likely replicated in other state statutes as well). 
Another key statutory factor, (3)(e), requires the Department 
to assess “whether the proposed fill or removal conforms to sound 
policies of conservation and would not interfere with public health 
and safety.”412 Evaluating this factor, the Department referenced 
extensive impacts to tribal fishing (both commercial and 
subsistence) in the immediate vicinity of the project area as well as 
in the Columbia River system. These impacts included, for example, 
physical interference with fishing nets, conflicts between barges and 
nets, safety threats from entanglements between nets and boats, or 
from capsized boats, and the impacts to fish from noise and light.413 
The tribal fishing evidence might not have been the only fisheries 
evidence in the record that influenced the agency in weighing this 
                                                
411 DSL Order, supra note 399, at 3. 
412 ORS § 196.825 (3)(e). 
413 DSL Order, supra note 399, at 8. 
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factor because the Department noted that it had received “thousands 
of comments that . . . the facility may lead to adverse effects to 
aquatic habitat, fishing or public health and safety.” However, this 
evidence was the only fishing evidence set forth in the Department’s 
discussion of this important factor. At the end of that discussion the 
agency stated, “The Department finds that the proposed fill does not 
conform to sound policies of conservation. For example, the 
proposed fill would obstruct a small but important long-standing 
fishery in the project area.”414  
In the portion of the opinion actually applying the two 
governing standards, the Department again emphasized tribal 
fishing. It found the proposed project would not be “consistent with 
the protection, conservation, and best use” of the state’s water 
resources. While the Department noted that the determination was 
supported by a number of considerations, it chose to elaborate on 
just two: alternatives to the project, and the impact of tribal fishing 
in the project area. Listing extensive submitted tribal evidence and 
affidavits, the agency wrote, “the Department finds and concludes 
that the evidence supporting that there is a small but important long-
standing fishery at the project site is more persuasive than the 
evidence submitted by the applicant regarding fishing at the project 
site.”415 Similarly, the agency found that the proposed project would 
not be consistent with the second governing standard, to “preserve . 
. . waters for navigation, fishing and public recreation.” Its treatment 
of this standard was brief, concluding (yet once again) that the 
project would “unreasonably interfere with a small but important 
and long-standing fishery . . . at the project site.” The Department’s 
decision was upheld by the Office of Administrative Hearings in 
2016.416 
 Beyond the importance of the Coyote Island Terminal denial 
to the immediate tribal fishing interests, the administrative saga is 
quite instructive on a broader level. First, it demonstrates how tribal 
treaty rights may play a role in a state agency’s decision that is 
structured by a statutory regime intended to benefit the general 
public. In this case, there were statutory principles providing 
protection of waters and fisheries, and the tribal fishing rights 
successfully fit within that principled realm. It is likely that other 
                                                
414 DSL Order, supra note 399, at 8. 
415 DSL Order, supra note 399, at 16. 
416 Hearings Opinion, at 22.  
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states have similar broad statutory standards intending to protect 
water and fisheries, and these too may provide a legal hook for the 
assertion of unique tribal interests. Second, this case study 
demonstrates the important role of tribal advocacy. The tribes had 
submitted extensive evidence that formed a major basis of the 
Department’s conclusions. The Columbia River tribes were greatly 
assisted by CRITFC, having over 100 staff persons, including 
scientists, advocates, and policy experts charged with promoting the 
protection of the tribes’ treaty fisheries and fishing rights.417 And 
finally, as parties in the administrative proceedings surrounding this 
project, the tribes were positioned to assert staunch opposition to 
fossil fuels more broadly through the media. When Umatilla tribal 
leader Chuck Sams was interviewed about the Coyote Island project, 
he explained (as paraphrased in the article) that the tribe “does not 
approve of the Columbia River as a corridor for dangerous fossil 
fuels.”418 JoDe Goudy, the Yakama tribal council chairman, said in 
a statement, “Yakama Nation will not rest until the entire regional 
threat posed by the coal industry to our ancestral lands and waters is 
eradicated.”419 By affirmatively asserting their treaty-guaranteed 
U&A fishing rights, these four Columbia River fishing tribes played 
an important role not only in defeating a looming fossil fuel 
transport project on the Columbia River, and in blazing a way 
through a state permit system that failed to include tribal interests in 
its express provisions, but also in using their legal platform to assert 
a broad leadership vision for opposing fossil fuels region-wide.  
 
b.   Millennium Bulk Terminals Denial 
 
Most recently, in September 2017, the State of Washington 
denied a permit with prejudice for another coal export facility on the 
Columbia River, citing potential harm to tribal treaty fishing rights 
                                                
417  
418 See George Plave, Port of Morrow Agrees to Withdraw Coyote Island 
Terminal Application, EAST OREGONIAN, Nov. 10, 2016: 
http://www.eastoregonian.com/eo/local-news/20161110/port-of-morrow-agrees-
to-withdraw-coyote-island-terminal-application (quoting article’s paraphrase of 
tribal spokesperson Chuck Sam’s statement). 
419 See Kim Kalliber, Big Coal’s Plans for the Pacific Northwest Take A Major 
Hit, TULALIP NEWS, Aug. 20, 2014: 
http://www.tulalipnews.com/wp/2014/08/20/big-coals-plans-for-the-pacific-
northwest-take-a-major-hit/. 
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as one of several grounds.420 The proposed Millennium Bulk 
Terminal at Longview, Washington, was designed to transfer 44 
million metric tons of coal from trains to ocean going vessels per 
year, enough to increase U.S. coal exports by 40 percent.421 The 
proposed export facility necessitated construction of rail beds, 
loading and dock facilities, transfer stations, pads, conveyors, and 
various buildings.422 The project would have impacted over thirty-
two acres of wetlands and included nearly five acres of new 
overwater coverage. 423 The construction required a Section 401 
Water Quality Certificate issued by the Washington Department of 
Ecology, exercising its authority under the federal Clean Water 
Act.424 In order to issue such a certification, the agency must 
determine the project will not only comply with state water quality 
standards, but also with “other appropriate requirements of state 
law.”425 The agency scrutinized the Millennium Bulk Terminal 
application to measure its compliance with not only water quality 
standards, but also the State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA).  
Tribes played an active role in opposing construction of the 
Millennium Bulk Terminal. The Cowlitz Tribe, whose tribal 
headquarters are located in Longview and whose ancestral territory 
includes much of southwest Washington, filed written comments 
with the Department of Ecology and requested government-to-
government consultations with state and federal officials regarding 
the proposed facility.426 Cowlitz Chairman Bill Iyall publicly stated 
                                                
420 Section 401 Water Quality Certification Denial (Order No. 15417), 
Department of Ecology, State of Washington, Sept. 26, 2017 (hereinafter DOE 
Order), http://www.millenniumbulk.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/401-WQ-
Certification-Denial-Letter.pdf. That denial was upheld on August 16, 2018 by 
the State Water Pollution Hearings Board.  
http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2018/aug/16/millennium-water-quality-
permit-denial-upheld/.  The order is available at:  
https://www.columbiariverkeeper.org/sites/default/files/2018-
08/20180815113207753.pdf. 
421 DOE Order, supra note 415, at 1; see also Rachel La Corte, “State Denies 
Key Permit for Coal Export Project in Longview,” THE BELLINGHAM HERALD, 
Sept. 26, 2017, 
http://www.bellinghamherald.com/news/state/washington/article175458506.htm
l. 
422 DOE Order, supra note 415, at 2-3. 
423 Id. 
424 Id. at 3 (detailing authorities). 
425 Id. at 13. 
426 Tony Schick, Cowlitz Tribe Asserts Opposition to Longview Coal Terminal, 
OREGON PUBLIC BROADCASTING, Oct. 21, 2016: 
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the proposed project “represents a massive movement of fossil fuels 
across the landscape through sensitive environments, impacting 
animals, fish, plant life.”427 The Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla 
Indian Reservation, which holds U&A treaty fishing rights in and 
along the Columbia, also actively opposed construction of the 
facility and the associated transport of coal-by-rail along its treaty 
fishing waters.428 The tribe’s Department of Natural Resources 
submitted comments in the State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA)  
process highlighting not only the potential harm to fishing at treaty 
sites, but also more broadly, the harm to fish habitat, air quality, and 
the climate system in general from greenhouse gas emissions as a 
consequence of massive coal transported by rail as a result of the 
proposed project.429  
In its order denying the application, the Washington 
Department of Ecology (WDOE) found the proposed project failed 
to meet the water quality standards, but more importantly for this 
discussion, found it conflicted with the stated purposes of the SEPA 
to “avoid or mitigate adverse environmental impacts.”430 The 
WDOE relied heavily on evidence developed through an 
environmental impact statement (EIS) prepared jointly by Cowlitz 
County and the WDOE. That EIS identified nine areas of 
“unavoidable and significant adverse environmental impacts” that 
would result from the project and could not be mitigated.431 The first 
eight dealt with, respectively: 1) air quality; 2) vehicle 
transportation; 3) noise and vibration; 4) social and community 
resources (including impacts on health); 5) rail transportation; 6) rail 
safety; 7) marine vessel transportation; and 8) cultural resources. 
With the exception of the last, which made brief mention of 
“potentially affected Native American tribes,” those areas did not 
focus on uniquely tribal concerns. The final, ninth ground, however, 
was devoted solely to “tribal resources” which the agency defined 
                                                
http://www.opb.org/news/series/coal-in-the-nw/cowlitz-tribe-asserts-opposition-
to-longview-coal-terminal/. 
427 Id. 
428 “CTUIR Pleased with Coal Terminal Decision,” MY COLUMBIA BASIN, Oct. 
6. 2017: http://www.mycolumbiabasin.com/2017/10/06/ctuir-pleased-with-coal-
terminal-decision/. 
429 Letter from Eric Quaempts, Director, CTUIR Department of Natural 
Resources, to DOE, Nov. 18, 2013 (on file with author). 
430 Id. at 3-4. 
431 Id. at 3-4. 
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to “refer to tribal fishing, and gathering practices and treaty rights.” 
The language clearly incorporates the interests of the Umatilla 
Tribe, which asserted its treaty rights in its comments, and the 
Cowlitz Tribe, which has no federally recognized treaty rights at this 
time but nevertheless had significant interests at stake.432 WDOE 
specified, “These [tribal] resources may include plants or fish used 
for commercial, subsistence, and ceremonial purposes.”433  
The discussion of tribal resources, while only one of many 
grounds for permit denial, was ground-breaking in many important 
aspects. First, the WDOE recognized not just direct impacts from 
the project on tribal fishing, but also the indirect ecological impacts 
to the fishery itself. Applying, but without explicitly mentioning, the 
Culverts treaty right of environmental protection, the agency 
examined the many potential harms to the fishery including: 1) the 
risk of fish being stranded through vessel wakes; 2) the addition of 
coal dust to waters and habitat areas; and 3) the potential harm to 
fish behavior caused by dredging and noise and other effects.434 
These impacts led the agency to conclude, “these impacts could 
reduce the number of fish surviving to adulthood and . . . affect the 
number of fish available for harvest by Native American Tribes.”435  
Second, the agency explored not just the project area around 
the proposed terminal, but the much more expansive area impacted 
by rail operations associated with the proposed terminal. The 
expansion of scope was key, and urged by the Umatilla Tribe, 
because its treaty fishing occurs in Zone 6 upriver of Bonneville 
Dam and several miles upstream from the actual proposed terminal 
at the Port of Longview. Recognizing the associated train traffic was 
a predictable consequence of the project, the denial order stated, 
“The additional Project-related trains travelling through areas 
adjacent to and within the usual and accustomed fishing areas of 
Native American Tribes could restrict access to fishing areas in the 
                                                
432 See U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Draft NEPA Environmental Impact 
Statement for Millennium Bulk Terminals-Longview, Chapter 4 Built 
Environment: Affected Environment and Project Impacts, Sep. 2016: 
https://www.millenniumbulkeiswa.gov/assets/chapter_4.5_tribal_treaty_rights_a
nd_trust_responsibilities.pdf. 
433 Section 401 Water Quality Certification Denial (Order No. 15417) at 12, 
http://www.millenniumbulk.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/401-WQ-
Certification-Denial-Letter.pdf. 
434 Id.  
435 Id.  
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Columbia River.”436 The WDOE specified, “The increase in 16 
additional Millennium-related trains per day traveling through areas 
adjacent to and within the fishing areas of Native American Tribes 
would restrict access to 20 tribal fishing sites . . . in the Columbia 
River. There are additional access sites that are not mapped that 
would be impacted.”437  
Third, WDOE recognized a realm of impacts that could not 
be quantified with precision—factors such as fish distribution and 
fish migration periods made it difficult to quantify the effect of the 
project on tribal fishing—but found that these factors could not be 
ignored or dismissed, citing SEPA’s language that “presently 
unquantified environmental amenities and values will be given 
appropriate consideration in decision making along with economic 
and technical considerations.” 
Fourth, the agency’s ruling did not fall back on mitigation 
promises made by the railroad, but instead drew a strict line on the 
role of mitigation. Acknowledging that conceivable mitigation steps 
(such as minimizing noise and conducting fish monitoring prior to 
dredging) could be required of Millennium to reduce impacts to 
fisheries and tribal fishing interests, the agency held, “[t]hese 
mitigation steps are inadequate because although noise impacts from 
construction would be reduced, they would not be eliminated, and 
fish behavior could be altered and affect the number of fish available 
for harvest by Native American Tribes.”438 Through its discussion 
of “mitigation” measures, the agency set a low threshold of harm 
that would trigger permit denial, arguably paralleling the de minimis 
federal standard established in caselaw dealing with impacts to 
treaty rights.439 
Finally, the agency precisely tied the impact on tribal 
resources to its governing statutory authority of SEPA, as it must 
under established Washington law if it relies on SEPA to deny a 
permit. 440 The impact of SEPA can be substantive, supporting a 
                                                
436 Id. at 13-14. 
437 Id.  
438 Id. at 12 (emphasis added). 
439 See discussion at Section IV.B.1, supra. 
440 WAC 197-11-660(1)(b); Cougar Mt. Assoc. v. King County, 111 Wn.2d 742, 
752-53, 765 P.2d 264 (1998). See also Order of Pollution Control Hearings 
Board on appeal from the WDOE, 
https://www.columbiariverkeeper.org/sites/default/files/2018-
08/20180815113207753.pdf. 
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permit denial even if all other statutory and permit requirements are 
met,441 but courts demand precision in citing the agency SEPA 
policy that is the basis of any denial. WDOE concluded, as a factual 
matter, that “Millennium at full operations would result in 
unavoidable significant adverse impacts to tribal resources” and 
stated that such impacts to tribal resources are “inconsistent with the 
following Ecology SEPA policies:” 
1) Fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee 
of the environment for succeeding generations; 
2) Preserve important historic, cultural, and natural 
aspects of our national heritage; 
3) [E]nsure that presently unquantified environmental 
amenities and values will be given appropriate 
consideration in decision making. . . .  
On appeal, the State Pollution Hearings Board upheld the 
decision in a lengthy opinion. Notably, the Board underscored the 
WDOE’s authority to deny a permit on substantive SEPA grounds, 
relying on established Washington law making clear that “‘[a]ny 
governmental action may be conditioned or denied’ based on the 
adverse environmental impacts disclosed in an EIS.” The board 
added, “Using SEPA substantive authority, a decision maker may 
deny a permit even if it meets all of the requirements for approval 
under permit criteria.”442 This substantive effect of SEPA 
effectively means that, as long as impacts to tribal resources are 
substantiated, the decision-making agency has a realm of authority 
under state law within which to deny permits in furtherance of treaty 
obligations, even if all other statutory permit requirements are met. 
Oregon lacks such a state environmental policy act, but as the 
Coyote Island case showed, the state has other potential statutory 
protections that can import treaty rights protection into the legal 
regime. 
The company seeking to develop Millennium Bulk appealed 
the State’s denial of a Section 401 Certificate to the Superior Court 
of Cowlitz County,443 so the future of this landmark decision 
remains unsettled. However, the case as it stands now holds 
                                                
441 See discussion infra note ___ and accompanying text. 
442 See Order of Pollution Control Hearings Board, at 12 (citing Polygon, 90 
Wn. 2d at 65). 
443 “Appeal,” Millennium Bulk Terminals Longview, LLC: 
http://www.millenniumbulk.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Complaint-and-
Petition.pdf. 
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tremendous importance as a guiding light for tribes seeking to assert 
their treaty rights (and non-treaty fishing rights) to halt fossil fuel 
transport. Like the Coyote Island case, the Millennium Bulk 
Terminals case represents a state agency premising its denial 
substantially, although not exclusively, on tribal fishing interests. 
These case studies both show the potential for Pacific Northwest 
state agencies to factor tribal treaty rights into state decisions 
regarding fossil fuel infrastructure, and legally tie the tribal interests 
into broader state law standards focused on promoting general 
public concerns. The fusion of state environmental standards with 
treaty rights obligations (the supreme law of the land) holds 
significant potential in fortifying a legal blockade against fossil fuel 
transport through the Pacific Northwest. 
 
3.   Local: Applying the “Supreme Law of the Land” 
at Ground Level 
 
Local governments also provide a jurisdictional context for 
tribes to assert treaty rights to block fossil fuel infrastructure 
projects. Notably, local governments may have considerable interest 
in stopping oil “bomb trains,” coal trains, and pipelines that threaten 
the health and safety of citizens and harm ecosystems. Counties and 
cities can choose to pass ordinances prohibiting fossil fuel 
infrastructure from entering their jurisdictions.444 The potential issue 
with such ordinances is preemption, just as it is with tribal 
ordinances that seek to prevent fossil fuel transport on-reservation. 
However, recent case law suggests that local governments may in 
some circumstances secure local permit denials against preemption 
claims if they deny local fossil fuel infrastructure permits on the sole 
ground of carrying out their sovereign duty to uphold federal treaty 
promises to tribes.445 The case below involving Wasco County’s 
denial of a railroad expansion permit represents one such instance 
and provides a fascinating glimpse into this legal possibility. While 
this case arose out of a unique legal context explained below—one 
                                                
444 Spokane, Washington and Portland, Oregon are two cities that have passed 
such ordinances. The issue of whether local ordinances will withstand 
preemption without any role of treaty rights is a timely and complex issue, but 
beyond the scope of this Article. This article limits the focus to a case study 
involving one town that denied a permit based exclusively on treaty rights 
considerations. 
445 This article odes not explore other arguments that may be successful in 
defeating preemption.   
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that should invoke caution against simplistic overgeneralization of 
its applicability to other contexts—nevertheless, the legal possibility 
raised by this case invites tribes and local decision makers to become 
allies in a joint effort to combat fossil fuel proposals that threaten 
their mutual interests.  
 
a.   Wasco County Halts Oil-by-Rail Expansion 
 
The leading case of a local government invoking and 
upholding treaty rights in the face of fossil fuels has played out in 
Wasco County, Oregon, along the banks of the Columbia River 
where three different interests converge. Four tribes retain U&A 
treaty fishing rights within this section of the Columbia River: the 
Nez Perce Tribe, the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama 
Indian Nation, the Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs, and the 
Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation.446 The 
same area features spectacular scenery and is a designated national 
scenic area protected under the National Scenic Area Act.447 And, 
the corridor also serves as a primary transportation route for trains 
carrying highly volatile Bakken oil as well as coal from the interior 
United States to western ports such as Portland, Oregon and 
Longview, Washington. Wasco County found itself at the 
intersection of those interests when Union Pacific Railroad applied 
to the County in January 2015 for a permit to construct and expand 
a section of rail track along the Columbia River near the city of 
Mosier in the designated National Scenic Area. The county permit 
requirement derived from, and was developed pursuant to, the 
federal legislation creating the scenic area (the National Scenic Area 
Act, described more fully below). The track expansion would have 
allowed Union Pacific to increase transport of trains carrying crude 
oil through the Columbia River Gorge.448  
On June 3, 2016, as the permit application was pending 
before the County, a Union Pacific train hauling ninety-six tank cars 
carrying Bakken oil from North Dakota derailed near the very 
project site that was subject to the permit application.449 Several cars 
                                                
446 See 16 U.S.C. § 544(b)(2)(D).  
447 16 U.S.C. §§ 544-544p (2012).  
448 Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Runyon, 320 F.R.D. 245 (D. Or. 2017). 
449 See Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Wasco County Board of Commissioners, 
CRGC No. COA=16-02, Final Opinion and Order, Sept. 8, 2017, at 44 
(hereinafter CRGC Order).   
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exploded, sending black plumes of smoke high into the air. The 
nearby town of Mosier was evacuated, as well as a school and homes 
in close proximity to the flaming railcars, and Interstate 84 was shut 
down to traffic. A total of 42,000 gallons of oil spilled, leaving about 
18,000 gallons of oil in the soil near the Columbia River, and an oil 
sheen appeared on the Columbia River the day following the 
accident; subsequently 10,000 gallons of oil were recovered from 
the city’s sewer plant.450 Multiple agencies responded to the fire, and 
with the threat of the blaze triggering a uncontrollable wildfire in the 
dry Gorge during a hot summer, Governor Kate Brown invoked the 
Conflagration Act to augment fire-fighting resources needed to 
contain the blaze. While there were no fatalities from the train wreck 
and resulting explosion, Executive Director Paul Lumley of the 
Columbia River Intertribal Fish Commission told the press, “We’ve 
got to do something to stop this. This was too close of a call.”451  
Despite the remarkable backdrop set by the calamity at the 
site just three months earlier, the Wasco County Planning 
Commission approved Union Pacific’s application for track 
expansion with conditions on September 29, 2016.452 The Yakama 
Nation as well as Union Pacific and a coalition of non-governmental 
organizations filed three separate appeals of the decision to the 
Wasco County Board of Commissioners. That board reversed the 
Planning Commission’s decision on November 14, 2016 on the 
basis that the project would impair the fishing rights of the four 
tribes with treaty rights in the National Scenic Area.453 Pursuant to 
the process set forth in the National Scenic Area Act described 
below, Union Pacific appealed the decision the Columbia River 
Gorge Commission (CRGC), a regional agency established by the 
                                                
450 Groundwater in the area remains contaminated, but the river itself is not 
polluted from the accident according to the Oregon Department of 
Environmental Quality. See Patrick Mulvihill, Mosier Derailment: No Pollution 
in Columbia, Groundwater Tests Continue, May 13, 2017: 
http://www.hoodrivernews.com/news/2017/may/13/mosier-derailment-no-
columbia-pollution-groundwate/. For an article examining the safety aspects of 
the derailment, see Rob Davis, ‘Mosier Really Dodged a Bullet’: Gorge 
Derailment Highlights Oil Train Dangers, June 4, 2016: 
https://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-
news/index.ssf/2016/06/mosier_really_dodged_a_bullet.html.  
451 Worst Fears Realized for Mosier Residents with Train Wreck, KGW8, June 
4, 2016: https://www.kgw.com/article/news/worst-fears-realized-for-mosier-
residents-with-train-wreck/283-231100297. 
452 CRGC Order, supra note 444, at 9.   
453 Id. 
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Act.454 Shortly after filing that administrative appeal, and while it 
was pending, Union Pacific filed a separate complaint in the federal 
district court of Oregon against Wasco County commissioners as 
well as members of the CRGC seeking a declaratory order to end 
the ongoing administrative process, arguing that federal law 
pertaining to railroad transportation preempts the permitting process 
established under the National Scenic Area Act.455 On March 8, 
2017, the court dismissed the case on a procedural ground described 
in Section 4 below (an appeal of that decision is pending in the Ninth 
Circuit). On September 8, 2017, the CRGC issued a lengthy and 
thorough opinion upholding the decision of the Wasco Board of 
Commissioners to deny the permit on the basis of tribal treaty rights 
impairment. The discussion below examines in detail the CRGC 
decision, focusing on its conclusions regarding the Board’s 
authority to deny a permit based on tribal treaty rights, and, 
relatedly, its discussion of a threshold preemption issue. Section 4 
then discusses the federal district court’s dismissal of the railroad’s 
challenge to the administrative process, highlighting the intertwined 
procedural principles of tribal sovereign immunity and 
indispensable parties that prompted the dismissal. 
 
b.   The County’s Permit Requirement and the Board’s Denial 
 
While it likely comes as a surprise to many that a local 
county board of commissioners in Oregon would deny a land use 
permit solely on the basis of treaty rights, the result is quite 
explainable by reference to the federal statutory context authorizing 
the land use decision. Wasco County’s permit requirement derives 
from both the National Scenic Area Act that established the 
300,000-acre federally protected area spanning both the States of 
Washington and Oregon in the Columbia River Gorge, and the 
associated Columbia River Gorge Compact that was executed 
between the two states and received consent of Congress. Pursuant 
to the compact, the CRGC was created as a regional agency to write 
(in concert with the U.S. Forest Service) a management plan for the 
National Scenic Area. The Act mandated that all land use within the 
scenic area was to be consistent with the standards set forth in the 
                                                
454 Id. at 12-13. 
455 Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Runyon, 320 F.R.D. 245, 248 (D. Or. 2017). 
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Act.456 The federal legislation relied on local counties to carry out 
the federal protections through their local land use mechanisms. 
Under this federal scheme, the six counties within the National 
Scenic Area were required to adopt land use ordinances to carry out 
the purposes of the act. Such ordinances were subject to review by 
the CRGC for consistency with the management plan it formulated 
for the Gorge.457 The permit sought by the Union Pacific was 
required by Wasco County’s National Scenic Area Land Use and 
Development Ordinance (referred to as NSALUDO), which is the 
County’s land use regulation implementing the National Scenic 
Area Act. 458 
Wasco County’s NSALUDO, as an instrumentality of the 
federal law from which it derives, both reflects and incorporates the 
National Scenic Area Act’s emphasis on protection of Indian treaty 
rights in the Gorge. Express statutory language in that Act specifies 
that nothing the in the Act shall “affect or modify any treaty or other 
rights of any Indian Tribe.”459 This provision manifests in the 
Management Plan devised by the CRGC: that plan expressly 
prohibits uses that would affect or modify a treaty right.460 The Plan 
defines “effect on treaty rights” (in pertinent part) as “to bring about 
a change in . . . or to have a consequence to Indian treaty or treaty 
related rights in the Treaties of 1855 with the Nez Perce, Umatilla, 
Warm Springs and Yakima tribes. . . . “461 Wasco County’s 
NSALUDO (the land use provision implementing the Act) brings 
the federal prohibition to the local level by expressly stating: “The 
County shall decide whether the proposed uses would affect or 
modify any treaty or other rights of any Indian tribe. . . . Uses that 
would affect or modify such rights shall be prohibited.”462  
Three of the four tribes with treaty rights in the Columbia 
                                                
456 See CRGC Order, supra note 444, at 11 (explaining federal statutory regime 
governing the Gorge). 
457 Id. at 12-13 (explaining legal context). 
458 See §§ 1.80(A), 14.800, “National Scenic Area Land Use and Development 
Ordinance (NSA-LUDO) for Wasco County Oregon,” adopted May 1994, most 
recently updated August 2010: 
http://www.co.wasco.or.us/docs/Planning%20Ordinances/MERGED_NSALUD
O.pdf. 
459 16 U.S.C. 544o(a)(1). 
460 See CRGC Order, supra note 444, at 35 (paraphrasing and quoting 
management plan). 
461 Id. at 35. 
462 Id. at 38 (citing NSALUDO 14.800.D). 
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Gorge—the Yakama Nation, Umatilla Tribe, and Warm Springs 
Tribe—all provided evidence to the Wasco County Board of 
Commissioners describing how the Union Pacific proposal would 
violate their treaty rights.463 Based on this evidence, the Board 
denied the permit in November 2016, finding an impermissible 
impairment of treaty-reserved rights, and denied the permit 
application, carrying out the mandate (of the local ordinance 
implementing the federal law) that “uses that would affect or modify 
such rights shall be prohibited.”464 Applying the County Ordinance, 
the Wasco County Board of Commissioners “conclude[ed] that the 
project would impair treaty-reserved fishing rights of the four 
Columbia River Treaty Tribes.”465  
 
c.   The CRGC’s Review 
 
Pursuant to the process established by the National Scenic 
Area Act, Union Pacific brought an appeal of the Wasco County 
Board of Commissioner’s decision before the CRGC. The CRGC is 
charged with supervising the development and enforcement of 
county land use ordinances within the National Scenic Area, 
including resolving appeals from county permitting decisions.466 
During the course of the permit appeal before the CRGC, tribes 
participated in various ways. The Yakama Nation, as a party to the 
appeal, provided extensive evidence and briefing regarding how the 
Union Pacific proposal would affect its treaty reserved fishing 
rights.467 The Warm Springs and Umatilla Tribes and Columbia 
River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission submitted separate amicus 
curiae briefs setting forth evidence of treaty interference caused by 
the proposal.468 Importantly, the arguments propounded by the tribes 
focused not only on acute, immediate threats posed by increased 
train traffic and infrastructure development, but also the risk of 
                                                
463 Id. at 39 (summarizing arguments). 
464 Id. at 9 (describing procedural history and Board’s denial of permit 
application). 
465 Wasco Co. Board of Comm’rs, CRGC at 9. 
466 16 U.S.C. §§ 544c, 544e, 544m(a); see also “Land Use Decision: Appeals,” 
Columbia River Gorge Commission: http://www.gorgecommission.org/land-
use/appeals/. The appellate posture before the CRGC was more complicated for 
reasons not pertinent to this discussion, as the CRGC actually faced two appeals 
consolidated into one. See CRGC Opinion, at 2. 
467 See CRGC Order, supra note 444, at 39 (summarizing Yakama arguments). 
468 Id. at 4, 39. 
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derailment and spill, and more broadly, the aggravation of climate 
change caused by emissions from the transported oil.469 The 
CRGC’s 52-page opinion handed down on September 8, 2017 
upheld the permit denial and provides deep contextual grounding for 
the remarkable outcome of Wasco County’s process, a local land 
use permit denial based exclusively on grounds of interference with 
treaty rights. 
 
i.   The CRGC’s Preemption Analysis 
 
The CRGC opinion confronted the preemption argument at 
the outset. Union Pacific argued that Wasco County’s permit 
requirement was local in nature and preempted by the federal 
Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA), 
which regulates rail transportation.470  As observed throughout this 
article, the preemption issue is pivotal to the ability of local 
governments to stop dangerous fossil fuel transportation through 
their jurisdictions, such as the “bomb trains” carrying Bakken oil 
like the one that derailed and exploded in Mosier, Oregon in June 
2016. 
The CRGC soundly rejected the preemption argument on 
seemingly two separate bases. First, the CRGC reviewed substantial 
precedent and concluded the local ordinance warrants treatment as 
federal law because it is both required by federal law and 
implements federal law (the National Scenic Area Act). As the 
CRGC concluded: “These National Scenic Area authorities and 
other case law involving other cooperative federalism laws also 
suggest that Wasco County’s NSALUDO is itself federal law, again, 
not local or state law.”471 As a federal law, it resists preemption as 
long as the law from which it derives (the National Scenic Area Act) 
may be harmonized with the ICCTA. Applying relevant factors from 
case law, the CRGC found the two laws could coexist harmoniously, 
and that Wasco County’s regulation (and implementing decision) 
                                                
469 Id. at 39. 
470 49 U.S.C. § 10101 et seq., establishing the Surface Transportation Board 
(STB) and giving the STB exclusive jurisdiction over rail routes and rates. 
471 See CRGC Order, supra note 444, at 11, 15. While the Columbia Gorge legal 
regime is unique, there may be other laws with similar features that may in 
effect federalize local law. The Coastal Zone Management Act, for example, is a 
federal law protecting coastal zones that relies on local planning and regulation 
as its primary implementation mechanism. See 16 U.S.C. 1451(i), (m). 
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was not preempted.472  
The importance of this analysis directly extends beyond 
Wasco County to the other five counties that implement the National 
Scenic Area Act. Under this analysis, any of those counties could 
similarly defeat preemption challenges to their local ordinances 
carrying out the Act. This is significant for the future of fossil fuel 
transport proposals, because the Columbia River rail corridor, 
situated as it is between the U.S. interior’s coal and oil reserves and 
the coastal ports of Oregon and Washington, presumably remains a 
key link in the global export designs of the fossil fuel industry. 
Beyond the practical significance of the stunning leverage held by 
those six counties under the National Scenic Area Act, the Wasco 
County case opens a field of questions as to whether any other 
statutory areas of localized federalism operate in a manner sufficient 
to defeat preemption (a matter beyond the scope of this Article but 
worth noting).  
The second basis asserted by the CRGC for finding no 
preemption bar seemingly rested entirely on treaty rights grounds.473 
The CRGC concluded: “The ICCTA does not preempt Wasco 
County’s NSALUDO because Wasco County is complying with the 
Columbia River Treaties.”474 It reasoned that, since the ICCTA does 
not evince clear congressional intent to abrogate tribal treaty rights, 
“the treaties remain the supreme law of the land.”475 While the 
CRGC’s discussion is brief, its conclusion is weighty: Wasco 
County’s Ordinance, by carrying out the supreme law of the land, 
survives a preemption challenge.476  
Stepping back to the preemption analysis in its entirety 
                                                
472 See CRGC Order, supra note 444, at 18-23. 
473 There is a bit of ambiguity, however, in the CRGC’s passing statement that 
treaty rights creates and “additional layer of preemption analysis on top of 
factors expressed by the STB and Ninth Circuit.” The statement could be 
interpreted as providing a treaty-rights backdrop to what is essentially a driving 
statutory analysis. However, the segregation of the analysis in a different section 
of the opinion, set apart and following the statutory analysis section, indicates 
that indeed the CRGC regarded the treaty rights basis as a separate basis for 
finding no preemptive effect of federal transportation law. 
474 Id. at 23. 
475 Id. at 24. 
476 In theory, the Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq., 
which covers the coastal reaches of Washington and Oregon, as well as 
California, provides a parallel federal beltway. Tribes could strategize with state 
and local leaders to develop plans and protocols for protecting coastal areas 
from fossil fuel transport and export.  
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(encompassing both grounds), the significance of the CRGC’s 
holding is great. The county’s denial of a fossil fuel infrastructure 
permit amounts to assertion of local control in a legal context 
heavily dominated by federal law.477 Here, the local entity 
succeeded in shielding its action from the inevitable preemption 
challenge both by 1) linking it to the federal legal structure of the 
National Scenic Area Act (from which the permit requirement 
derived); and by 2) premising the denial exclusively on treaty rights, 
which remain the supreme law of the land unabrogated by any 
federal rail transportation laws. The duality of that defense begs the 
question of whether a local ordinance protecting treaty rights can 
alone, without the backing of a federal statutory structure such as 
the Scenic Area Act, can survive a preemption challenge.478 In light 
of the counties’ derivative responsibility (as sub-sovereigns of the 
state) to uphold treaty promises securing fishing rights—promises 
that recently received a strong judicial pronouncement of 
environmental protection in the Culverts case described in section—
a strong argument exists that local entities in the Pacific Northwest 
may legally shield some decisions from preemption even outside a 
federal scheme such as the Scenic Area Act if they carefully tailor 
their regulatory decision to the binding federal purpose of protecting 
the use and enjoyment of treaty secured tribal fishing rights. In short, 
applying the “supreme law of the land” at the local level brings an 
entirely new frame to traditional preemption challenges. In this 
manner, while the National Scenic Area Act provides the genesis of 
                                                
477 Moreover, the project had already obtained another necessary permit from 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.  See 
https://www.statesmanjournal.com/story/news/2017/06/14/board-affirms-wasco-
countys-denial-railroad-expansion/395962001/. 
478 Of course, a separate question pertains to whether there may be other federal 
statutory schemes that parallel the basic structure of the Columbia Gorge Act in 
ways important for preemption analysis. The Columbia Gorge Act essentially 
created a federalized structure for local regulation, a fact deemed important to 
the Columbia Gorge Commission’s analysis. There may be other acts that 
present this basic model. While outside the scope of this Article’s analysis, the 
Coastal Zone Management Act certainly creates a unique context for preemption 
by setting forth federal goals carried out through state or local action. 16 U.S.C. 
1451 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. III); c.f. California Coastal Commission v. 
Granite Rock Company, 480 U.S. 572 (1986) (interpreting statute involving 
different preemption question of state regulation of mining claim on federal 
public land). The jurisdictional reach of the CZMA overlays tribal U & A sites 
on major waterways and coastal zones in the Stevens Treaty area of the Pacific 
Northwest. See 16 U.S.C. 1453(1) (defining “coastal zone” to mean “coastal 
waters . . . and the adjacent shorelands”). 
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Wasco County’s unique regulation, the circumstances of this case 
suggest a window of possibility much broader than the Wasco 
County permit saga itself. The possibility of treaty rights protection 
through localized regulation will undoubtedly be explored as local 
entities and tribes develop stronger partnerships to resist dangerous 
fossil fuel transportation through their shared geographies.  
 
ii.   The CRGC’s Treaty Rights Analysis 
 
Moving to the substantive heart of the matter, the CRGC 
upheld Wasco County’s decision to deny the rail expansion permit, 
finding that it was supported by substantial evidence of impacts on 
tribal treaty fishing rights.479 The CRGC’s opinion set forth several 
important analytical steps worthy of note and provides valuable 
guidance on some of the more nuanced issues raised in the 
enforcement of treaty promises. 
 
Geographical Scope of the U&A Right 
 
One central issue concerned the geographic scope of the 
treaty right—a matter approached quite differently by the tribes and 
Union Pacific. The railroad argued the right attached only to specific 
U&A locations that were historically identified, as well as “in-lieu” 
sites (provided as replacements for sites inundated by dams). The 
treaty tribes defined the treaty reserved rights as applying to the 
entire Columbia River in Zone 6, the river area managed under 
treaty cases as the exclusive Indian commercial fishing area.480 
Obviously, beyond the immediate impacts to tribal fishing in the 
project area, the effects of increased rail traffic could affect fishing 
throughout Zone 6 because the rail line follows the river. The CRGC 
summoned extensive and longstanding case law dealing with 
Columbia River tribal treaty rights to adopt the tribes’ geographical 
interpretation of the treaty zone of interest, concluding:  
 
We agree with the tribes and Columbia River Inter-Tribal 
Fish Commission that treaty fishing rights are not 
                                                
479 Wasco Co. Board of Comm’rs, CRGC, at 51. 
480 See CRGC Order, supra note 444, at 26-27. Notably, the tribes’ interpretation 
correctly also includes “a property right in adjacent lands to the extent and for 
the purpose mentioned in the treaties.” See id. (quoting Yakama Nation response 
brief).   
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geographically limited to specifically identifiable 
historically used stations, but that the term ‘usual and 
accustomed’ encompasses all of Zone 6 without need to 
establish specific historical access points to Zone 6. The 
right also includes the right of crossing land to access the 
Columbia River from the Winans case noted above.481 
 
The CRGC also underscored the role of the tribes in the 
Gorge protection framework established under the Management 
Plan and highlighted a presumption that worked in their favor. The 
plan incorporates a process that both secures tribal governments a 
role in decision-making and provides space for the “Indian world-
view,” which the Plan drafters recognized as being different from 
the non-Indian approach.482 To that end, as noted by the CRGC in 
its Order, “the treaty rights protection process in the Management 
Plan creates [a] rebuttable presumption in favor of tribal 
governments when they identify and describe an effect on treaty 
rights in the National Scenic Area.” At various points in the opinion, 
the CRGC applauded and affirmed Wasco County’s approach, 
which “consider[ed] the Indian world view and adopted the tribes’ 
perspective of effect of treaty rights.”483 
 
The Treaty Right of Environmental Protection and the Role of Risk 
 
Having defined the geographic scope of the treaty right, the 
CRGC next addressed the substantive rights secured by the treaty. 
The tribes presented evidence of interference with their fishing site 
access as a result of increased train traffic and mounting safety 
concerns relating to tribal fishers who regularly cross train tracks. 
Such interference directly impinges on the access that is part of the 
treaty secured fishing right and would seemingly be an ample 
ground to deny the permit. The CRGC noted that it did not need a 
                                                
481 Id. 
482 As described by Kristine Olson Rogers in her article describing the 
collaborative approach underlying the Management Plan and the emphasis on 
recognizing the Indian worldview, “Western scientists and planners expect a 
checklist; Native Americans do not operate that way.” See CRGC Order, supra 
note 444, at 36-7 (quoting Native American Collaboration in Cultural Resource 
Protection in the Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area, 17 VT. L. REV. 
741 (1993)). 
483 See CRGC Order, supra note 444, at 42. 
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second reason to uphold the permit denial.484 But the tribes also 
presented environmental threats posed by increased train traffic, 
leading the CRGC to squarely address the right of habitat protection. 
It began with the correct premise that the treaty fishing right includes 
a right to fish habitat as a result of the recent Culverts decision 
(described in Section IV.B, supra), stating, “Courts have now settled 
that the Columbia River Treaty Tribes’ treaty fishing right includes 
the right to fish habitat free from human acts of despoliation.”485 It 
then substantially advanced the analysis of the environmental 
protection right by observing,  
 
This matter presents a slight twist on the culverts case that 
Judge Martinez [of the Western District of Washington] 
decided. In the culverts case, the tribes presented specific 
information about current habitat damage relating to fish-
blocking culverts. Here the tribes describe a high risk of 
future environmental degradation rather than current 
degradation. . . . Nothing in [the Culverts decision and Ninth 
Circuit decision affirming it] requires the tribes take a wait 
and see approach to protecting their treaty-reserved places 
from environmental degradation where [the] administrative 
record contains substantial evidence that a derailment and 
spill into or adjacent to the Columbia River would damage 
or destroy habitat in Zone 6, which the federal government, 
the tribes, and others have spent decades restoring.486 
 
This interpretation of the habitat protection right is path-
breaking in the sense that it applies the right prospectively against 
significant risk. Turning to the evidence developed by Wasco 
County in its record, CRGC noted that the railroad project would 
allow for five to seven more trains to pass through Zone 6, “and 
those trains [would be] longer and travel faster.”487 Citing a report 
stating that there were more than 2,500 derailments between 2008 
and 2015, that “greater tank car damage can be expected at higher 
speeds,” and referencing the derailment and explosion in Mosier in 
2016 at the proposed project site, the CRGC concluded,  
                                                
484 Id. 
485 Id. at 34; see also id., at 32 (noting that the same standard was advanced by 
the tribes and CRTIFC). 
486 Id. 
487 Id. at 43. 
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While no party can say for sure whether or when a train will 
derail and affect treaty-protected habitat, the record . . . 
supports Wasco County’s conclusion that this project 
significantly increases the likelihood that it will happen.”488 
We believe that Wasco County honored Governor Stevens’s 
promise of salmon forever when it concluded that it could 
not approve Union Pacific’s application where there was 
concrete and substantial evidence . . . in the whole record of 
a significantly increased risk of treaty fishing habitat 
degradation.489  
 
 In its totality, the CRGC’s decision relied upon substantial 
precedent to forge analysis of treaty rights in the modern era where 
the major threats to Indian treaty rights arise not from state game 
wardens arresting tribal fishers, but from the risk of catastrophic 
spills into the river, and more existentially, a heated planet that 
would send the salmon into collapse.490 While the statutory context 
giving rise to the Wasco County denial is unique, the case sends a 
clear indication that tribes are playing a historic role through 
science, advocacy, and assertion of their treaty rights in protecting 
their traditional territories and time-honored cultural practices 
against the next wave of industrial onslaught coming down the 
tracks. 
 
4.   Procedural Power: Tribal Sovereigns as Necessary and 
Indispensable Parties 
 
Another chapter of the Wasco County case unfolded in the 
federal district court of Oregon, resulting in a 2017 decision that 
turned on an aspect of tribal sovereignty. As noted earlier, while the 
Columbia River Gorge Commission’s administrative process 
described above was underway, Union Pacific brought a complaint 
in federal court seeking to stop the process. In the case called Union 
                                                
488 Id. at 44. 
489 Wasco Co. Board of Comm’rs, CRGC, at 44-45. 
490 See generally NOAA, Impacts of Climate Change on Salmon of the Pacific 
Northwest, 
https://www.nwfsc.noaa.gov/assets/4/9042_02102017_105951_Crozier.2016-
BIOP-Lit-Rev-Salmon-Climate-Effects-2015.pdf. 
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Pacific Railroad v. Runyon.491 Union Pacific argued (as it did before 
the CRGC) that the ICCTA preempted Wasco County’s ordinance. 
The federal district court dismissed the complaint based on 
procedural grounds that may have potential application in other 
instances of state or local permit denials of fossil fuel projects.  
The ruling navigated a complicated realm at the intersection 
of federal Indian law and the rules of civil procedure. In a nutshell, 
the court dismissed the case because it found the tribes to be 
“necessary and indispensable parties” (as described under Rule 19 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP)), without which the 
case could not proceed, yet the tribes could not be joined by the 
defendant railroad because of their inherent sovereign immunity. 
This interaction of tribal sovereign immunity and Rule 19 is familiar 
in the context of federal Indian law, but threads a narrow 
jurisdictional needle nonetheless. The ramifications may be pivotal 
when applied to Pacific Northwest treaty tribes that are fighting 
fossil fuel proposals, because the major potential impediment to 
local and state regulation is the preemption bar raised by federal 
transportation laws. Fossil fuel interests have long enjoyed 
dominance within the scheme of federal preemption,492 yet 
preemption is only relevant if enforced in court. The Runyan ruling 
suggests that, under Rule 19 of the FRCP,493 sovereign tribal nations 
possess a unique procedural power to prevent companies involved 
in transporting fossil fuels from invalidating permit denials by local 
and state authorities.  
 
Tribes Prevailing on Rule 19 in the District of Oregon 
 
Three tribes with treaty-reserved fishing rights in the 
Columbia River successfully leveraged their tribal sovereign 
immunity to win dismissal of Union Pacific’s federal preemption 
suit on procedural grounds.494 Though they were not parties in the 
suit,495 The Yakama, Umatilla, and Warm Springs Tribes filed a 
motion with the court to dismiss the case for failure to join them as 
necessary and indispensable parties under Rule 19, “while expressly 
                                                
491 320 F.R.D. 245 (D. Or. 2017). 
492 See, e.g., Hazardous Materials Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5127.  
493 Fed. R. Civ. P. 19, “Required Joinder of Parties.” 
494 Runyon, 320 F.R.D. 245. 
495 Id. at 248. 
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reserving their sovereign immunity.”496  
 
As the Runyon court summarized, Rule 19 creates a three-
step inquiry for determining whether a case must be dismissed for 
failure to join a party: 
1)   Is the absent party necessary to the case? 
2)   If so, is it feasible to order that the absent party be joined? 
3)   If joinder is not feasible, can the case proceed absent the 
party, or is that party so indispensable that the action 
must be dismissed in that party’s absence?497 
 
The Runyon court applied three factors to the tribes, 
emphasizing along the way the Ninth Circuit’s “broad, practical, and 
fact-specific approach” to Rule 19(a)(1)’s “Required Party” 
requirements. First, the Court determined that the treaty tribes were 
“necessary parties,” based on their vital treaty interests at stake in 
the case. The tribes demonstrated their treaty fishing rights were 
cognizable interests498 sufficiently related to the subject of the action 
(challenge to the permit denial) so that proceeding without the tribes 
would impair the court’s abilities to protect the tribes’ interests in 
treaty fishing, and further, that the present parties were not capable 
of adequately representing the tribes’ interests.499 A significant part 
of the Court’s reasoning was that “[t]he sole basis for [the county’s 
permit] denial was interference with the Treaty Tribes’ treaty-
reserved fishing rights.” As the court elaborated, “Had the Wasco 
Board made a different finding about treaty rights, it would have 
granted the permit and this lawsuit never would have been filed. . . 
. Similarly, if plaintiff’s argument regarding preemption were to 
succeed, it would affect the Treaty Tribes’ treaty-reserved fishing 
rights because it would enable plaintiff to proceed with its railway 
expansion project through land that is subject to those rights.”500  
                                                
496 Id. at 249. 
497 Id. at 250. 
498 Id. at 251 (“Such rights are much more than a financial stake or speculation. 
They are rights that are of great significance to tribes generally. . . . They are a 
function of tribal sovereignty . . . . They are so strong they survive the 
conveyance of title to underlying land . . . . the Treaty Tribes’ [possess] 
indisputable interest in their treaty-reserved fishing rights . . . .” internal citations 
omitted). 
499 Id. at 250-53. 
500 Id. (original emphasis); see also id. at 257 (“If [UPRR] were to succeed in 
this lawsuit, that success would necessarily and immediately invalidate a permit 
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Applying the second factor, the Court held that due to their 
tribal sovereign immunity, the tribes could not be compelled to join 
the action, and therefore, their joinder was not feasible.501 The 
doctrine of sovereign immunity is an ancient common law doctrine 
shielding sovereign governments from suit unless the sovereign 
consents to an action. The principle was imported into American 
jurisprudence early in this country’s history502 and has been applied 
to federal, state, and tribal governments.503 In Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez, the U.S. Supreme Court announced, “Indian tribes have 
long been recognized as possessing the common-law immunity from 
suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.”504 Courts have 
recognized tribal sovereign immunity as one of the “important rights 
and protections” of tribes’ sovereign status.505 
The third and final phase of the court’s Rule 19 analysis 
established that Tribes were “indispensable” parties.506 The court 
                                                
denial [by the Wasco County Commission] that rested solely on the finding that 
the Project would harm Treaty Tribes’ rights. The relationship between this 
lawsuit and the Treaty Tribe’s rights is direct, not incidental.”).  
501 Id. at 253.  
502 See, e.g., Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 81, at 414 (Gary Willis ed. 
1982) (asserting “It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable 
to the suit of an individual without its consent”).  
503 See, e.g., Katherine Florey, Sovereign Immunity’s Penumbras: Common Law, 
‘Accident,’ and Policy in the Development of Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 43 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 765, 773-80 (2008).  
504 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978). The immunity extends to tribal officials and 
employees as well. See, e.g., Cook v. AVI Casino Enter., Inc., 548 F.3d 718 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (“Accordingly, we hold that tribal immunity protects tribal employees 
acting in their official capacity and within the scope of their authority”); Hardin 
v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 779 F.2d 476, 479-80 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding 
that claims against various tribal officials were “barred by the Tribe’s sovereign 
immunity”). Tribal sovereign immunity is not absolute, but “limited.” See 
Kahwaiolaa v. Norton, 386 F.3d 1271, 1273 (9th Cir. 2004). Tribes can be sued 
if: (a) Congress affirmatively abrogates a tribe’s sovereign immunity, see Santa 
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (citing U.S. v. U.S. Fidelity & 
Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940)); (b) the United States brings suit 
against a tribe, see E.E.O.C. v. Peabody Western Coal Co., 400 F.3d 774, 781 
(9th Cir. 2005); or (c) a tribe expressly and unequivocally waives immunity,” 
see Santa Clara Pueblo, at 58 (citing U.S. v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976) 
(quoting U.S. v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969)). 
505 Kahwaiolaa, at 1273.   
506 Runyon, at 253. The Runyon Court further held that the “public rights” 
exception to joinder did not apply. Id. at 256-57. The public rights exception is 
unlikely to apply in fossil fuel preemption cases generally because the exception 
is available only when an action transcends private interests and seeks to 
vindicate a public right. See Kescoli v. Babbitt, 101 F.3d 1304, 1311 (9th Cir. 
1996) (citing Kickapoo Tribe of Indians of Kickapoo Reservation in Kansas v. 
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emphasized the unique factual circumstances before it, and the risk 
to the tribes’ interests should the case go forward.507 Moreover, it 
found that the plaintiff retained an adequate remedy after dismissal, 
because the Columbia River Gorge Commission provided an 
adequate alternative forum for Union Pacific to air its grievances.508  
Accordingly, the Runyon Court dismissed Union Pacific’s 
preemption suit for failure to join the Umatilla, Warm Springs, and 
Yakama Tribes as necessary and indispensable parties to the 
action.509 Though the case is now on appeal before the Ninth Circuit, 
it provides a valuable template for how tribes may assert tribal 
sovereign immunity as a procedural shield against preemption 
claims that that undermine local protection of treaty resources. 
While preemption certainly has a legitimate and complicated place 
in the federal-state allocation of power, its singular use by fossil fuel 
corporations to thwart local protection of vital resources 
perpetuates, in essence, an industrial hegemony over natural wealth 
and local landscapes—and may prove disastrous to tribes and local 
communities alike. As established in the Runyon case, Rule 19 
provides one important legal avenue for tribes to push back, exerting 
their role as necessary, indispensable, and inherent sovereigns of the 
Pacific Northwest. 
 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 
In the face of record-breaking temperatures and rising sea 
levels, tribes of the Pacific Northwest are emerging as leaders in this 
planetary crisis. While federal officials in power continue to speed 
full-throttle toward climate chaos, the region’s original sovereigns 
are taking legal action to curb dangerous fossil fuel transport and 
export. For example, the Lummi Nation prevented the release of 
ninety-six million metric tons of carbon dioxide annually when the 
tribe halted the construction of Gateway Pacific Terminal at Cherry 
                                                
Babbitt, 43 F.3d 1491, 1500 (D.C. Dist. 1995) (citing Nat’l Licorice Co. v. 
NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 362 (1940))). 
507 Id. at 254-55. “[T]he Treaty Tribes have a major concern about plaintiff’s 
project as it would increase [train] traffic . . . as much as twenty-five percent, 
leading to more spills that would damage the water in which the Tribes fish.” Id. 
at 254. 
508 Id. at 255. 
509 Runyon, 320 F.R.D. at 257.  
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Point, or Xwe’chi’eXen, in northwest Washington State.510 The 
Umatilla, Warm Springs, Yakama, and Nez Perce Tribes prevented 
an additional 16 million metric tons of carbon dioxide from being 
released into the atmosphere each year when together they stopped 
Coyote Island Terminal on the Columbia River.511 Tribes are 
deploying sophisticated legal strategies to halt the transport and 
export of fossil fuels through the Pacific Northwest, perhaps 
transforming what industry once deemed a regional gateway for 
fossil fuel transportation into a chokehold instead. 
Every ruling in favor of tribal communities against pipelines, 
coal cars, and “bomb trains” is also a victory for the planet and 
future generations of all people. The climate crisis dwarfs virtually 
all other crises Humanity faces. There is frighteningly scant time to 
change course, as the Chief of the United Nations emphasized in 
September 2018, when he issued a warning that the world must take 
action by 2020 to avert runaway climate change.512 As underscored 
by Pacific Northwest tribes in their multiple resolutions, an urgent 
climate response demands rejecting fossil fuel infrastructure 
proposals. 
Absorbing the gravity of this moment, tribes are reasserting 
leadership as the necessary and indispensable original sovereigns of 
planet Earth. From the banks of the Columbia River to the shores of 
the Salish Sea, Northwest native nations are showing that an 
effective, resilient, and inspiring environmental movement must be 
rooted in a worldview that brings human activities back into balance 
with Nature’s supreme laws. As our colleague, historian and former 
Dean Rennard Strickland, wrote, “If there is to be a post-Columbian 
future—a future for any of us—it will be an Indian future . . . a world 
in which this time, . . . the superior world view . . . might even hope 
to compete with, if not triumph over, technology.”513 Opposing 
fossil fuel transport and export proposals, —and winning key 
regulatory battles —tribes of the Pacific Northwest are creating that 
Indian future today.  
                                                
510 See supra Section IV. 
511 Id. 
512 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
513 Rennard Strickland, Tonto’s Revenge: Reflections on American Indian 
Culture and Policy, 130 (1997).  
